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Abstract: 
 
As new and intrusive ways of invading a person’s privacy become increasingly common, it is 
important that tort law has a satisfactory way of protecting a person from intrusion. The case 
of C v Holland in 2012 created such a protection mechanism, by importing the tort of 
intrusion into seclusion from the USA. Whereas the first tort of privacy introduced in New 
Zealand protects the publication of private facts, intrusion into seclusion prevents access to a 
person even if it does not result in dissemination of any personal information. This thesis 
explains why protecting the intrusion interest per se is important and uses Kirsty Hughes’ 
barriers theory, which suggests that privacy should only be protected when a desire for it is 
communicated or normatively appropriate, to help define the intrusion interest such that it is 
legally useful. It analyses the elements of an intrusion into seclusion action as suggested by 
Whata J in C v Holland, and recommends how they could be better constituted. The crux of 
the thesis though focuses on when a reasonable expectation of privacy is satisfied, a question 
that received limited attention in C v Holland. This section suggests that determining a 
reasonable expectation of privacy involves a detailed analysis of three suggested factors, 
modified from Richard Wilkins’ approach in the US search and seizure context. The thesis 
considers how the factors could be applied, both separately and holistically, to an intrusion 
into seclusion claim in New Zealand. 
 
Word Length:  
The text of this paper comprises of 49,984 words including footnotes. 
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I Introduction 
 
The 2012 High Court case of C v Holland1 introduced the privacy tort of intrusion into 
seclusion in New Zealand. In the case, C was filmed in the shower by a camera 
surreptitiously installed by Mr Holland, causing C great distress.2 
 
The purpose of the intrusion into seclusion tort is to protect the privacy intrusion interest 
which prior to the introduction of this cause of action was inadequately protected in the legal 
framework. This thesis aims to explore what the intrusion interest is, and how the tort of 
intrusion into seclusion can best be applied and developed in New Zealand. 
 
Intrusion into seclusion is likely to become increasingly relevant. Contemporary society is in 
the midst of an explosion of new technologies, particularly since the advent of the ubiquitous 
smartphone. A person’s phone now has the capability to track a person using GPS,3 and to 
capture detailed photographs and videos of people in compromising positions without the 
subject even realising. Some cameras even have technology which enables photographs to be 
taken through the clothing.4 These examples only touch the surface of a rapidly expanding 
area. 
 
Intrusion into seclusion is the second tort of privacy to become part of New Zealand’s law, 
with the publicity of private facts tort having been affirmed by a narrow 3-2 judgment in 
Hosking v Runting5 in the Court of Appeal in 2004.6 The Hosking tort, which will be 
discussed further in the ensuing chapters, protects people’s private information from being 
published and therefore is unable to protect C from the intrusion she suffers in C v Holland, 
as no publication is involved. 
 
A Thesis Structure 
 
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the tort of intrusion into seclusion. Chapter II 
analyses privacy theory in general, asking what constitutes privacy and why, and in what 
situations it should be protected. Its purpose is to understand and define the desirable scope of 
the intrusion interest. In order to do so it considers how the intrusion interest fits alongside 
                                                            
1 C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672. 
2 At [1]. 
3
 “Smartphones a woman’s worst enemy as jealous ex-partners use GPS tracking” 29 June 2015 Television 
New Zealand <www.tvnz.co.nz>. 
4 Casey Chan “Pervert Alert: This Camera Can See Through Clothes” 21 April 2011 Gizmodo 
<www.gizmodo.com>.   
5 Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA).   
6 Hosking concerns photographs of a celebrity couple’s children in a busy Newmarket street that are taken 
without their knowledge, and intended to be published in a magazine – see [9]-[11]. The Court of Appeal 
determines, at [246], that there is a free-standing tort to protect the publicity of private facts, only that in this 
case the facts were not sufficient to satisfy the tort – see [260]-[261]. 
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the protection of the dissemination of personal information, that is how they are delineated 
from each other and how they overlap. This in turn informs what the intrusion into seclusion 
tort should protect. The privacy theories considered in this chapter, particularly the Kirsty 
Hughes theory of privacy,7 will be highly relevant when it comes to the legal analysis of 
when a reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed. 
 
Chapter III analyses legislation, regulatory bodies and common law other than intrusion into 
seclusion, which to some degree protect the intrusion interest defined in chapter II. It 
demonstrates that the remedies are generally inadequate, and the requirements often too 
difficult to satisfy. Chapter III therefore reveals the gaps in the protection of the intrusion 
interest that would exist without the existence of the intrusion into seclusion tort. 
 
Chapter IV examines and explains the elements of the intrusion into seclusion action as they 
are described in C v Holland. Its purpose is to look at how the tort currently protects the 
intrusion interest, and it identifies the heart of the tort as the infringement of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. It briefly analyses the public interest defence which, due to the word 
limit, is not subsequently discussed in any detail. The chapter also considers whether the 
elements could be constituted better, and if so, how.  
 
Chapter V justifies the use of the sources of law most predominant in analysing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in chapter VI. Chapter VI gets to the crux of the thesis, considering 
how to determine when a reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed. It suggests that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy should be evaluated using a modified version of three 
factors set up by Richard G Wilkins.8 The Wilkins factors are place, intrusiveness and object, 
which chapter VI modifies to place, intrusiveness, and nature of activity or information. The 
chapter details how each factor can be applied to the question of when there is an 
infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy, including using Hughes’ privacy theory 
discussed in chapter II to aid the analysis.  
 
Chapter VII completes the substantive work of the thesis by considering whether a separate 
element of high offensiveness is needed, given the rigour with which one can determine 
whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7 Kirsty Hughes “A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and its Implications for Privacy Law” (2012) 75(5) 
MLR 806. 
8 Richard G Wilkins “Defining the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: An Emerging Tripartite Analysis” 
(1987) 40 Vand L Rev 1077. 
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II The Nature of the Intrusion Interest   
 
A Introduction 
 
Privacy theory informs and underpins the application of legal principles. Understanding the 
underlying theory strengthens the legal analysis; they are inextricably linked. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to understand the intrusion interest and how it fits into privacy as a 
whole. It articulates what privacy is and, using privacy theories, demonstrates when and why 
it should be protected – both generally and with respect to the interests in personal 
information and intrusion.  
 
The premise on which this chapter is based is that privacy theory is useful when it asks both 
descriptive and normative questions. It can provide an invaluable tool for determining the 
scope of the intrusion into seclusion action and a framework for how the courts might 
consider whether elements of the tort of intrusion into seclusion are satisfied.  
 
The theoretical definition of the intrusion interest put forward in this chapter is a broad one, 
but it contains important limits that prevent it from being uncontrollably wide. Thus although 
the definition focuses on a person’s subjective privacy desires, it also requires that intrusion 
is only invoked when privacy should be objectively respected, thereby ensuring that the 
intrusion interest is not construed too widely. In essence, the application of the elements of an 
intrusion into seclusion claim will have to reflect the true nature of the theoretical intrusion 
interest. The main theory that achieves this is Kirsty Hughes’ barriers hypothesis,9 which will 
be discussed shortly.  
 
B Why Privacy is Important 
 
Before attempting to determine the best definition of the intrusion interest, it is important to 
consider why privacy is important as a value in its own right rather than simply as a means of 
achieving other social ends. In order to do so, its relationship with other values must also be 
understood. 
 
1 Is privacy the right to be let alone? 
 
Privacy is often defined in an overly broad way. One such conception of privacy is what 
Judge Cooley describes as the “right to be let alone”,10 a description which Warren and 
Brandeis also use as their overarching reason as to why, for example, written “thoughts, 
                                                            
9 Hughes, above n 7.  
10 Thomas M. Cooley The Law of Torts (2nd ed,1888) at 29. 
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sentiments and emotions” should be protected.11 Even Tipping J has described privacy as the 
right to have people leave you alone.12  
 
Although this definition has some intuitive appeal, it has its limitations. These commentators 
not only describe a state that people may choose to be in for reasons other than privacy, they 
state a viewpoint that has come to be seen as “an assertion of liberty [rather than] privacy”.13 
Indeed the conflation of privacy and liberty is a common theme; in the 1973 Supreme Court 
decision of Roe v Wade the Court considers the right of privacy as “broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”.14 Such conflation 
gives credence to the problematic idea that privacy only exists when it is in conjunction with 
other interests, rather than being an interest per se. As soon as privacy is tacked on to, or seen 
as merely a stepping stone towards another value, it loses potency. It also strips it of much of 
its distinctive meaning because the definition covers things which are not generally regarded 
as private, such as compelling people to “pay their taxes or go into the army”.15 In cases of 
decisional interference such as Roe v Wade the primary concern is about autonomy and 
liberty, not privacy. 
 
Ruth Gavison is right to say, in accordance with much of the modern privacy literature, that a 
reductionist view in which privacy merely derives from other values, not only diminishes 
privacy, but does not stand up to scrutiny.16 Judith Wagner DeCew agrees, considering it 
inaccurate to say that one can “explain each right in the cluster of privacy rights without ever 
mentioning the right to privacy”.17 
 
2 Privacy and its relationship with other values  
 
Although privacy should not be conflated with, or merely attached to, other values such as 
liberty, this is not to say that other interests are not part of what makes privacy important. 
Privacy does not exist in a vacuum and hence Gavison explains that the reasons people might 
want to protect their privacy can include the furtherance of universal concerns such as 
“liberty, autonomy, selfhood, and human relations”.18 Privacy in general allows the values of 
autonomy, dignity and personhood to flourish. The link between privacy and self-identity is 
made clear by Irwin Altman’s apt quote – 
                                                            
11 Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harvard Law Rev 193 at 205. 
12 Hosking, above n 5, at [238]. 
13 Hilary Delany and Eoin Carolan The Right to Privacy: A Doctrinal and Comparative Analysis (Thomson 
Round Hall, Dublin 2008) at 8 as cited in Chris DL Hunt “Conceptualizing Privacy and Elucidating its 
Importance: Foundational Considerations for the Development of Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort” (2012) 37 
Queen’s LJ 167 at 181. 
14 Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973) at 153. 
15 Ruth Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of the Law” (1980) 89(3) Yale LJ 421 at 438. 
16 At 424. 
17 Judith Wagner DeCew “The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics” (1986) 5(2) Law & Phil 145 at 149. 
18 Gavison, above n 15, at 422-424. 
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“If I can control what is me and what is not me, [then] I can define what is me and not 
me, and if I can observe the limits and scope of my control, then I have taken major 
steps toward understanding and defining what I am. Thus, privacy mechanisms serve to 
help define me”.19 
 
The protection of personal information and intrusion (which will be discussed later in the 
chapter) are both essential for advancing these accepted values. Such protection not only 
guards against individual mental pain and distress, but contributes positively to society itself 
since “privacy harms affect the nature of society and impede individual activities that 
contribute to the greater social good”.20  
 
However, privacy is an interest in itself, irrespective of whether the loss of it causes a 
detrimental impact on another value or not. It is both an end in itself and an instrument in 
achieving other social ends. Essentially this means that privacy is desirable not just because it 
helps achieve other social objectives such as furthering liberty and autonomy, but also 
because there is something intrinsic about the privacy interest which makes it worth 
protecting. Nicole Moreham expresses this by saying that whilst the compensation for harm 
caused by privacy breaches is welcome, this does not mean the absence of harm supports not 
protecting privacy breaches.21 There is, she contends, something beyond emotional, physical 
and psychological damage to the person when a privacy breach occurs, meaning that privacy 
should never be automatically downgraded in the balance against freedom of expression or 
the public good.22 Stanley Benn suggests privacy can be seen as grounded in the principle of 
“respect for persons”,23 and Edward Bloustein contends that all invasions of privacy “injur[e] 
… our dignity as individuals”.24 This is similar to Moreham’s point, that even when no 
obvious direct harm is caused, such as watching someone in secret and never being 
discovered, the general impertinence, insensitivity and lack of consideration are what are 
truly indicative of a loss of privacy. 
 
C Defining the Intrusion Interest 
 
The ultimate goal of this section is to define the intrusion interest in order to enable an 
understanding of what the intrusion into seclusion tort is designed to protect. Such a 
definition will be vital to the remaining chapters, as it will help elucidate both when intrusion 
is legally protected, and when it should be protected.  
                                                            
19 Irwin Altman The Environment and Social Behaviour: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory, Crowding 
(Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Monterey, California, 1975) at 50. 
20 Daniel J Solove “A Taxonomy of Privacy” (2006) 154(3) U Pa L Rev 477 at 488. 
21 Nicole Moreham “Privacy in the Common Law” (2005) 121 LQR 628 at 635. 
22 At 634-636. 
23 S Benn “Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons” in J Pennock and J Chapman (eds) Privacy NOMOS XIII 
(Atherton Press, New York, 1971) 1 at 8.   
24 Edward J Bloustein “Privacy as an aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser” (1964) 39 NYU L 
Rev 962 at 1003. 
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Some commentators, such as Raymond Wacks, suggest that intrusion has no significant place 
in our understanding of privacy. Wacks argues that the “protection against the misuse of 
personal … information”25 is at the core of privacy, and contends that the “principal pursuit” 
of electronic surveillance “is personal information”.26 The protection of personal information 
is undoubtedly important; a person’s ability to withhold information about him or herself, lest 
it be used for the opprobrium of the general populace, should be recognised. Nevertheless, 
privacy also includes the intrusion interest.  
 
The intrusion interest is essentially about recognising the intrinsic value of a person’s private 
space; a space which is broad enough to encompass both physical and psychological 
attributes,27 as will be discussed later in the chapter. The intrusion interest preserves the 
private space by protecting against both physical access and access to personal information. It 
does so by stopping such activities as electronic surveillance or general prying into personal 
items.  
 
1 Theories of Privacy   
 
Privacy theorists often build on the work of others in the area in order to find new and 
improved ways of defining privacy. This thesis follows the same approach, critiquing the 
theories of others and using the best ones to create the most legally useful definition. As will 
become apparent, previous definitions tend to suffer from being too abstract, and are 
therefore of limited use in the legal context. Whilst a focus on the person’s subjectivity is 
necessary and important, this does not easily assist legal tests which require a certain degree 
of realism and objectivity. Consequently, a privacy theory that is grounded in the actual 
experience of privacy, and which provides the best transition from theory to the legal context, 
is favoured. 
 
(a) Gavison, Moreham and Hunt 
 
The most useful abstract privacy theories all define privacy from the point of view of access. 
For example, Gavison’s definition describes perfect privacy as no-one having any 
information about X, no-one paying any attention to X, and no-one having physical access to 
X.28 This means that any time anyone gains information about someone, pays him or her any 
attention, or has physical access to him or her, some privacy is lost. However, only 
sometimes is that loss of privacy undesirable. There is only some information that 
subjectively and objectively should be protected as private, just as there is only some 
                                                            
25 Raymond Wacks Privacy and Media Freedom (1st ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 22. 
26 At 190. 
27 David Libardoni “Prisoners of Fame: How an Expanded Use of Intrusion Upon Psychological Seclusion Can 
Protect the Privacy of Former Public Figures” (2013) 54(3) BC L Rev 1455 at 1464. 
28 Gavison, above n 15, at 428. 
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attention that should be prevented, and only some physical access that should be stopped. 
Gavison’s theory provides no indication of when privacy is subjectively or objectively 
desired.  
 
Moreham takes Gavison’s definition a step further by proposing a theory of privacy around 
the idea of desired inaccess, explaining that “a person will be in a state of privacy if he or she 
is only seen, heard, touched or found out about if, and to the extent that, he or she wants to be 
seen, heard, touched or found out about”.29 Essentially she considers that being in a state 
inaccessible to others only puts a person in a state of privacy if he or she desired the 
inaccessibility. She uses an example of someone being stranded on a desert island as 
experiencing solitude, isolation and loneliness, but not necessarily experiencing privacy.30 
Whilst the stranded person almost inevitably wishes to be saved from his or her fate by 
contact with other people, Gavison would say that person was in a state tantamount to perfect 
privacy, only that such a state was not desirable for that person.31 Moreham, however, views 
privacy as something which cannot be undesirable. As soon as the lack of access is not 
desirable, the circumstances are not considered to be private.  
 
Hunt narrows the definition even further in what he calls the “refined subjective approach”.32 
His criticism of Moreham is that people can experience desired inaccess which is not truly 
related to privacy, for example someone on public transport seeking solitude purely so as not 
to inflict halitosis on the other passengers.33 Another example might be a nudist seeking 
solitude only because of his or her considerate nature. Hunt’s criticism is similar to the 
criticism as to why defining privacy as the right to be let alone is a weak definition; it does 
not get to the essence of privacy. The difficulty though is that it is still a desire for privacy; it 
is just a secondary desire. In other words it is a desire based on the assumption that other 
people would not want to be near a nudist or someone with bad breath, and therefore in order 
not to be thought of badly the nudist or halitosis ridden person seeks solitude.  
 
Hunt, in refining Moreham’s definition, appears to require that the individual feel acutely 
sensitive about the activity or information, and considers it private for that reason.34 This 
requirement of acute sensitivity ensures that the desire for inaccess is specifically related to a 
primary, direct, individualist desire for privacy. However, it could be criticised for the 
vagueness of the term acute sensitivity which does not impart an obvious threshold. The 
application of acute sensitivity applies to both personal information and physical access; one 
                                                            
29 Moreham, above n 21, at 636. 
30 At 637. 
31 Gavison, above n 15, at 428. 
32 Hunt, above n 13, at 199. 
33 At 195. 
34 At 199. 
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can be acutely sensitive about being intruded upon in a particular place as much as by having 
private information revealed about oneself. 
 
Hunt and Moreham’s theories both posit privacy interests as unashamedly subjective, 
although both realise that in a legal context this must be tempered by objectivity. Hunt states 
that “any legal test will have to have an objective component”35 and Moreham recognises that 
if her subjective definition “were to be transplanted, unmodified, into the legal context [it] 
would protect a claimant against any unwanted physical or informational access”36 which is 
“intolerably broad”.37  
 
The problem with their approach is that describing privacy purely from a subjective 
perspective is not only legally less useful, it is also not reflective of what privacy means at a 
societal level. In society, every person’s desire for privacy must be mediated by his or her 
necessary interactions with others. Consequently, it is not enough to simply desire privacy. 
Society’s approach to privacy should therefore not be encapsulated by a theory that ignores 
social norms, as that is reflective of an unrealistic rather than practical view of society. 
Hunt’s theory transposed directly into society would effectively assume that an alleged 
perpetrator know the acute sensitivities of the person intruded upon, regardless of how 
unpredictable they might be. There is little difference between privacy at a legal level and at a 
societal level and consequently privacy theory must sit closer to the legal application than it 
does in Hunt and Moreham’s conception. Objectivity will be forthcoming within the legal 
tests of the torts’ elements; but there should still be a modicum of objectivity at the 
theoretical level.  
 
If a person feels acutely sensitive about the privacy of something that general society would 
consider innocuous, then there is no social norm to protect that something unless the person 
has communicated this acute sensitivity. Society therefore does not protect it. If a person feels 
acutely sensitive about something because of religious beliefs, and it is something most 
people who share those religious beliefs feel acutely sensitive about, then there can surely 
only be a social norm involved if the intruder knows or ought to know about that person’s 
religious convictions. If in the first example the acute sensitivity has not been communicated, 
or in the second example there is no indication that the person follows that religion, then to 
describe this as a theoretical loss of privacy would be conceptually unsound because it 
ignores the social context of when privacy does and does not exist. It would divorce theory 
from reality, suggesting that the only way to avoid causing a loss of privacy to someone 
would be to consider every potential trivial privacy incursion, such as an everyday social 
interaction, as to whether the individual in question would be acutely sensitive about it.  
                                                            
35 At 200. 
36 Moreham, above n 21, at 643. 
37 At 644. 
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In essence, the best privacy theories will be tied in with normative considerations. They will 
demonstrate when privacy should be respected by recognising that the alleged perpetrator 
should have had the claimant’s subjective desires communicated to him or her, or 
alternatively he or she ought to have known that those desires were likely because they were 
objectively reasonable. Privacy theory that considers when privacy should be respected or is 
potentially breached will include a knowledge requirement that a subjective desire for privacy 
was communicated or that the action may invoke privacy concerns. Such an approach to 
privacy theory will also be legally useful when it comes to applying the legal test of 
reasonable expectation of privacy which brings in the requisite objectivity.  
 
(b) Hughes barriers 
 
The best concept to use to create a smooth transition between privacy theory and its legal 
application is Kirsty Hughes’ theory of physical, behavioural and normative barriers.38 
Hughes is attracted to theories, such as Moreham’s desired inaccess theory, which are 
inherently subjective. She, however, “take[s] this further” by suggesting how “a desire for 
privacy is manifested”.39 This is because it is important to explore “how privacy is 
experienced and how privacy is achieved in a social setting”.40 Hughes’ article is therefore 
predicated upon the social reality of what privacy is and should be, rather than abstract 
theory. 
 
Hughes’ analysis that privacy is concerned with the preservation of barriers,41 building on 
Altman’s social interaction theory,42 suggests that when privacy is desired it should be 
communicated or socially understood. In other words a person whose hair is ruffled by 
someone else cannot claim any loss of privacy to be morally objectionable against the other 
person unless that person has disrespected any barriers. The three types of barriers discussed 
are: physical, behavioural and normative. “Physical barriers include things such as walls, 
doors, hedges, lockers and safes”.43 In the hair ruffling example this might be wearing a hat 
or a headscarf. Behavioural barriers are verbal or non-verbal communication that tell others 
they do not wish to be accessed.44 Therefore stating “please do not touch my hair” or putting 
a hand up to indicate to someone to back off would be barriers to prevent hair ruffling. A 
normative barrier is a societal expectation that a person does not want his or her privacy 
invaded, based on “social practices and codified rules” that derive from “the normal rules of 
social interaction”.45 For example social convention suggests that a person having a shower 
                                                            
38 Hughes, above n 7, at 809. 
39 At 810. 
40 At 810. 
41 At 807-815. 
42 Altman, above n 19, at 32-42. 
43 Hughes, above n 7, at 812. 
44 At 812. 
45 At 812. 
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wants privacy while he or she does so. Additionally, although the non-exposure of hair is not 
necessarily seen as a social rule, if it is a Muslim woman, not only is the hijab a physical 
barrier but it communicates the normative rule that Muslim women consider their hair as an 
alluring adornment which should not be kept naked before others.46 
 
Hughes argues convincingly that “the right to privacy should be understood as a right to 
respect for [physical, communication and normative] barriers”.47 Where Hunt and Moreham’s 
theories could be criticised for ignoring social norms, Hughes’ barriers approach provides an 
excellent link between the theory of privacy and its legal application. This is because the 
Hughes barriers postulate when privacy should be respected, something that Moreham fails to 
do and which Hunt attempts unconvincingly at best. Hunt’s requirement that “the particular 
individual [feel] acutely sensitive about [the] activity/information”48 suggests that a desire for 
privacy is not automatically protected, having instead to pass a slightly more stringent 
subjective test of acute sensitivity. The criticism that the alleged perpetrator may not know of 
a person’s acute sensitivities can be assuaged if there is a knowledge requirement: namely a 
physical barrier for the purposes of achieving privacy, a behavioural barrier in which the 
desired inaccess is communicated, or a social norm that ought to have been considered.  
 
The Hughes barriers are legally useful because they not only provide a theory about when 
privacy is lost, they also provide a tool to assist the determination of the legal question as to 
when privacy is breached such that a claim can be made out. The Hughes barriers can provide 
some assistance to the question of when a reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed, and 
therefore shows how Hughes’ theory can easily be transposed into the legal context.  
 
2 Personal information 
 
Having set out the best way of approaching privacy in general, it is possible to break privacy 
theory down into its separate interests of personal information and intrusion. In order to 
define the intrusion interest, one must first consider how the interest in personal information, 
on a theoretical level, is conceived. Defining personal information helps explain where 
personal information ends and intrusion begins, and where they overlap. The purpose of this 
section is therefore to determine a theoretical definition of personal information that is 
grounded in the actual experience of privacy rather than abstract theory. It will seek to cover 
both what personal information is and when it should be protected.  
 
 
 
                                                            
46 Hunt, above n 13, at 199. 
47 At 810. 
48 Hunt, above n 13, at 199. 
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(a) How the interest in personal information is relevant to both privacy torts 
 
The theoretical definition of the personal information interest will be important both for 
protecting the dissemination of personal information in the Hosking tort, and access to 
personal information in intrusion into seclusion. In other words, protecting personal 
information is part of both the Hosking tort and intrusion into seclusion. The interest in 
personal information is part of the Hosking tort because this protects personal information 
from being disseminated. However, before it is disseminated the Hosking tort provides no 
protection. Up until that point it is only protected by the intrusion interest which prevents 
access to a person and access to his or her information. Consequently, information about a 
person should be considered as part of the intrusion interest until it is disseminated. 
 
C v Holland demonstrates why the protection of personal information is sometimes part of 
the Hosking approach, and sometimes part of the intrusion interest. This is because secretly 
taking a video of someone in the shower is not just an intrusion into a person’s dignity or 
private space; it also obtains information about a person’s naked body. This personal 
information cannot, however, be protected by the Hosking tort because it requires the 
information to be disseminated; it can only be protected by the intrusion interest. Defining on 
a theoretical level what information is personal and should be protected therefore relates to 
both interests.  
 
This somewhat subtle point has been overlooked by the likes of Gavison who consider 
“[i]nformation [k]nown [a]bout an [i]ndividual”49 as including access to this personal 
information, and “[p]hysical [a]ccess to an [i]ndividual”50 not incorporating such access.  
 
(b) What constitutes personal information  
 
Ascertaining what constitutes personal information requires first addressing whether a fact is 
private because it is objectively deemed to be so, or because of a subjective decision.  
 
Wacks and Moreham have opposing views of what constitutes personal information, with the 
former considering it as objective and the latter as subjective. Wacks sees personal 
information as that “which it would be reasonable to expect” a person “to regard as intimate 
or sensitive”.51 His view of personal information is that it should be defined “by reference to 
some objective criterion”52 or adjudged to belong to a “putative category”.53 This is because 
                                                            
49 Gavison, above n 15, at 429. 
50 At 433. 
51 Wacks, above n 25, at 125. He also states that “a subjective test would clearly be unacceptable”. 
52 At 125 
53 Raymond Wacks Personal Information, Privacy and the Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989) at 25. 
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even though a person may be willing to tell his best friend of his infidelity, and be unwilling 
for it to be published in a newspaper, “the information remains personal” in both situations.54  
 
Moreham dislikes this approach, however, because it fails to distinguish between trivial and 
serious matters in the same category, and rests on the “arbitrary (and often fraught) question 
of whether information falls into one category or another”.55 It also fails to recognise that 
“what is private to one person is not necessarily private to another”.56 Moreham therefore 
sees it as necessary to adopt a “broad, subjective approach” in which “unwanted access to any 
information about a person” constitutes personal information.57 Although Moreham makes 
the same mistake as Gavison in including access to personal information within the 
informational privacy interest rather than intrusion, the important point is that in her view 
what is a private fact is purely subjective. Westin agrees, stating that: “privacy is the claim of 
[individuals] to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about 
them is communicated to others”.58 Hunt provides an equally subjective approach, but limits 
it to personal information that a person feels acutely sensitive about.59 
 
Wacks’ approach should not be favoured because it is almost exclusively objective and 
therefore fails to appreciate the subjective nature of privacy. It too quickly eliminates various 
potentially private facts, which although no social norm or objective measure would initially 
consider personal, can take on the characteristics of private facts in certain situations. It can 
also render something private that a person does not desire to be so, simply because it fits into 
one of his categories. For example Wacks might consider the fact that a campaigner for gay 
rights is openly homosexual as a private fact because it fits into the “sexuality” category, 
without consideration of the context. Moreham on the other hand would see that this person’s 
sexuality does not fit the privacy interest of personal information because such information is 
widely available, and because the homosexual gay rights campaigner does not desire for it to 
be kept private. 60             
 
(c) When should personal information be protected?  
 
It is not enough to simply define what constitutes personal information, as it is only some 
personal information that will be protected by law. This section determines a theoretical 
concept of when personal information should be protected, based on how privacy is actually 
experienced.  
 
                                                            
54 At 23. 
55 Moreham, above n 21, at 642. 
56 At 641. 
57 At 641. 
58 Alan F Westin Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum, New York, 1967) at 7. 
59 As discussed above in II C 1 (a) at 7. 
60 Moreham, above n 21, at 645. 
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Gavison considers that all personal information is part of the theoretical concept of privacy.61 
However, she contends that some scholars have rejected this, providing the example of Tom 
Gerety who believes that personal information should only be protected where it relates to 
intimacy, identity and autonomy.62 Gavison, however, fails to fully appreciate that Gerety is 
searching for a normative definition as to when, legally, personal information should be 
protected, rather than a philosophical one. Gerety is eager to move from a conception of 
privacy as a “metaphysical entity” to an “ethical and legal boundary that we prescribe for 
others and ourselves”.63 His focus is on what the law should protect in terms of privacy, 
rather than what privacy is on a descriptive level. Gavison uses her definition of what privacy 
is as a “methodological starting point”64 for her more specific view as to which aspects of 
personal information are desirable for protection, whilst Gerety jumps straight to this 
normative question. Therefore both scholars want to see personal information protected by 
law, but neither wants to protect all information about a person.  
 
Where Gerety’s “ethical and legal boundary” should be drawn is the essence of this section.                                                                                                                             
Moreham postulates that translating her theoretical definition into the legal context requires 
tempering each person’s subjective view with an objective check.65 This objective check 
comes in the form of the first element of the Hosking tort which requires “the existence of 
facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy”.66 In this scenario any 
fact which is private, based on the theoretical definition of personal information as subjective, 
is assessed through an objective lens of reasonableness. 
 
In the same way that Hunt’s general theory of privacy (desired inaccess for the reason of 
acute sensitivity) 67 is considered too abstractly subjective to create a smooth transition from 
theory to legal, a theoretical definition of the personal information interest should also not 
simply be subjective, as “in the legal context, this simply includes too much”.68 A purely 
subjective definition would not be founded upon how privacy is actually experienced. As 
noted above, the power of the Hughes barriers is that they can improve Hunt and Moreham’s 
theoretical definition to create a mixed subjective/objective approach that is based on the 
actual privacy experience,69 and will also ultimately prove relevant to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
 
                                                            
61 At 429. 
62 Tom Gerety “Redefining Privacy” (1977) 12(2) Harv CR-CL L Rev 233 at 281-295. 
63 At 245. 
64 Gavison, above n 15, at 428. 
65 At 643. 
66 Hosking, above n 5, at [117]. 
67 Discussed above in II C 1 (a) at 7. 
68 Gerety, above n 62, at 262. 
69 Hughes, above n 7, at 807-815. 
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The Hughes barriers recognise the social reality that when a person has information that he or 
she considers private and therefore does not want to be disseminated, it is not enough to 
simply have this thought. The fact that it is considered personal must be communicated to 
others, or otherwise must be normatively recognised as personal. The communication aspect 
ensures the enquiry retains a subjective focus, underlining people’s autonomy and liberty to 
decide what about themselves should be public or private, but still allowing societal norms to 
prevent what constitutes personal information from being intolerably broad. They also enable 
the important question of what the alleged perpetrator knows or ought to know about whether 
the information is personal. In this way the Hughes barriers help provide a more relevant 
theoretical definition of personal information, which is consequently more legally useful.  
 
(d) Conclusion 
 
Consistent with Hughes’ approach, the personal information interest can be defined as 
information which a person desires to be kept private, and is communicated to be so by a 
physical barrier (such as locking the information in a safe), by actual verbal or non-verbal 
communication (such as stating that certain information is private, or by whispering to 
prevent anyone in earshot from hearing), or which even if it has not been communicated can 
be understood as private by virtue of social norms.  
 
This philosophical understanding can then help inform the application of a legal test (such as 
reasonable expectation of privacy) which could limit this further to determine normatively 
and holistically whether the information is sufficiently private, and whether the person’s 
acute sensitivity towards the information objectively breaches a particular threshold of non-
triviality.70  
 
3 Intrusion 
 
Access to a person as represented by an intrusion has only emerged as worthy of specific 
legal protection very recently in the Anglo-Commonwealth.71 In contrast, preventing the 
dissemination of personal information has historically been considered as fundamental to 
privacy and it has therefore undergone extensive analysis. In spite of this, it is essential that 
the conception of privacy cover both the dissemination of personal information and the 
intrusion interest. The intrusion interest protects universal values like autonomy and self-
identity, and promotes dignity, consideration and respect. It is imperative to have a suitable 
theoretical definition of the intrusion interest. Again it should be grounded in the actual 
experience of privacy rather than abstract theory. 
                                                            
70 The reasonable expectation of privacy test is discussed in detail in Chapter VI. 
71 Although Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 demonstrates that it is not a legal 
principle in its own right in the United Kingdom, in the USA such protection has been common for over fifty 
years. 
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(a) What is inherently bad about an intrusion? 
 
Definitions of intrusion that focus almost exclusively on the information interest, and 
consider access to a person only in terms of what communicable information is obtained, 
really undervalue and “[fail to] appreciate the gravity of the privacy violation itself”.72 If one 
considers the situation in C v Holland, setting up a video recorder to film a flatmate in the 
shower is clearly something that should be protected for reasons beyond obtaining 
information about the flatmate’s naked form. Such an intrusion is a privacy breach that 
intrinsically attacks the dignity of the person regardless of the limited amount of information 
that is revealed. Hence although access to information is protected by the intrusion interest 
before it is disseminated, the focus is not just on whether the information is personal but also 
the circumstances surrounding the intrusion.  
 
Hunt and Moreham both describe how someone spying on an ex-lover getting undressed 
would communicate a negligible amount of new information, and therefore if privacy were 
considered as simply the protection of information, there would be no privacy violation.73 
However, it seems intuitively obvious that watching someone getting undressed without 
consent, particularly perhaps by a scorned ex-lover, would be a serious violation of a person’s 
privacy. A person’s naked body is not for anyone to look at, even if that person has seen it 
many times before, unless the person has given permission to be watched. People walk 
around wearing clothes in public life and only tend to get undressed in inherently private 
places in front of lovers, family or friends. As soon as someone trains a telescope on the 
bedroom window or installs a video camera, the privacy breach must surely be a significant 
one. It is a clear breach of Hughes’ physical and normative barriers. 
 
Another situation for which it is more important to protect the intrusion interest generally 
than it is to protect access to information is the solitude and secrecy sought by an intimate 
interaction between two people. Intimacy is an actual experience of privacy that advances 
social interactions because it is a private state in which conversations are more frank and 
more illuminating of the inner self than any interaction between others not so intimately 
acquainted.74 When people are intimate with others, they tend to reveal more of themselves 
than in any other state “though the expression is inevitably limited and incomplete”.75 Two 
people in a state of intimacy do not want their intimate interaction to be broken by anyone 
intruding regardless of whether such an intrusion obtains information. Additionally, if they do 
suffer the unfortunate event of someone intruding and obtaining personal information, they 
will not want such details to be distributed to a wider audience. Information is not revealed to 
                                                            
72 Moreham, above n 21, at 650-651. 
73 Moreham, above n 21, at 650; Hunt, above n 13, at 184. 
74 Westin, above n 58, at 31. 
75 Janna Malamud Smith Private Matters: In Defense of the Personal Life (Addison Wesley, Reading, 
Massachusetts, 1997) at 49. 
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outsiders as long as no-one is interrupting or paying attention to the interaction, therefore 
protecting the intrusion interest can be one effective means of also protecting the 
informational interest.  
 
However, one must avoid focussing on the intrusion interest as simply a means of protecting 
the control and dissemination of information. The intrusion interest is important even if it 
results in no information being put at risk of exposure. For example a man who is both blind 
and deaf wandering unannounced into a woman’s house where she is having an intimate 
conversation with her father, is still committing a potential intrusion regardless of the fact 
that there may be no information he can see or hear. The heightened awareness of the 
possibility of intrusion, or the intrusion itself, will potentially prevent the participants being 
quite so frank in their conversation compared with the situation in which they have no 
concern over potential privacy loss. This is one reason why a conversation between friends at 
a restaurant can sometimes be protected from intrusion, because in a public place people “still 
need space from others in order to converse freely”.76 The friends are deprived of “engag[ing] 
in a particular type of privacy experience, namely intimacy”.77  
 
Essentially, not only does access to a person attack his or her dignity, it can inhibit the future 
behaviour of a person who may worry that every move or comment could be under 
surveillance, causing self-censorship. The same is even true of a threat or known risk of 
access. Access to a person also, in a negative way, enhances “the power of social norms, 
which work more effectively when people are being observed by others in the community”.78 
Social norms tend to control a person’s behaviour rather than provide the opportunity to act 
in an autonomous way. As Solove points out, the possibility of surveillance is one of the most 
damaging forms of observation. If a person is aware that at any time he or she is under 
surveillance then he or she will likely abide by societal conventions at all times, to avoid the 
possibility of criticism.79  
 
(b) Access to a person 
 
Given its centrality to the intrusion inquiry, it is necessary, in this final section, to consider in 
more depth what is meant by “access to a person”. Access to a person can be quite obvious in 
some circumstances, for example breaching the physical barrier of a locked door, but this will 
not always be the case. Essentially access to a person involves an invasion of someone’s 
person (or things closely associated with the person) by means of the senses, technological 
                                                            
76 Solove, above n 20, at 553. 
77 Hughes, above n 7, at 817. 
78 Solove, above n 20, at 493. 
79 At 494-495. 
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devices that enable the use of the senses, or physical proximity.80 This includes access to a 
person’s information. 
 
Considering the advantage of having a theoretical definition that translates smoothly into the 
legal context, the intrusion interest should also be defined with both subjective and objective 
components. It is therefore not enough for people to desire that they not be accessed, they 
also objectively should not be intruded upon. The Hughes barriers are, once again, an 
excellent way of achieving this normativity. If the desire to be free from intrusion has been 
indicated by a physical barrier such as erecting a fence, a behavioural barrier of verbal or 
non-verbal communication, or a normative barrier of societal expectation that an intrusion 
should not occur, then the desirable scope of the intrusion action will be satisfied. As was 
pointed out in more detail in the personal information section above, the communication 
aspect of the physical and behavioural barriers takes a subjective desire and makes it 
objectively worthy of respect. 
 
It should also be remembered that although breaches of a physical barrier will generally 
invoke the intrusion interest, not all intrusions or access to a person will breach a physical 
barrier. As the above definition notes, it can simply involve the senses or a technological 
device to aid the senses. For example, a photograph of someone in a public place who is 
unable to impose a physical barrier can still invoke the intrusion interest, as can someone 
interrupting a conversation at a restaurant in the example detailed above. Scenarios like these 
should be considered based on “the role that privacy plays in social interaction”, “the impact 
[it has] on individuals experiencing the various states of privacy” and “the impact [the] 
technology has upon an individual’s opportunity to employ physical or behavioural 
barriers”.81   
 
One example of an individual experiencing a state of privacy, which rarely imposes a 
physical barrier, is Westin’s idea of the state of reserve which helps elucidate what is 
appropriate in social interactions. The concept of reserve is such that it recognises perfect 
privacy does not exist and is predicated upon “the willing discretion of [others]”.82 It is a 
concept that is clear about the fact that people live in society and that this means they are 
required to come into contact with other people in their daily life. Reserve in the intrusion 
context minimises how unavoidable contact with others affects individuals’ privacy. Reserve 
“is the creation of a psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion”83 such as by using 
headphones to block out other passengers on public transport. This is an example of obtaining 
an essence of solitude in a busy place. This example also provides some sort of explanation 
as to why, normatively, intrusions into public places are much harder to protect. In a public 
                                                            
80 Moreham, above n 21, at 639-641. 
81 Hughes, above n 7, at [814]. 
82 Westin, above n 58 at 32. 
83 At 32. 
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place like a bus there can be no complete physical seclusion, physical access is almost 
inevitable. As much as a person may avoid contact by wearing headphones, he or she should 
not be perturbed by an unavoidable intrusion such as being pushed past by people attempting 
to get to their seat, or being tapped on the shoulder to receive important information. These 
intrusions are expected and an inescapable part of the state of reserve.  
 
A non-verbal behavioural barrier against unwanted intrusion, such as wearing headphones, 
cannot create pure privacy; it is simply a barrier to enable maximum privacy in a situation 
where it is impossible to have full privacy. Headphones can offer “a basic form of emotional 
safety”.84 However, some access goes beyond what is expected and desirable in a state of 
reserve, and therefore every action should be assessed on its merits. For example, it is 
obviously not expected or desirable for a voyeur to take an unwanted photograph up a 
person’s skirt. Such an action not only violates the state of reserve, but human dignity also – 
the skirt provides a physical and normative barrier that should be respected. Reserve 
demonstrates that privacy can depend upon the extent to which different social interactions 
are expected by society, expectations which can be influenced by what Hughes barriers, if 
any, are in place.  
 
A definition of access to a person should not include the control of such access. As Moreham 
states: “people can lose control over access to themselves even though no access to them is 
actually gained” and hence “control-based definitions … fail to distinguish between those 
situations where there is a risk of unwanted access and those where unwanted access has in 
fact been obtained”.85 In other words where there is only a risk of unwanted access, no barrier 
has been breached. 
 
For the purposes of clarity, intrusion should cover the hacking of a person’s computer or 
email account regardless of whether this will allow information to be accessed, as people’s 
files are closely associated with them and the hacker can physically see the material. Even 
though one could say there is no physical barrier being breached by sitting at one’s computer 
screen, a physical barrier has to be construed more broadly than that. A person’s files on their 
computer can be conceived as having the computer as the barrier and even though it cannot 
even be seen by the hacker the computer’s barrier is still being breached when material on it 
is accessed. Regardless of whether there is a physical barrier, there is certainly a normative 
barrier against intruding into personal files on a computer. 
 
The intrusion interest should also be sufficiently flexible to include some behaviour that 
exists outside the strict definition. The most important aspect in considering if an action can 
be conceived of as an intrusion is whether it demonstrates an intuitive lack of respect, 
                                                            
84 Smith, above n 75, at 46. 
85 Moreham, above n 21, at 638. 
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disregarding a person’s dignity. In other words, anything that intrudes into a person’s private 
sphere where he or she “should be free from the incursions of others”86 is a potential 
intrusion. Such flexibility will allow for any technological developments to be able to come 
under the ambit of intrusion where appropriate, and may have the side effect of broadening 
what constitutes a physical barrier.  
 
A legal test such as reasonable expectation of privacy can satisfy a similar role as has been 
indicated for personal information: it could normatively and holistically determine whether 
the intrusion interest has been sufficiently breached, and whether the person’s acute 
sensitivity towards the breach of the intrusion interest objectively satisfies a particular 
threshold of non-triviality.87 
 
D Conclusion 
 
The definition of the intrusion interest is that there must be access to someone’s person (or 
things closely associated with the person) by means of the senses, technological devices that 
enable the use of the senses, or physical proximity. The intrusion interest includes access to 
information and has the possibility of being extended to include any incursion into the private 
physical and psychological space of another person. An intrusion must not just be 
subjectively unwanted as per Moreham’s theory of desired inaccess, it must also be 
something that the person is acutely sensitive about as per Hunt.  
 
There should also be the requisite objectivity in the form of a knowledge requirement 
represented by the Hughes barriers. The desire not to be intruded upon needs to have been 
demonstrated either by the imposition of a physical barrier such as a locked cupboard, or a 
behavioural barrier that communicates the desire by words or actions. If it has not, then there 
should be a normative barrier in which intrusions are objectively unwanted due to social 
norms. An intrusion is therefore not precluded from occurring in a public place; it is very 
much context dependent based largely on what privacy barriers are in place and on the 
dignitary interest as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
86 Solove, above n 20, at 555. 
87 Again, the reasonable expectation of privacy test is discussed in detail in chapter VI. 
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III Protection of the Intrusion Interest in New Zealand Other Than the 
Tort of Intrusion into Seclusion 
 
In order to identify the gaps in intrusion protection, and hence the role the intrusion into 
seclusion tort needs to play, this chapter will look at a range of legal measures that in limited 
ways protect the intrusion interest defined in chapter II. Analysis of these protections will 
show that the intrusion interest is generally protected haphazardly and ineffectively. Any 
measures that appear to have any degree of effectiveness are rare and highly circumscribed. 
 
This chapter will analyse the protection of intrusion in the common law, in legislation and by 
regulatory bodies. Some legal actions only protect indirectly against intrusion, some have 
weak or difficult to satisfy remedies, and others have requirements that undermine their 
attempted protection of intrusion. The following analysis demonstrates a great need for the 
intrusion into seclusion action to be a comprehensive regime, available to fill in the many and 
varied gaps of intrusion protection. 
 
A Common Law  
 
1 Hosking tort  
 
Prior to the introduction of the tort of intrusion into seclusion in New Zealand the Hosking 
tort provided limited indirect protection of the intrusion interest. Although intrusion is not a 
focus of the Hosking tort, it is unavoidably an aspect that comes into consideration, albeit 
implicitly rather than explicitly. The concurring judgment of Gault P and Blanchard J 
elucidate the elements as they are still expressed today.88  
 
1) the existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy; 
and 
2) publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly offensive to an 
objective reasonable person. 
 
(a) First element 
 
It is mainly within the first element that intrusion comes to be considered. A reasonable 
expectation of privacy is a requirement that the published information be information for 
which a person could reasonably expect his or her privacy to be respected. This requires a 
somewhat objective assessment as to whether each set of facts in question is private or not. 
One factor within this objective assessment is how the information was obtained. For 
                                                            
88 At [117]. 
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example Hosking v Runting is about whether photographs of the appellant’s 18-month-old 
twins on a busy Auckland street could be prevented from publication.89 The fact that the 
photograph was taken on a public street, where thousands of people could have seen the 
children that day, helps the judges decide there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the pictures: they “do not disclose anything more than could have been observed by any 
member of the public in Newmarket on that particular day”.90 However, had the photos been 
taken through the appellant’s front window for example, the intrusive nature of such a 
photograph would likely have informed a decision that there may have been private facts 
involved. In such a situation, information regarding what the twins looked like, what they 
were doing, or how they were interacting with their parents, could only have been obtained 
through intrusive means and hence could suggest that such facts were private.  
 
Another example might be that political paraphernalia promoting one party stuck to a 
person’s fence could suggest political allegiance was not a private fact, but a private notepad 
found in the dustbin of that person’s property could make his or her political opinions private. 
Protecting the dissemination of information found in a person’s dustbin also indirectly 
protects the intrusion into the dustbin itself. Here the intrusion is only being protected 
because it reveals the private facts of a person’s political allegiances, not because the 
intrusion itself is against a person’s dignitary interest.  Often what is a private fact to one 
person is not to another and it is factors such as intrusiveness that can objectively indicate 
those subjective expectations. The more intrusiveness required to obtain information can 
suggest the degree to which something is private. For example, the most highly secretive 
information is likely to require the most covert operation, potentially involving highly 
invasive electronic surveillance. 
 
Tipping even contends in Hosking that a reasonable expectation of privacy can arise purely 
from “the circumstances in which the defendant came into possession of [private facts]”,91 
comments that are similar to those of Lord Hoffman in the UK case of Campbell who 
suggests that a picture taken in a private place “may in itself” be an infringement, “even if 
there is nothing embarrassing about the picture itself”.92 Those arguments seem to go beyond 
what the Hosking tort is aiming to protect; they are about protecting a person’s dignity 
regardless of what information is obtained.  
 
The essence of the Hosking tort is protecting people’s personal information that they would 
find objectionable for others to know about. This allows people to protect themselves from 
the judgement of those possessing a different sense of morality, prevent themselves from 
being embarrassed, or generally avoid interference from others. However, at the time the 
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91 At [249]. 
92 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 at [75]. 
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Hosking and Campbell judgments were made, neither the New Zealand nor UK jurisdiction 
had a tort of intrusion into seclusion. Therefore it was always going to be likely that the more 
pro privacy judges would push the boundaries of the Hosking tort in such a way.  
 
Nevertheless, clear demarcation between the means of gathering information and the 
information and publication of the information itself, best protects the separate privacy 
interests involved. The means of gathering information can help decide whether the facts are 
private; however, they should never be considered private purely on the basis that they were 
obtained from an intrusion. 
 
(b) Second element and damages 
 
Intrusion can influence the second element of high offensiveness. The more intrusiveness 
required to obtain information the more secretive the information is likely to be, and therefore 
the more offensive it would be to publish such information. Consequently, the degree of 
intrusiveness could be one indicator of the level of offence which publication would cause to 
an objectively reasonable person. However, the extent of intrusiveness is likely to be 
insignificant in comparison to factors that focus more squarely on what is being revealed, to 
what audience, and through what medium.  
 
The District Court case of L v G93 indicates that intrusion could be relevant to the Hosking 
tort when it comes to a damages assessment. The case involved Mr G consensually taking 
photographs of Ms L’s genitals as part of their prostitute client relationship, and publishing 
these photographs in an adult entertainment magazine without her consent.94 The Judge 
appears to consider it pertinent that “Mr G’s conduct was itself contemptuous of Ms L and 
her rights” and that he was “prepared to exploit Ms L for his own prurient or salacious 
ends”.95 Whilst such behaviour is not a reflection of intrusion into seclusion given Ms L’s 
consent to the photographs in a private context, it indicates that it is not just the invasion of 
privacy or the offensiveness of the facts which are significant, but the behaviour involved, 
such as the wanton disregard for a person’s feelings. Clearly Judge Abbott would consider 
granting higher damages where deplorable behaviour (intrusions) such as wiretapping is 
involved.  
 
L v G also finds liability for the publicity of private facts with the aid of the language of 
intrusion. Despite the fact the person whose genitals were exposed to the world through the 
magazine could not be identified, the publicity of private facts tort was still made out. The 
reason given for doing so was the consideration of privacy as serving a “psychological need 
                                                            
93 L v G [2002] DCR 234. 
94 At 236. 
95 At 250. 
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to preserve an intrusion-free zone of personality and family”.96 The anguish and stress of a 
person is seen as important rather than whether he or she is identified. This kind of language 
is more akin to protecting what intrusion protects. In other words, having one’s genitals 
displayed to the world but without people knowing whose genitals they are, is an affront to a 
person’s dignity and it is this unwarranted invasiveness which intrusion protects. However, it 
does not go to the core of a person’s reputation or individual autonomy, more connected with 
the informational interest, because he or she is not associated with the exposed genitalia. 
 
The very limited protection of intrusion by the Hosking tort demonstrates the need for a 
separate tort of intrusion. In the Hosking tort, intrusion is protected only insofar as it helps 
create a reasonable expectation of privacy in disseminated facts, influences high 
offensiveness, or relates to the decision or damages assessment. Intrusiveness is relevant to 
helping the Hosking tort be made out but it does not receive any protection for its own sake. 
A person against whom a plethora of intrusive acts are committed, but which result in the 
publication of facts that are already widely known, facts that are not highly offensive or no 
facts at all, would not have any recourse to this cause of action. This is where intrusion into 
seclusion comes in. 
 
2 Trespass 
 
Trespass to land prevents the “unjustified direct interference with land in the possession of 
another” and “is actionable per se without proof of actual damage”.97 Trespass is traditionally 
about protecting the proprietary rights in land but in contemporary times it is “primarily 
intended to protect possessory rights”.98 Possession requires an intent to possess and the 
exercise of control to the exclusion of others.99 It can never encompass “a mere right to use 
land”. 100  Trespass can therefore coincide with intrusion into seclusion only when possessory 
interests are at stake.101   
 
Trespass extends to both the air above and the ground below the land, yet “the rights of an 
owner…above his land [only extend so far] as is necessary for the ordinary use and 
enjoyment of his land”.102 This means that “observation [or photographs] from a reasonable 
                                                            
96 Geoffrey Robertson The Justice Game, (Vintage Book/Random House, London, 1999) at 351 as cited in L v 
G, above n 93, at 246. 
97 Stephen Todd and others The Law of Torts in New Zealand (6th ed, Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2005) at 468. 
98 At 473. 
99 At 473. 
100 At 469. 
101 Although it is pointed out in Bill Atkin and Geoff McLay Torts in New Zealand: Cases and Materials (5th ed, 
Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2012) at 113 that trespass developments “arguably focus more on 
protecting a person’s ability to be left alone in a zone which can be called his or her own”, possessory rights 
remain its focus.  
102 Bernstein of Leigh (Baron) v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] 1 QB 479 at 488.  
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height above a property is not actionable in trespass”.103 Neither is “observation from a 
neighbouring property or public place”.104 These examples combined with the strict 
possessory requirements of the law demonstrate that trespass is tightly circumscribed to 
specific situations and therefore intrusion into seclusion is needed because of its much 
broader reach.  
 
Trespass to goods is a “[direct] interference … with the plaintiff’s possession of goods”.105 
However, “whether [mere contact] with goods constitute trespass if no damage ensues is 
doubtful”.106 Again, the trespass involved here is tightly circumscribed. A person who peers 
inside someone’s bag and reads a document has committed an act against the intrusion 
interest, but intrusion into seclusion not trespass will be best placed to provide a satisfactory 
remedy. 
 
Trespass to the person also forms part of the trespass action. This will often be a battery 
which “is the act of intentionally applying force to the body of another person without … 
consent or other lawful justification”.107 The force does not need to be “hostile” but should be 
“generally [un]acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life”.108 This cause of action most 
obviously coincides with intrusion into seclusion in the very limited circumstance of direct 
physical contact with a person, but it seems unlikely to cover such actions as taking a 
person’s hair or body fluids he or she has left unattended, as this involves no application or 
threat of force. As discussed below,109 intrusion into seclusion might therefore be of 
relevance in such circumstances. 
 
B Statute 
 
The Law Commission noted in relation to the protection of private facts that: "[t]here is no 
reason why the development of a judge-made tort and the creation of statutory protections by 
the legislature [cannot] develop side-by-side”.110 
 
This section will explore the statutory protections of intrusion to determine the extent to 
which each protects the intrusion interest. This helps to define the role of the tort, i.e. the gaps 
it is filling compared with how the intrusion interest is already covered by statute. 
 
                                                            
103 Mark Warby QC, Nicole Moreham and Iain Christie (eds) Tugendhat and Christie’s The Law of Privacy and 
the Media (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 6. 
104 At 6. 
105 Todd and others, above n 97, at 601. 
106 At 602. 
107 At 107. 
108 At 108-109. 
109 See VI B 2 (d) at 80. 
110 Law Commission Protecting Personal Information From Disclosure (NZLC PP49, 2002) at [78]. 
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1 Acts containing criminal sanctions 
 
(a) Crimes (Intimate Covert Filming) Amendment Act 2006 
 
This Act covers only a very limited range of intrusions such as the kind that occurred in C v 
Holland, and in practice it often provides insufficient remedy. Section 4 of the Crimes 
(Intimate Covert Filming) Amendment Act added ss 216G and 216H to the Crimes Act 1961 
in order to protect against the intrusion of intimate covert filming. Section 216H makes 
everyone “liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years who intentionally or 
recklessly makes an intimate visual recording of another person”. Intimate visual recording is 
defined in s 216G. This covers such recordings as a photograph, videotape or digital image of 
nudity or partial nudity, sexual activity, showering or any bodily activity that requires 
dressing or undressing; although only if the person is in a place that would reasonably be 
expected to provide privacy. These all clearly come under the category of intrusion. 
 
Section 216G(b) makes it clear that the peeping tom recordings beneath or under clothing are 
always an intimate visual recording. It also prohibits recordings through a person's clothing 
but only when it is unreasonable to do so. It is unclear when such a recording might be 
reasonable, and the author cannot conceive of such a situation. The section also notes that 
intimate visual recordings do not have to be stored; they can be made and transmitted in real 
time in physical or electronic form. The Law Commission has also recommended that “it 
should be an offence to deliberately observe without consent, whether with or without a 
device, for purposes of sexual gratification, conduct of the kind defined in the Crimes Act 
1961, section 216G(1)(a)”111 – i.e. nudity or partial nudity, sexual activity, showering or any 
bodily activity that requires dressing or undressing. The rationale for this is that any kind of 
voyeurism is considered an extreme invasion which is truly deplorable and intrusive. The fact 
that this is not currently an offence highlights the limitations of this Act in protecting the 
intrusion interest.  
 
Although the maximum penalty is three years jail, it is instructive that the intimate visual 
recordings made in C v Holland only resulted in a $1,000 fine under that offence.112 Had the 
remedy in that situation been stronger, it is less likely that Ms Holland would have taken the 
civil claim against C which resulted in the intrusion into seclusion tort. C v Holland also 
demonstrates intrusion into seclusion working alongside statute to provide two remedies 
where the criminal one was considered to be insufficient. This highlights that even where 
criminal offences cover the behaviour in question, the civil remedy of damages through the 
intrusion into seclusion tort can also operate. 
 
                                                            
111 Law Commission Invasion of Privacy: Penalties and Remedies (NZLC R113, 2010) at R23. 
112 C v Holland, above n 1, at [2]. 
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(b) Summary Offences Act 1981  
 
The Summary Offences Act can protect against intrusive behaviour in very limited ways. 
Section 30 provides that every person who peers into a dwellinghouse or loiters on land in 
which a dwellinghouse is situated, at night and without reasonable excuse, is liable to a fine 
not exceeding $500. Although this recognises the sanctity of the family home, protection is 
limited to night-time (defined as starting one hour after sunset and ending one hour before 
sunrise) and to dwellinghouses. Section 29 also provides liability against those found on 
premises without reasonable excuse, carrying a maximum penalty of 3 months jail or a 
$2,000 fine. The limited nature of these legislative measures inadequately protects the 
intrusion interest, and highlights the need for a wide ranging tort.  
 
(c) Harassment Act 1997 
 
The Harassment Act, whilst initially implemented “in response to concerns about the 
activities of gangs and…stalking”,113 was described in Hosking v Runting as recognising “the 
privacy value and entitlement to protection”.114 However, its usefulness as a tool to protect 
against intrusion is limited. Section 3 of the Act explains that harassment occurs when a 
person engages in a “pattern of behaviour that includes doing any specified act to the other 
person on at least two separate occasions” within a 12 month period. The nature of some of 
the specified acts would be considered intrusion. The specified acts are in s 4 ss 1 (a) – (f).  
 
Section 4(1)(a) describes “watching, loitering near, or preventing or hindering access to or 
from, that person’s place of residence, business, employment, or any other place that the 
person frequents for any purpose” as a specified act. Within that, watching can be an 
unauthorised and intentional intrusion into another person’s seclusion in which he or she has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. Whilst a person can lawfully walk on the street and look 
at another person’s residence or place of employment, to do so continually and consistently 
with the purpose of gathering information about the likes of a person’s movements or 
interactions is intruding on an individual’s personal space in a way that affronts dignity and 
emotional well-being. A person aware of being watched is hindered making decisions, 
knowing that there is a possibility that any of his or her actions are being observed by an 
unauthorised third party. It is not clear whether setting up a video camera to constantly keep 
track of someone constitutes “watching” but there is certainly a tenable argument that it does.  
 
Loitering near and preventing or hindering access to or from a place could also be considered 
an intrusion. The knowledge of a loiterer and the difficulties inherent in entering or leaving a 
                                                            
113 Law Commission, above n 111, at [5.6]. 
114 Hosking, above n 5 at [108]. 
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property would be an incursion of a person’s private space that attacks a person’s dignity or 
quiet enjoyment of privacy. It can be viewed as an unwarranted accessing of a person.  
 
It is not only “watching” that presents the possibility of surveillance activities coming under 
the Harassment Act. Section 4(1)(b) includes “following” a person and s 4(1)(c) refers to 
“entering” or “interfering with” property in a person’s possession. Logically, bugging a 
person’s room (in which consent was given to enter the premises), or having cameras 
installed on the periphery of a person's property, should constitute entering or interfering with 
property, or following a person. Nevertheless, the author is unaware of any cases which test 
this. The dignity afforded a person to live his or her life without being followed is the same 
whether or not the following is of a physical or an electronic nature. However, until it is 
tested, due to the Government refusing as yet to accept the Law Commission's 
recommendations to include another specified act of “keeping that person under 
surveillance”,115 it is unclear where the courts would stand. 
 
Intrusion could be protected in the generic space of s 4(1)(f). Section 4(1)(f) covers any 
conduct that causes a person to fear for his or her safety and for which it is objectively 
reasonable that he or she does so. There is the temptation for certain allegedly intrusive acts 
to attempt to be brought within s 4(1)(f) because they may not fit within the other more 
particular specified acts. The problem with this is of course that many intrusive acts do not 
cause fear for safety per se, even though they do cause emotional distress.  
 
There is still a need for the tort because the Harassment Act has overly onerous requirements, 
inadequate remedies and gaps in protection for the intrusion interest. Section 3 requires that 
there are two specified acts. Therefore one act of intrusion cannot be punished, there has to be 
two. This means that a camera set up for a protracted period, say twenty four hours a day for 
several weeks, would not be enough to be within the ambit of the legislation as it would 
appear to be only one specified act. This is why the Law Commission also recommended that 
“as well as repeated conduct, a single protracted instance should be enough to constitute 
harassment”.116 
 
Harassment Act remedies are also problematic. Section 8 provides what can constitute 
criminal harassment, which would result in a jail sentence of up to two years. This requires 
the person to know that his or her behaviour would cause another person in the same 
particular set of circumstances to reasonably fear for his or her or another person's safety or 
intends to cause that fear. Causing fear is not connected to the heart of the intrusion interest 
and would seem to be a stricter criterion than the high offensiveness requirement of intrusion 
into seclusion. 
                                                            
115 Law Commission, above n 111, at 5.7 and R21. 
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The only civil remedy available for the Harassment Act is to obtain a restraining order.117 
Beyond proving two specified acts in a 12 month period that constitute a pattern of behaviour 
amounting to harassment, the complainant must also prove that the behaviour caused, or 
threatened to cause, him or her distress; that it would cause, or threaten to cause, distress to a 
reasonable person; and that the degree of distress caused or threatened justifies the making of 
an order.118 The last part appears to bring in a proportionality element to the behaviour. The 
requirements are quite onerous and a successful result is only that a restraining order is made. 
Whilst this will bring comfort to a complainant, it very much focuses on safety rather than 
any punitive measure or financial compensation. Such an inadequate remedy again highlights 
the need for an intrusion into seclusion tort. 
 
2 Regulation of state powers 
 
A combination of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 and s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (BORA) protect against intrusion in a state-individual context.119 Whilst this will 
provide protection against intrusion in some circumstances, such as police trespassing on a 
property to search for illegal drugs, the obvious limitation is that these statutes only govern 
state activities and therefore leave the behaviour of individuals untouched. Given that 
intrusion into seclusion is a civil tort which largely governs intrusions by private citizens on 
other private citizens, these pieces of legislation are protecting intrusions in a narrower 
context to the one in which intrusion into seclusion operates.  
 
As shall be seen,120 however, the search and seizure cases spawned by s 21 of BORA are 
highly relevant to an assessment of when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
3 Other legislative protections 
 
(a) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 
 
Section 38 of the Residential Tenancies Act provides limited protection of the intrusion 
interest. It requires that “the landlord shall not cause or permit any interference with the 
reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of the tenant in the use of the premises by the tenant”. 
Effectively this prevents a landlord from intruding into the tenant’s seclusion, or allowing 
others to. A landlord intruding on a tenant is a highly restricted situation. Additionally, by 
                                                            
117 Section 9. 
118 Section 16. 
119 Section 21 of BORA states that “everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, 
whether of the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise”. This is the basis for the Search and 
Surveillance Act requiring warrants by police officers in many situations, such as the requirement in s 46(1)(c) 
that an enforcement officer must obtain a surveillance device warrant to observe and record “private activity in 
private premises”. 
120 Particularly in chapters V and VI. 
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making a landlord liable for another person’s intrusion, it is unable to make the actual 
intruder liable.  
 
The Residential Tenancies Act also provides that a tenant must not cause or permit 
interference with the privacy of any of the landlord’s other tenants or anyone living in the 
neighbourhood.121 Again, this protects the intrusion interest in a highly restricted situation, 
and again it can potentially make a person liable for another person’s intrusion.  
 
Intrusion into seclusion will allow the people who actually intrude to be taken to court, not 
just landlords and tenants. 
 
(b) Privacy Act 1993 
 
The Privacy Act protects the intrusion interest by regulating the collection and dissemination 
of personal information by agencies, whether in the public or private sector. However, the 
privacy commissioner notes, essentially summarising s 56, that an agency does not include 
“individuals who collect or hold personal information for their own personal … affairs”.122 
This severely limits the potential for the Privacy Act to cover intrusion into seclusion 
situations, as these often involve the collection of information on the basis of personal affairs. 
The Privacy Act is instead focused on organisations such as government departments, schools 
and clubs.123 Agencies, however, also do not include the news media collecting information 
for their news stories,124 which are instead subject to the BSA and Press Council.  
 
The Privacy Act contains 12 privacy principles but only principle 4 deals exclusively with the 
way the information is collected, i.e. protecting intrusion. Not only is personal information 
not supposed to be collected by unlawful means, it also shall not be collected by an agency 
“by means that, in the circumstances of the case are unfair or intrude to an unreasonable 
extent upon the personal affairs of the individual concerned”.125 This protects the intrusion 
interest to some extent, although not any intrusion per se, only intrusion that is unreasonable. 
The privacy commissioner website explains what reasonable means. It states that it depends 
on the circumstances and that relevant factors include: 126  
 
 
 
                                                            
121  Section 40(2)(c). 
122 “A Guide to the Privacy Act 1993” (4 June 2009) Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
<www.privacy.org.nz>. 
123 “A Guide to the Privacy Act 1993”, above n 115. 
124 Section 2(b)(xiii). 
125 Privacy Act 1993 Information Privacy Principle 4. 
126 “Manner of collection of personal information (principle 4)” Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
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(1) “the purpose” of collecting the information;  
(2) “the degree to which the collection intrudes on privacy” such as the information 
being highly sensitive; and 
(3) “the circumstances”, such as whether “the place” has a “stronger or weaker 
expectation of privacy”. 
 
The purpose is analogous to the public interest defence used in the torts and BSA context, 
which will briefly be explained in chapter IV. The other points relate more directly to the 
intrusion interest. The second point demonstrates that the more private the information is, the 
more an intrusion is unacceptable.127 The third point is a key one with respect to protecting an 
interest against intrusion because it explicitly mentions the degree of reasonable expectation 
of privacy, specifically alluding to the locational inquiry of place. However, it fails to 
elaborate regarding what factors will determine whether something has a strong or weak 
expectation of privacy.  
 
Principle 4 does not, on strict reading, include failed attempts to collect information, even 
though those failed attempts might be equally as intrusive as successful ones. The Tribunal in 
Stevenson v Hasting District Council commented, however, that an approach covering how 
an agency “shall not set about collecting personal information” would be an approach that 
arguably “reflects the legislative intention”.128 Although it would therefore be logical to 
prevent intrusive failed attempts, it seems unlikely that they can be explicitly prevented.  
 
Although principle 4 can protect the intrusion interest in some situations it is limited to the 
collection of information, appears to be particularly focused on the intrusions of organisations 
rather than individuals, explicitly does not incorporate individuals who collect information 
for their own affairs, does not encompass the news media, and seems unlikely to protect 
failed intrusions. In addition, an interference with privacy is only found if the action has 
caused some form of harm, although this can include “significant loss of dignity”.129 
Damages can only be awarded by the Human Rights Review Tribunal; therefore a complaint 
often needs to go through a number of stages before such a remedy is provided.130  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
127 This is discussed in depth in VI C at 84-100. 
128 Stevenson v Hastings District Council HRRT Decision 7/06, 4 March 2006.  
129 Section 66(1)(b). 
130 Section 88. 
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C  Regulatory Bodies 
 
1 Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA)  
 
Intrusion is also protected by the BSA, but again only in a very specific context. The BSA 
was set up by s 20 of the Broadcasting Act 1989 and is only applicable to determine 
complaints about television or radio broadcasts.131 Privacy principle 3 states:132 
 
1. (a) It is inconsistent with an individual’s privacy to allow the public disclosure of 
material obtained by intentionally interfering, in the nature of prying, with that 
individual’s interest in solitude or seclusion. The intrusion must be highly offensive to 
an objective reasonable person. (b) In general, an individual’s interest in solitude or 
seclusion does not prohibit recording, filming, or photographing that individual in a 
public place (“the public place exemption”). (c) The public place exemption does not 
apply when the individual whose privacy has allegedly been infringed was 
particularly vulnerable, and where the disclosure is highly offensive to an objective 
reasonable person. 
 
Principle 3 protects against intrusion in limited circumstances and in potentially inconsistent 
ways. The above wording demonstrates that it protects against intrusion but only when there 
is subsequent publication in the form of a television or radio broadcast. If material is obtained 
by intentionally interfering with someone’s seclusion, such as by prying, and the material is 
kept but never published, the BSA has no grounds on which to impose sanctions. At the same 
time, there is a remedy for the publication of innocuous facts in which there could be no 
expectation of privacy but which were obtained by snooping. This is due to 3(a) which 
prevents the disclosure of any material acquired by prying. It also states the intrusion rather 
than the disclosure must be highly offensive. Therefore despite the fact publication is 
required, the interest protected is not in the publication of private facts, but explicitly in the 
intrusion itself.  
 
The public place exemption in 3(b) demonstrates that the BSA generally does not consider 
intrusions to occur in public places. Intrusions are therefore potentially more narrowly 
protected by the BSA than in intrusion into seclusion in which no such public place 
exemption formally exists. 3(c) states that the public place exemption does not apply when 
the person whose privacy has allegedly been infringed is particularly vulnerable, and the 
disclosure is highly offensive to a reasonable person. The requirement of high offensiveness 
to be in the disclosure rather than in the intrusion shifts the interest protected to the 
publication itself. The requirement of vulnerability creates a two tier approach in which 
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principle 3 is applied differently to two different categories of people as it suggests that 
notions of reasonableness can be diminished in importance for those who are emotionally 
fragile. It is also unclear as to whether the broadcaster has a knowledge requirement of 
people’s vulnerability. 3(c) goes beyond considering a person’s unique circumstances in 
deciding whether his or her privacy is infringed and does not translate well to a general 
application of intrusion principles.   
 
Section 13(1)(d) of The Broadcasting Act allows damages to be awarded for a decision on a 
complaint that finds “the broadcaster has failed to maintain, in relation to any individual, 
standards that are consistent with the privacy of that individual”, but only up to $5,000. BSA 
decisions can be appealed to the High Court.133  
 
The fact that the BSA is a separate regime for broadcasters, which only protects intrusions 
when they are subsequently published in a television or radio broadcast, means that principle 
3 of the BSA provides only a very limited protection of intrusion in New Zealand law. In 
addition, although 3(b) and (c) may be appropriate in a BSA context134 they highlight the 
stand-alone nature of the BSA as they are quite different to what one might expect in an 
intrusion into seclusion analysis. This suggests the need for a comprehensive tort of intrusion 
into seclusion which may consider BSA decisions as persuasive in some circumstances. 
 
D Conclusion  
 
Prior to the tort of intrusion into seclusion, intrusion was only protected in piecemeal ways. 
For instance, it was indirectly protected by the Hosking tort, but only when intrusive means 
were used to obtain the disseminated information. Even then, intrusion was not considered as 
a privacy breach in its own right. It simply helped point to whether certain facts were private 
and generally assisted in deciding whether there was liability for a private facts claim, such as 
the extent of intrusion indicating the degree of offensiveness in publishing facts, and the 
magnitude to which harm caused to the complainant should be compensated.  
 
Many statutory protections for intrusion are clearly targeted at particular behaviour in 
particular contexts and do not provide comprehensive protection against intrusion. For 
example, whilst the Harassment Act protects against a number of behaviours considered 
intrusive, such as watching, loitering near and preventing access to a person’s place of work, 
it is only some arguably intrusive acts that are considered. Some intrusive acts are unclear as 
to whether they are covered and there is the difficulty that there needs to be two intrusive acts 
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to qualify. Additionally the only civil remedy is a restraining order, and the criminal remedy 
is much more difficult to satisfy.  
 
In addition, the Privacy Act does not cover individuals who intrude for their own personal 
affairs, the BSA can only be invoked if there is subsequent publication, and the covert 
filming section of the Crimes Act only covers one type of intrusion and often provides 
inadequate remedies.  
 
On the rare occasion when a cause of action effectively protects an aspect of intrusion it is 
only in very circumscribed situations, such as trespass to the person in the form of a battery, a 
trespass into a person’s possessory interest in land, or peering into a dwellinghouse during the 
prescribed time. Consequently, intrusion into seclusion is the only comprehensive remedy for 
intrusions in general. 
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IV Elements of the Intrusion into Seclusion Tort in New Zealand: What 
They Are and What They Should Be  
 
C v Holland introduced the intrusion into seclusion tort in New Zealand because of the gaps 
in the protection of the intrusion interest identified in chapter III. It is important to set out and 
explain the elements Whata J identified in order to understand how the intrusion interest is 
currently protected by this tort. 
 
The High Court established the four elements it considers as appropriate for determining an 
intrusion into seclusion.135 The case explains these elements by reference to other 
jurisdictions and contexts; consequently the following explanations of the elements adopt a 
similar mode of analysis.  
 
There is nothing preventing an appellate court in the future from modifying the elements. 
Recommended modifications are the focus of the latter part of this chapter. 
 
A The Elements 
 
  1 An intentional and unauthorised intrusion 
 
As Sharpe J A points out in the Canadian case of Jones v Tsige, the focus of the first element 
of intrusion into seclusion is on the type of interest involved.136 In other words, that it 
involves an act of intrusion rather than publication of information. This is just as appropriate 
to the New Zealand tort. Whata J in C v Holland explains that “intentional” precludes a 
“careless intrusion”,137 for example accidentally encountering a flatmate in the bathroom. It 
has to have what criminal law would consider a mens rea element – that is the person needs 
to have intended to do the intrusive act. However, this element does not require the intruder 
to know that his or her intrusion was a probable breach of privacy. The word “unauthorised” 
is included in order to prevent the tort covering consensual intrusions.  
 
2 Into seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or affairs). 
 
The influential American treatise “Restatement of the Law”138 explains the requirements of 
the US intrusion tort in § 652B. It explains that the intrusion must be “upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns”. The word “seclusion” is not dealt with 
in much detail in C v Holland because a shower is clearly a place of seclusion. It is, however, 
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described further by the phrase in parentheses: “namely intimate personal activity, space or 
affairs”. Whata J states that “the reference to intimate personal activity acknowledges the 
need to establish intrusion into matters that most directly impinge on personal autonomy”.139 
The Restatement also points out that there is only liability when someone “has intruded into a 
private place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about 
his person or affairs”.140 All of these explanations indicate that seclusion is not purely 
locational, but extends to something much broader. The indication is that the most personal 
places or interactions are the places or interactions in which intrusion into seclusion would be 
most easily established.  
 
Shulman, a leading US case in which the treatment and rescue of car accident victims was 
recorded and broadcast on TV, essentially describes seclusion as the penetration of “some 
zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, 
the plaintiff”.141 This explanation, by including any action that obtains information about 
another person, also conceives of seclusion as covering a broader area than physical or 
sensory privacy.  
 
In the BSA context the High Court case of CanWest TVWorks Ltd v XY describes seclusion as 
“a state of screening or shutting off from outside access or public view”.142 The case notes 
that this “creates the zone of physical or sensory privacy referred to in Shulman”.143 Although 
this is a less broad definition of the essence of the seclusion interest, even physical privacy 
does not just mean privacy in a particular place. Moreham defines interfering with physical 
privacy as “watching, listening to or otherwise sensing [someone] against [his or her] 
wishes”.144 This means that a breach of physical privacy can occur in any location where a 
person desires not to be intruded upon. CanWest also usefully points out that the definition of 
seclusion “is of a wider reach than solitude in that it allows or extends to a situation where the 
complainant is accompanied”.145 Solitude, in which a person is completely alone, is a subset 
of seclusion. 
 
“Seclusion” has never been simply a locational approach. There is ample evidence from a 
variety of legal sources that seclusion denotes private matters, regardless of the physical place 
in which they occur. If a person is physically secluded it will likely be easier to ascertain that 
this element has been satisfied; however, a legal definition that encompasses any private 
activity, space or affairs recognises that intrusions into these areas are the most devastating. 
                                                            
139 At [95]. 
140 At § 652B comment c. 
141 Shulman v Group W Productions Inc 955 P 2d 469 (Cal 1998) at 490. 
142 CanWest TVWorks Ltd v XY [2008] NZAR 1 (HC) at [42]. 
143 At [42]. 
144 Nicole Moreham “Beyond Information: Physical Privacy in English Law" (2014) 73 Cambridge L J 350 at 
354. 
145 At [42]. 
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As stated in Evans v Detlefsen: what is most important is “the type of interest involved and 
not the place where the invasion occurs”.146 
 
3 Involving infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy 
 
The reasonable expectation of privacy in the intrusion into seclusion tort has a wider focus 
than the reasonable expectation of privacy in the Hosking tort. In the latter the facts 
themselves are analysed as to whether the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
such that they should not be published to the world at large. In the former the focus is on 
whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the intimate personal activity, space or 
affairs identified in the second element. 
 
Reasonable expectation of privacy is treated superficially in C v Holland as a person having a 
shower is always going to enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to uninvited 
outsiders. However, Whata J describes how the US tort has used a two-prong test,147 adopted 
from the search and seizure applications of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
constitution.148 In Canada, Jones v Tsige also affirms that “[t]he courts have adopted the two-
prong test”.149 The test is “a subjective expectation of solitude or seclusion, and for this 
expectation to be objectively reasonable”.150 The first prong would therefore see courts test 
whether claimants truly believed they had an expectation of seclusion. The second would be 
an objective assessment by the courts as to whether such a situation is in fact one that has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Similarly, Shulman states that there is a requirement to 
show a “reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data 
source”.151 
 
In the recent New Zealand case of Faesenkloet v Jenkin, Asher J states that “[i]t is the 
unauthorised intrusion into a place where privacy is reasonably expected that is important, 
not whether the place was in public or private premises”.152 Although he suggests that place 
is relevant to the reasonable expectation of privacy test, he notes that it is the “nature of the 
intrusion” generally which is determinative.153 Hamed v R, which held that s 21 of BORA 
“guarantees reasonable expectations of privacy from State intrusion” in a New Zealand 
search and seizure context,154 considers that there can be a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in “private conversations and conduct” in public spaces.155 This can be infringed when people 
                                                            
146 Evans v Detlefsen 857 F 2d 330 (6th Cir 1988) at 338. 
147 At [17]. 
148 Katz v United States 389 US 347 (1967) at 361. 
149 Jones v Tsige, above n 136, at [59]. 
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151 At 490. 
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153 At [39]. 
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155 At [12]. 
   37
secretly observe or listen to them.156 The English Court of Appeal suggests in the private 
facts context that reasonable expectation of privacy can be assessed based on factors such as 
“the nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged, the place at which it was 
happening, [and] the nature and purpose of the intrusion”.157 Reasonable expectation of 
privacy will be discussed in detail in chapter VI. 
 
4 That is highly offensive to a reasonable person 
 
The current tort in the USA, New Zealand and Canada, requires that high offensiveness be 
met before a breach is made out.158 This means that it is possible for there to be an intentional 
and unauthorised intrusion into seclusion involving infringement of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy which fails in establishing a breach because it is not highly offensive. Whilst in the 
private facts context Tipping J in Hosking reasons that a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
“unlikely to arise” unless there is “a high degree of offence”,159 and similarly Young P in 
TVNZ v Rogers states that “[i]n most cases it will be the defeating of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy which makes publication objectionable”,160 the very fact they use the phrases 
“unlikely to arise” and “in most cases” suggests that occasions when everything but high 
offensiveness are met are rare but do occur. High offensiveness in intrusion is likely to follow 
a similar line of thinking and is clearly supposed to be a step beyond breaching a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Such a breach could indeed, for example, be classified as substantially 
offensive and thus fail to satisfy the criteria.  
 
The US case of Miller v National Broadcasting Co161 sets out a list of factors to consider 
when evaluating what meets the highly offensive standard. These are cited affirmatively by 
Whata J in C v Holland, and adopted by the Ontarian Court of Appeal in Jones v Tsige.162 
These are: (1) “the degree of intrusion”, (2) “the context, conduct and circumstances of the 
intrusion”, (3) “the motives and objectives of the intruder” and (4) “the expectations of those 
whose privacy is invaded”.163 Whilst these factors are similar to those that could be employed 
in the second prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, they impart a different 
threshold. The test of a reasonable expectation of privacy asks whether the person could have 
reasonably expected to have been afforded seclusion in that context, and the offensiveness 
question asks whether, given that a reasonable expectation of privacy has been breached, that 
breach is a highly offensive one. It is essentially an extra step that increases the difficulty of 
satisfying an intrusion into seclusion claim.  
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Principle 3 of the BSA also contains the exact limitation of the intrusion into seclusion tort 
that the intrusion must be highly offensive.164 
 
B Public Interest Defence 
 
The defence of public interest is not a focus of this thesis, but for completeness it must be 
noted that any intrusion into seclusion claim can be defeated by such a defence in New 
Zealand. As Whata J states: “freedom from intrusion into personal affairs is amenable to…a 
defence of legitimate public concern based on freedom of expression or prosecution of 
criminal or other unlawful activity”.165 This foreshadows the possibility that a justified belief 
in the existence of facts in which there is a significant public interest is a legitimate defence 
for using intrusive means to gather information. To say that intrusive means is never 
acceptable would encroach too much on freedom of expression because it would mean that 
even if bugged telephone calls resulted in a discovery that the Government of the day was 
systematically murdering citizens who opposed their policies, the bugged telephone calls 
themselves would still provide the Government with a remedy.  
 
The BSA and the Hosking tort also have a public interest defence.166 Given the public interest 
defence does not yet appear to have been used in an intrusion into seclusion case in New 
Zealand, it would be instructive to note how it has been treated in a BSA context. Privacy 
principle 8 explains that if the matter disclosed is in the public interest then legitimate 
concern to the public is a defence. This defence is consistent with the public interest defence 
in both privacy torts. In CP v TVWorks Ltd it is noted that “the more serious the breach of 
privacy, the greater the degree of legitimate public interest necessary to justify the breach”.167 
This imputes a balancing exercise between the severity of the intrusion and the extent of the 
public interest. In that decision electricians from three different electricity companies were 
surreptitiously filmed installing a heated towel rail and changing a light fitting in order to rate 
their performance. The decision pointed out that there was some public interest in the footage 
in terms of encouraging proper training and workplace safety, but that did not outweigh the 
privacy of an ordinary citizen going about his work. This is contrasted to the decision of de 
Hart168 in which secret footage was seen to be in the public interest because it was of a well-
known identity who had received serious allegations of sexual impropriety. In that situation, 
the public interest in the situation meant that there was no liability despite an infringement of 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. The word limit precludes any further analysis as to when 
a public interest defence should be satisfied.  
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C What Should the Elements of an Intrusion into Seclusion Action be?  
 
Ultimately, the most important element of an intrusion into seclusion action appears to be the 
third element: infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy. This element goes to the 
crux of the tort. This is because remedies for intrusion into seclusion do not occur as a result 
of every intrusion into the privacy interest; unauthorised, non-consensual intrusions happen 
all the time but most are not considered sufficient to create liability. There is only sufficient 
interest in determining liability when an intrusion infringes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Consequently it would seem appropriate to combine Whata J’s first three elements.  
 
The first element requiring an intentional and unauthorised intrusion is easily satisfied as it 
essentially only requires that the intrusion interest is engaged by an intrusive act that is 
deliberate and non-consensual.  
 
The second element of “seclusion” requires that the intrusion was into personal activity, 
space or affairs. The third element requires that this intrusion into personal activity, space or 
affairs infringes a reasonable expectation of privacy. The second element is therefore almost 
redundant. If the intrusion is not into personal activity, space or affairs then there can be no 
breach of a reasonable expectation of privacy. If it is, then the personal activity, space or 
affairs is assessed as to whether it is sufficient to breach a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Therefore essentially both elements analyse whether the intrusion is into matters that are 
intrinsically private, it is just that reasonable expectation of privacy requires a higher 
threshold to satisfy. It therefore makes sense to analyse it only once, but to do it rigorously. 
 
Additionally, the requirement that the intrusion be into “seclusion” can be a dangerous one if 
it is misinterpreted to mean that only intrusions into private places can be actionable, or even 
if it carries a subconscious connotation that renders the place an intrusion occurs in as 
elevated in importance at the expense of other considerations. The word seclusion can imply 
that there can only be liability if a person is in actual seclusion, that is, in some sort of 
isolation. If it is misinterpreted to mean that the intrusion must occur in a particular type of 
location, and such a misinterpretation would be easy to make despite the fact the word is 
legally defined in brackets to mean personal activity, space or affairs, then it will change the 
essence of the tort in unfortunate ways. Thomas Levy McKenzie for example analysed the 
whole “into seclusion” element as if this imbued the tort with a “strict locational 
requirement”.169  
 
It would be much simpler, cleaner and effective to remove the word seclusion from the 
lexicon of the elements as occurs in the way the elements of the tort in America are 
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constructed.170 Whilst Whata J states that this element “acknowledges the need to establish 
intrusion into matters that most directly impinge on personal autonomy”,171 this need can be 
fulfilled completely by a proper assessment of reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Additionally, as Mckenzie points out, “[t]he “seclusion” element of Whata J’s test is similar 
to the term “private facts” from the first limb of the Hosking tort”.172 However, the Hosking 
tort states the first element as “the existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy”173 without separating this into determining first whether the facts are 
private, and second, “whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in those facts”.174 
 
Essentially, the first three elements can be combined into one element in such a way that it 
achieves everything it needs to. This element could be simply expressed as: “an intrusion into 
intimate personal activity, space or affairs that infringes a reasonable expectation of privacy”. 
This would largely retain Whata J’s wording of the elements. Such wording ensures that the 
largely overlapping second and third elements become one, thereby allowing an analysis that 
does not cover the same or similar ground twice. Some cases in the USA, notably Shulman, 
summarise New Zealand’s first three elements as one. In that case it is worded as “intrusion 
into a private place, conversation or matter”,175 with the explanation being that this covers 
penetration of a zone of physical, sensory or informational privacy in which the plaintiff had 
an objective reasonable expectation of privacy. Whilst Whata J considers this a two-prong 
test of subjective and objective expectations, the analysis in Shulman merges the so-called 
two prongs, with the focus being on whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
with the subjective aspect predominantly assumed. 
 
Not only are the first two elements easily satisfied, the extent of each of them are highly 
relevant in determining whether reasonable expectation of privacy is also satisfied. That is, 
the extent of an intrusion, and the degree to which the intrusion goes into private matters, 
helps establish whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. It therefore makes sense 
to combine the first three elements together, consequently allowing the heart of the tort to be 
thoroughly evaluated to determine potential liability.  
 
The question as to whether high offensiveness should remain as an element is considered in 
chapter VII, once it is understood from chapter VI how reasonable expectation of privacy is 
to be applied. As will become clearer, high offensiveness is largely dependent upon the 
application of reasonable expectations of privacy. 
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V Sources of Law: A Note on the Comparators 
 
Before embarking on the application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test which is 
the subject of chapter VI and the crux of this thesis, it is important to justify the main sources 
of law that will be used in this analysis. This chapter explains why particular sources of law 
are especially relevant to intrusion into seclusion in New Zealand, and the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test specifically. It also considers how different causes of action in 
different jurisdictions can have an indirect effect on the application of intrusion into seclusion 
in New Zealand.   
 
A The US Version of Intrusion into Seclusion 
 
The intrusion tort has been active in the USA for over fifty years,176 thereby providing a 
wealth of cases to analyse and potentially apply to intrusion into seclusion in New Zealand. It 
is obvious why it is advantageous to make use of an influential jurisdiction’s case law for the 
same tort, especially when it has been a feature of their law for markedly longer. The 
American tort is particularly significant in New Zealand because it is used to justify the 
creation of the tort in C v Holland. Whata J stated that since “the intrusion based privacy 
claim is so novel, I have found it necessary to … describe the North American tort of 
intrusion upon seclusion”.177  
 
Whata J provides a detailed discussion of the American tort as a background for its 
application in New Zealand, giving a clear indication of the value of the US case law. He 
explains how “intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into private affairs” is one of the four 
privacy torts summarised by Prosser,178 and that it is subsequently adopted by the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977).179 He also notes the four elements of the tort, 
identically described by Prosser in 1971 and the Ontarian case of Jones v Tsige only a few 
months previously in 2012.180 
 
These elements are also very useful when bearing in mind some of the differences between 
America and New Zealand in the application of the tort. 
 
                                                            
176 As pointed out in footnote 71. 
177 At [9]. 
178 William L Prosser “Privacy” (1960) 48 Cal L Rev 383 at 389 as cited in C v Holland, above n 1, at [12]. 
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Prosser described the four elements of intrusion into seclusion as:181  
 
1. An intentional and unauthorised intrusion; 
2. That the intrusion was highly offensive to the reasonable person; 
3. The matter intruded upon was private; and 
4. The intrusion caused anguish and suffering. 
 
The first element is identical to that used in New Zealand. The element of high offensiveness 
is used in both jurisdictions, although the way the words are put together indicate that in the 
USA it is the intrusion that must be highly offensive, whilst in New Zealand it is the 
infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy that must be highly offensive. In practice 
there is little difference. The US element that “the matter intruded upon was private” seems to 
be equivalent to the amalgam of “seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or 
affairs)” and “infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy” in New Zealand.  
 
The main difference is that America includes an element that requires the intrusion to cause 
anguish and suffering. This element is, however, only required by some states;182 others such 
as California make no such requirement.183 In New Zealand there is no requirement that an 
intrusion cause mental suffering, a position supported by Bloustein who points out that if 
mental tranquillity is part of the social value of privacy, then privacy lacks independence as a 
value.184 Bloustein views mental suffering like Warren and Brandeis, as a “mere element of 
damages”.185 Whata J’s comment that anguish and suffering “may be more relevant to the 
assessment of damages”186 appears to accord with such thinking. 
 
B The effect of the Different Treatment of America’s Privacy Torts on Intrusion into 
Seclusion in New Zealand 
 
This thesis has already covered the difference conceptually between the Hosking tort and the 
intrusion into seclusion tort. The publicity of private facts and intrusion interests are protected 
similarly by their respective equivalent US tort. There are, however, inherent difficulties in 
satisfying a private facts claim in the USA compared to New Zealand, due to the 
constitutional differences in the treatment of freedom of speech. The same is not true, 
however, for an intrusion into seclusion claim. This section will explain how this has the 
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potential to unjustifiably broaden the scope of intrusion into seclusion in both the USA and 
New Zealand. 
 
In the USA, freedom of expression is upheld by the First Amendment, which must not be 
contravened by any court decision.187 It is this sanctity of free speech which gives the news 
media a “right to investigate and relate facts about the events and individuals of our time”.188 
In New Zealand, freedom of expression is a right in s 14 of BORA. However, s 5 states that 
“the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society”. New Zealand law can therefore allow torts to be developed which balance freedom 
of expression with other values, compared with the American system in which freedom of 
expression is of elevated importance. 
 
The tort of publicity of private facts in the USA requires the plaintiff to prove as one of its 
elements that the private facts are “not of legitimate public concern”.189 In New Zealand 
public interest (concern) is a defence to the Hosking tort which the defendant must raise and 
prove.190 This demonstrates the extra protection of freedom of expression in America: their 
default position is that publications of private facts are assumed to be in the public interest 
unless proven otherwise, whereas in New Zealand liability is found for the publication of 
private facts unless they are proven to be in the public interest.  
 
Legitimate public concern is considered broadly in the USA.191 Consequently it is only the 
exceptional case which establishes a private facts claim,192 as the vast majority of private 
facts published within arguably newsworthy stories are deemed acceptable. In New Zealand, 
however, “the greater the invasion of privacy, the greater must be the level of public concern 
to amount to a defence”.193 This means it will usually require a greater public interest to 
remove or counter any liability that has already been established. 
 
In Shulman, no liability was found for broadcasting the rescue of accident victims due to the 
public interest in “highlight[ing] some of the challenges facing emergency workers dealing 
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with serious accidents”.194 It was therefore left to the intrusion tort to offer some protection 
for the intrusive behaviour of the broadcasters. Even though the broadcast showed one of the 
victims stating that she “just want[s] to die”,195 the court held that personal conversations 
depicting “disorientation and despair”196 are substantially relevant to the matter of public 
interest. It is considered inappropriate for the Court to act as editors of the news media.197 
There is a strong argument, however, that one could edit out the private facts to produce a 
broadcast which serves the public interest just as effectively, whilst still providing sufficient 
context for the story.  
 
In a similar kind of case in Andrews in New Zealand it was considered that the personal 
words expressed by the injured parties also form part of the public interest due to the 
contention that “the Court will ordinarily permit a degree of journalistic latitude”198. The 
Court’s comments in regard to public interest are based largely on its interpretation of 
Shulman, that “the degree of detail shown was not only relevant, but essential to the 
narrative”.199 At the time there was no intrusion tort for Andrews to fall back on. However, 
this suggests that were a similar case to happen today it would be the tort of intrusion into 
seclusion that would provide the best opportunity for finding liability. 
 
Andrews shows no appreciation of the differing constitutional context of freedom of 
expression in New Zealand compared with America. In other words, in New Zealand an 
argument that colour is gratuitously unnecessary is compelling due to the freedom of 
expression right being subject to the aforementioned reasonable limits in s 5 of BORA.  
 
In the USA, when a publicity of private facts claim and an intrusion are brought together “the 
private facts claim frequently fails on First Amendment principles, and the intrusion question 
more often may be left to the jury”.200 Consequently some judges, who want to find the 
defendant liable for breaching the tort of publicity of private facts but feel constrained from 
doing so because of the First Amendment, may unreasonably extend the tort of intrusion into 
seclusion in order to find liability.  
 
Another reason for this is the lack of a specific newsgathering defence for intrusion into 
seclusion in the USA, as Shulman demonstrates. Whilst the actual broadcast of newsworthy 
items prevent liability in a publicity of private facts context, any intrusive means of obtaining 
that information is not similarly protected from liability. Shulman notes that the “high degree 
of deference to editorial judgment” for publication of private facts is not extended to 
                                                            
194 At 488. 
195 At 476. 
196 At 488. 
197 At 488. 
198 Andrews, above n 193, at [82]. 
199 At [89]. 
200 Warby, Moreham and Christie, above n 103, at 75. 
   45
intrusions “into secluded areas or conversations in pursuit of publishable material”.201 
Newsworthiness in the USA can only stop an intruder being liable by preventing the intrusion 
from satisfying the high offensiveness element.202 Intrusion into seclusion in New Zealand is 
amenable to a public interest defence however. 203  
 
The differing constitutional context of freedom of expression between New Zealand and 
America, and the contrasting treatment of the public interest or newsworthiness in intrusion 
into seclusion, indicates that the courts need to be circumspect in following America’s torts 
too closely. If New Zealand blindly follows America then it too could face the danger of 
widening the ambit of intrusion into seclusion beyond its logical limits. Or alternatively, in 
situations like Shulman or Andrews where both torts could clearly apply, the focus will be on 
intrusion into seclusion to find liability and the Hosking tort will be too easily dismissed.  
 
Whenever any work or analysis is done on either of the two torts in New Zealand, or privacy 
torts as a whole, one must always bear in mind the legal framework of both torts and ensure 
that there is little danger of their application becoming somewhat lopsided as arguably occurs 
in America. This thesis ensures that it does not widen the intrusion tort in response to any 
interpretation of the Hosking tort, and is careful not to simultaneously reduce the scope of the 
Hosking tort in order to broaden the horizon of the other. It never chooses to prefer intrusion 
over private facts simply because of the difficulties imposed on private facts in a different 
jurisdiction.  
 
Despite the above analysis, the treatment of intrusion into seclusion by the various 
jurisdictions in America has immense persuasive power. 
 
C Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) 
 
BSA decisions in relation to the intrusion interest can inform the development of ideas such 
as reasonable expectation of privacy. This is because despite being applicable only when 
information is published through a broadcast medium, and despite being subject to the flaws 
exposed in chapter III, the legal precepts in principle 3 of the BSA are similar to those in an 
intrusion into seclusion claim. They deal with similar intrusions into privacy as might be 
apparent in an actual intrusion into seclusion claim. BSA decisions can therefore be used to 
defend, add value to and potentially modify a legal or theoretical proposition. Relevant 
decisions will therefore be discussed in the analysis of reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the following chapter. 
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D Search and Seizure Case Law in New Zealand, the USA and Canada 
 
Search and seizure case law is also a useful source of principles and guidance for the 
development of intrusion into seclusion.  
 
In the USA, search and seizure is protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution 
which states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”. Wilkins notes that 
“[i]n Katz the court adopted a flexible “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis for 
resolving search and seizure issues”.204 Wilkins uses three factors as the base for exploring 
how to apply reasonable expectation of privacy in a search and seizure context in the USA, 
namely place, intrusiveness, and object.205 It is a modified version of these three factors 
which this thesis recommends in determining a reasonable expectation of privacy for an 
intrusion into seclusion in New Zealand. This will be developed in chapter VI. 
 
Search and seizure case law in New Zealand derives from s 21 of BORA which states that 
“everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the 
persons, property or correspondence or otherwise". Reasonable expectations of privacy in a 
search and seizure context in New Zealand are used by Whata J in C v Holland as part of his 
reasoning for why there should be a tort of intrusion into seclusion in this country. He pointed 
to s 21 in BORA as protecting a similar type of privacy as would be upheld by his 
introducing the new tort of intrusion into seclusion. 206 Importantly, Whata J emphasised that 
leading cases such as R v Williams207 and Hamed v R208 defend “the proposition that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy is the touchstone of s 21”209. The purpose of this was to 
demonstrate “that New Zealand’s legal framework has embraced freedom from unauthorised 
and unreasonable physical intrusion or prying into private or personal places”.210 Canada’s 
search and seizure case law is based on s 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
which is very similar to s 21 of BORA, and embraces the reasonable expectation of privacy 
as the barometer for liability.211 
 
A search and seizure claim is quite different compared to one for intrusion into seclusion; the 
former relates to actions of the State against the individual and the latter more usually relates 
to actions between individuals. There will inevitably be some differences between what is 
unreasonable search and seizure by a public official or body and what is unacceptable 
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between private citizens. A policeman fulfilling his duty to investigate crime and protect the 
public from antisocial behaviour potentially has good reason to undergo search and seizure 
that in a private context would be unacceptable. Essentially, there will always be an arguable 
case for a search and seizure by the State to be reasonable given the public interest. There is 
therefore a danger of the courts “marginalis[ing] privacy interests” by “manipulat[ing] 
reasonable expectations of privacy” to prioritise “investigating serious criminality”, or to give 
leeway to actions that have brought about the discovery of some illicit contraband or exposed 
some criminal behaviour.212 An intrusion into seclusion may also infrequently be justified on 
public interest grounds, such as perhaps media investigating high profile figures engaging in 
activities of dubious morality. However, this is likely to happen far less often than in a 
policing context as many intrusions into seclusion will have no arguable public interest 
defence. 
 
Despite the difference it is judicious to suggest that some aspects of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis can be transposed between the two, given how they both 
protect the intrusion interest. Even though the courts have tended to downgrade BORA 
concerns for the sake of the public good, one can still analyse the Courts’ decisions and 
judgments as a pointer to where different situations might fit on a sliding scale of 
expectations of privacy. Additionally, the reasonable expectation of privacy in s 21 cases is 
often discussed separately and irrespective of the public interest, such as by arguing that there 
may be a reasonable expectation of privacy before assessing that the public interest in the 
officer’s behaviour supersedes it. This is closer to New Zealand’s intrusion into seclusion 
approach in which a public interest defence is only raised after an infringement of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy has been made out.  
 
The recent decision of Faesenkloet v Jenkin indicates the strength of transferability of 
reasonable expectation of privacy from one cause of action to the other.213 In this case, New 
Zealand search and seizure case law is used to determine whether there is infringement of 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the intrusion into seclusion context. The issue in the case 
revolved around whether a video camera situated on top of a garage recording a shared 
driveway on council land constituted intrusion into seclusion. Asher J noted that C v Holland 
“did not have to consider an intrusion into an activity, space or affairs that occurred in a 
public place”.214 However, he considered that Whata J’s “assessment of the elements of the 
tort would not preclude the invasion being in or of a public area”.215  
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Asher J analysed the position in relation to s 21 reasonable expectations of privacy and 
applied this to intrusion. He considered it highly relevant for example that R v Fraser 
holds that “[r]easonable expectations of privacy for activities readily visible from outside the 
property must be significantly less than, for instance, for activities within buildings”.216 In 
other words, Asher J’s decision was intrinsically linked to what happens in a search and 
seizure context given the greater depth of case law in that area and the transferability of 
reasonable expectations of privacy between the two. 
 
Reasonable expectations of privacy in search and seizure are therefore an excellent analytical 
tool in assisting a reasonable expectation of privacy in an intrusion into seclusion, providing 
they are used with caution. Both causes of action look to protect the intrusion interest by 
requiring a reasonable expectation of privacy to be infringed as one of the steps in 
determining liability. 
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VI How to Determine Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Wilkins’ 
Tripartite Approach 
 
As previous chapters have discussed,217 the reasonable expectation of privacy test is the crux 
of the tort of intrusion into seclusion. One of the aims of this thesis is to provide guidance as 
to when a reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed. This will be fundamental to 
assisting judges charged with ascertaining liability for intrusion into seclusion in the future. 
The dearth of cases on this tort in New Zealand, due to its very recent introduction into the 
legal landscape, means that providing a roadmap or a set of flexible rules to navigate when an 
expectation of privacy exists is crucial. By bringing together reasonable expectations of 
privacy in a variety of contexts, such as those discussed in chapter V, it is hoped that this 
thesis will create a useful resource for qualitatively calculating when a reasonable expectation 
of privacy is likely to exist. 
 
Interpreting the reasonable expectation of privacy is problematic. Whilst the concept of 
reasonableness is used in many aspects of law, it is never straightforward to actually 
determine whether reasonableness is satisfied. This is because ascertaining what the 
reasonable person would think requires considering contemporary societal viewpoints, and 
establishing normatively what society’s positions are at any one time is always going to be a 
somewhat subjective exercise.  
 
This thesis contends that the best guidance for working out when a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists comes from a modified version of Richard Wilkins’ tripartite approach as put 
forward in his 1987 journal article “Defining the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: An 
Emerging Tripartite Analysis”.218 This article was written following what Wilkins saw as an 
inconsistent approach by the US judiciary to the Supreme Court decision in Katz219 which, as 
pointed out in the previous chapter, “adopted a flexible ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
analysis for resolving search and seizure issues” in response to “the rapid development of 
electronic and other technologically-enhanced means of surveillance”220 that “required no 
physical penetration”.221 Wilkins believed that the “potentially limitless range of factors 
relevant to” determining a reasonable expectation of privacy could be reduced to “a workable 
set of criteria … discernible in the stated rationales of Supreme Court decisions”.222 This was 
seen as necessary to prevent the “divergent and conflicting analytical resolutions” which had 
become predominant in search and seizure case law.223 
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Wilkins presents three factors: “(1) the place of location where the surveillance occurs; (2) 
the nature and degree of intrusiveness of the surveillance itself; and (3) the object or goal of 
the surveillance”.224 He justifies this on the basis that although “the Court has not adopted 
explicitly this trio of factors as a formal legal test”, “cases before and after Katz imply this 
approach”.225 This thesis employs a modified version of the Wilkins factors. It retains their 
essence but renames the “object” factor as “nature of activity or information” in order to 
reflect more accurately what the factor represents.226 Once the three factors have been 
analysed there should then be a holistic assessment as to reasonable expectation of privacy in 
which the factors are balanced and combined. 
 
Although Wilkins synthesised these factors almost thirty years ago regarding the reasonable 
expectations of privacy of surveillance in search and seizure cases, they are still highly 
relevant to reasonable expectations of privacy in an intrusion into seclusion claim today. For 
example, many considerations of reasonable expectation of privacy in contemporary New 
Zealand search and seizure case law actually consider, to some degree, the same three factors 
as Wilkins. However, this happens somewhat accidentally, rather than in a clear and 
methodical way. The aim here is to combine all ideas of a reasonable expectation of privacy 
into the invaluable Wilkins approach. In addition, Wilkins’ three factors are similar to the 
four factors Moreham suggests being used in place of a purely locational approach to the 
BSA: nature of the location, the nature of the activity, indications that filming was not 
welcome, and the way the recording was obtained.227 Moreham also suggests in her “Privacy 
in Public Places” article that location, nature of the activity, and the way in which the image 
is obtained are crucial, dedicating sections to each of these.228 
 
In each of the three Wilkins factors there is a hierarchy of highest reasonable expectation of 
privacy to lowest reasonable expectation of privacy. Analysis centres round what kind of 
places, activity and information have the highest expectations of privacy, and what kind of 
behaviour is the most intrusive. Ultimately it is vital to consider what combinations of the 
three factors will equate to a breach satisfying the infringement of an overall reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Much of this analysis benefits greatly from an assessment of the 
Hughes barriers in the context of the Wilkins factors. 
 
The Hughes barriers229 is a theory about how privacy is actually experienced. In the same 
way that Wilkins attempts to find out when an expectation of privacy is reasonable in a legal 
context, Hughes creates a theory which describes when a subjective desire for privacy should 
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be respected. Whilst Hughes’ theory is broader, it can help inform the Wilkins factors as to 
when a desire for privacy has been communicated, or has a tenable basis for being 
reasonable. The Hughes barriers are physical (placing a tangible object in between the 
intruder and the subject matter), behaviour (verbal or non-verbal communication that privacy 
is desired), and normative (a societal expectation against intrusion based on social norms). 
Physical, behavioural and normative barriers can increase the reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a place, make an intrusion more intrusive, and/or make the nature of the 
information or activity more intimate.  
 
Although (like the Hughes barriers) all three Wilkins factors are interlinked, it is useful to 
consider them separately. Sometimes it is only by considering each situation in terms of all 
three factors that one can make a useful assessment as to the overall reasonable expectation 
of privacy. However, when a reasonable expectation of privacy in one or two of the factors is 
very high there will often be an overall reasonable expectation of privacy, even if the other 
factor(s) have a low expectation of privacy. One factor can even be completely absent and 
there be an infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy. These ideas will be 
demonstrated at various points throughout the chapter.  
 
A Place 
 
Wilkins includes “place” as one of his three factors because even though it is sometimes not 
determinative of a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as in the cases California v 
Ciraolo230 and Dow Chemical Co v United States231, it is still considered in detail.232 Wilkins 
considers that this is indicative of the fact that a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis 
will always require consideration of place.233 Secondly, although the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test is designed to protect “people, not places”,234 Wilkins views place 
as relevant because of the “types of human conduct likely to occur in particular locales”.235 
The locational inquiry is therefore not so much whether the place is constitutionally 
protected, “but rather whether it is conceptually linked with intimacy and personal 
privacy”.236  
 
The factor of place essentially refers to the location of the alleged intrusion and whether that 
is traditionally associated with privacy rights. It requires detailed consideration of the 
location of the alleged intrusion in order to ascertain the extent to which there may be a 
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reasonable expectation of privacy in the place itself. The purpose of this section is to 
determine which places are most associated with privacy rights. 
 
1 The home 
 
Residential property has the highest expectation of privacy attached to it.237 R v Thomas 
makes plain that privacy embraces the sanctity of the private home238 and the US Fourth 
Amendment explicitly mentions protecting houses.239 The home is protected because it is the 
place where the most intimate activities occur and in which no-one expects to be observed. 
The somewhat trite maxim that “a man’s home is his castle” implies that people can do as 
they please in the privacy of their own home, which would be gratuitously undermined by 
any unwarranted intrusion into the property. This is focused on the building in which a person 
resides rather than the backyard or driveway which will be assessed separately. 
 
New Zealand search and seizure case law draws fine distinctions between different parts of 
the residential home such that although the home itself is at the forefront of the sliding scale 
of expectations of privacy, there are gradations within it.240 The purpose behind assessing 
these distinctions, and why one part has a higher reasonable expectation of privacy than 
another, is because it provides a framework, or a set of ideas, for the analysis of any place 
that is not so obviously private. When a place has a borderline reasonable expectation of 
privacy it is these kinds of concepts and ways of thinking that will allow a relevant 
assessment to be made.  
 
The fine distinctions between different parts of the home require determining which parts are 
intuitively more private than others. Williams points out for example that “the public areas 
will invoke a lesser expectation of privacy than the private areas of the house”.241 Whilst 
Fraser indicates that a public area is one which is “readily visible from outside the 
property”,242 essentially a backyard or a driveway, Williams gives an example of 
“inaccessible areas such as drawers and cupboards” counting as private areas,243 suggesting 
that one could also make a distinction between public and private areas inside a home. By 
pointing out that drawers and cupboards are especially private where they are likely to 
contain intimate correspondence or clothing,244 Williams demonstrates that even within 
buildings there can be a sliding scale of reasonable expectation of privacy. 
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It would seem reasonable to suggest that anywhere in the home with a locked door has a 
higher reasonable expectation of privacy, as this creates a physical barrier that makes the 
room inaccessible. In addition, regardless of whether a bathroom and bedroom have a locked 
door, they should have a greater normative barrier than a living room. As Young v Superior 
Court of Tulare County states: a bathroom or bedroom “is entitled to an expectation of 
privacy far greater than [exists] in the common areas of a house, such as the living room and 
kitchen”.245 In a bathroom intimate activities like showering and undressing occur; bedrooms 
are a space to retreat and carry out intimate or secret activities such as sexual relations, 
secretly reading a copy of Mein Kampf or watching obscene YouTube clips.  
 
Whilst an intrusion into a living room or dining area will invariably infringe a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, they have a lower normative barrier than a bathroom or bedroom as 
they are more public. These are places for example where guests are often entertained. When 
people enter a house it is common for them to be invited into the living room and anyone in 
there is likely to be operating under the assumption that visitors will enter from time to time. 
Consequently people are less likely to be doing something in a living area that they do not 
want others to see. In a dining area, although personal conversations should not be intruded 
upon without consent, the nature of observing someone have a conversation at a dinner table 
does not offend privacy so much as observing someone in a bathroom or bedroom. This is 
perhaps because most people have eaten meals in the presence of others, including strangers 
and vague acquaintances, whereas a person’s bedroom or bathroom are inherently private 
locations for undertaking inherently private activities. Such a normative barrier is highlighted 
by the fact that housemates or family members tend to knock on a bedroom or bathroom door 
before entering. However, a living room can increase its reasonable expectation of privacy 
further by imposing the Hughes barriers to communicate a greater desire for privacy. For 
example by installing a lock on the door or asking guests not to enter the living room. 
 
Plaintiffs in an intrusion into seclusion claim should have little difficulty establishing their 
expectation of privacy when an individual has intruded upon their home, regardless of which 
part of the home has been breached.246  
 
2 Places equivalent to the home 
 
There is also a high expectation of privacy in a private hotel room which is considered 
analogous to a home. The Restatement sees “the defendant forc[ing] his way into the 
plaintiff’s [hotel room]” in the same way as “insist[ing] over the plaintiff’s objection in 
entering his home”.247 The Supreme Court of Canada describes a hotel room as a “home 
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away from home” and states that a hotel room is a “private enclave where we may conduct our 
activities free of uninvited scrutiny”.248 This of course is the same as a private home. However, 
where a person has indiscriminately invited people to a hotel room, such as by passing out 
notices in restaurants and bars, “[i]t is impossible to conclude that a reasonable person, in the 
position of the appellant, would expect privacy in these circumstances”.249 
 
A hospital is viewed similarly to a private home or hotel room. Receiving hospital treatment is 
always going to be considered private because of the personal information it can impart, and 
because treatment is generally intimate and sensitive and can include dealing with parts of the 
human body not usually accessible to the public. This shows a clear link between place and 
nature of activity or information. The place an intrusion occurs will always suggest the nature of 
the activity that might be observed or the nature of information that might be obtained. This link 
and its implications will be expanded upon in the analysis of the third factor. 
 
The reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital was breached in Barber v Time when a 
woman sick in hospital with a rare disease refused to see a reporter, but the reporter entered the 
hospital and took a photograph of her anyway.250 In Shulman a rescue helicopter was seen in the 
same light as a hospital: “a jury could reasonably regard entering and riding in an ambulance - 
whether on the ground or in the air – with two seriously injured patients to be an egregious 
intrusion on a place of expected seclusion”.251 The Court of Appeal had rightly surmised that 
there is no societal permissibility for “media representatives [to] hitch a ride in an ambulance 
and ogle as paramedics care for an injured stranger”.252  
 
Had the presence of someone outside the patients or those associated with the medical fraternity 
been consented to, there would be no reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital or rescue 
helicopter with respect to that person; just as accepting a person’s entry into one’s house or hotel 
room reduces the reasonable expectation of privacy in the place. In De May v Roberts some 
people were present at a birth with permission, but one person was not.253 The unwelcome 
viewer was committing an intrusion into seclusion. Solove points out that a person “can want to 
keep things private from some people but not others”.254 Similarly, Huskey v National 
Broadcasting points out that "[the plaintiffs] visibility to some people does not strip him of the 
right to remain secluded from others. Persons are exposed to family members and invited 
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guests in their own homes, but that does not mean they have opened the door to television 
cameras”.255  
 
In places such as the home, the hotel or the hospital, proactive consent is needed for the presence 
of those who are not free to come and go as they please. This means that where patients, due to 
their condition, are not “in a position to keep careful watch on who [is] riding with them, or to 
inquire as to everyone’s business and consent or object to their presence” there is no passive 
acceptance of everyone who is there.256 Instead a behavioural barrier seems to be assumed.257 In 
general, in places of the highest reasonable expectation of privacy, such as a family home, a 
private hotel room or a hospital, there is a normative expectation that people will only enter if 
they have requested to do so, and their request has been accepted.  
 
It is suggested that, as with the home, the tort of intrusion into seclusion will generally be made 
out if there is an intrusion into a person’s hotel or hospital room. 
 
3 What role does the proprietary interest play in an assessment of place? 
 
The fact that there is a high reasonable expectation of privacy in a private hotel room and in a 
hospital suggests that the notion of proprietary interest is irrelevant to an assessment of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a place. A reasonable expectation of privacy “should not 
become dominated by formal proprietary notions given the universal nature of the rights it 
protects”.258 Privacy interests are to be “assessed objectively without any concentration on 
property rights”.259  
 
Section 21 of BORA is worded to include the phrase “whether of the person, property, 
correspondence or otherwise”, in order to ensure the privacy interest protected by an 
unreasonable search and seizure measure is broader than a simple property interest.260 For 
example, an unreasonable search and seizure on a child in the family home can still create 
liability, despite the child having no proprietary interest.261  
 
R v Jefferies for example focused on the importance of s 21 for defending “those values or 
interests which make up the concept of privacy”.262 This means that a person can have a 
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reasonable expectation of privacy in something he or she has no proprietary interest in. This 
is no different from the intrusion into seclusion tort.  
 
The American search and seizure case law follows a similar path. Although the Fourth 
Amendment specifically states that people have the right to be “secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects”, the house comes, not just to be protected for the proprietary 
interest, but because of the privacy interest as well – that is, “the human activities innately 
associated” with it.263 Katz, well-known for adopting a flexible reasonable expectation of 
privacy analysis for resolving search and seizure issues, dismissed proprietary requirements 
of search and seizure in the USA, the Court stating, as mentioned above, that it protects 
“people, not places”.264 That of course does not mean that places are irrelevant, only that one 
of the purposes of including the location in a reasonable expectation analysis is in it being “an 
analytical tool to determine what conduct and activities people reasonably could assume 
would remain private”.265  
 
Recent Supreme Court case law suggests a departure from this approach. United States v 
Jones,266 “which held that attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s car…constitutes a physical 
intrusion upon the car”,267 potentially shifts the paradigm back from reasonable expectations 
of privacy to common law trespass. Five judges decided the case based on trespass and four 
reached the same decision via reasonable expectation of privacy.  
 
Erica Goldberg agrees with the decision, contending that “reliance on the value-laden notion 
of reasonable expectation of privacy” erodes Fourth Amendment rights.268 Whilst Harlan J, 
who established the reasonable expectation of privacy test in Katz, states that judges should 
not merely “recite the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling 
them upon society”,269 Goldberg criticises this reasonable expectation of privacy approach for 
giving judges “the power to dictate to society when society’s assumptions about privacy [are] 
acceptable”.270 
 
If the proprietary approach of United States v Jones continues to be adopted, common law 
trespass will mean that any trespass regardless of whether there are strong Hughes’ barriers or 
no barriers at all, will be treated the same. It will mean that any situation in which there is no 
trespass will not be a breach of privacy. If this continues to be adopted, there will be little use 
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in New Zealand looking to contemporary US search and seizure case law to assist in 
determining when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
4 Relevance of place as a factor in its own right 
 
Clearly the nature of the place can indicate the nature of the activities that take place there 
and the kind of information sought by an intrusion. One could suggest that this does not just 
demonstrate one way location and nature of activity/information can be closely related, but 
that location as a factor in its own right is superfluous because it is merely a tool to determine 
the more important question of the activity taking place. Such a suggestion seems flawed 
though as this could lead to intrusions on innocuous domestic activity in some parts of the 
home being considered acceptable.  
 
The nature of a place like a private residence should mean that any activity taking place there, 
even those that seem innocuous such as reading a book or sweeping the floor, has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because of the location in which it occurs. That is, 
activities have differing reasonable expectations of privacy depending on where they take 
place. For example, a person reading a book at home has a much higher reasonable 
expectation of privacy than a person reading a book in a park, because the person reading a 
book in a park has knowingly and willingly exposed him or herself to the public gaze. The 
main reason for this is that the home is viewed as the quintessential private space for which 
intrusions infringe upon reasonable expectations of privacy per se. Any intrusion in the home 
weakens its psychological primacy as a place where people can be themselves, free from the 
burden of carefully constructing their desired public persona. The inviolability of the home271 
would be lost regardless of the actions that occurred to upset the sanctity of the space. 
 
Of course the home is not completely impenetrable. Whilst the highest reasonable 
expectations of privacy will exist in a home, these can be superseded by the public interest in 
ascertaining whether a person is breaking the law or harming others.272 
 
5 Rented lockers and contents of bags  
 
Places other than the home, hotels and hospitals to have been considered by Canadian search 
and seizure cases to have a reasonable expectation of privacy, although not as high, are a 
rented locker273 and the contents of a bag.274 A rented locker is a place rented to someone to 
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store belongings. It presumably requires a key to get into, contains contents that the person 
who has rented the locker has hidden from public view, and is a space to which only he or she 
should normatively have access. A bag also has a physical barrier when it is shut, with the 
difficulty level required to access it suggesting how strong the physical barrier is and 
therefore the level at which it has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Even if a zip is 
accidentally left open, there is a normative barrier that a person’s bag, like a locker, may 
contain highly intimate or secret effects. The reasonable expectation of privacy in a bag may 
also fluctuate slightly on the basis of the place the bag is located. 
 
6 Curtilage and driveway 
 
The curtilage is the land immediately surrounding a house or dwelling excluding any open 
fields beyond.275 It is not always clear where a curtilage starts and ends but United States v 
Dunn considered four factors: (1) the area’s proximity to the home, (2) “whether the area is 
included within an enclosure surrounding the home”, (3) how the area is used, and (4) the 
extent the area is protected from observation.276 The driveway is often considered as 
“included within the curtilage”.277 However, some courts see it as a separate entity, 
“analog[ising] a private driveway to an open field”278 or stating that it is “not enclosed in a 
manner that shield[s] it from [outside] view”.279 
 
The curtilage has a high reasonable expectation of privacy because people use it to engage in 
“intimate activity associated with the sanctity of [the] home and the privacies of life”.280 The 
driveway also has a high reasonable expectation of privacy, although it is often lower than the 
curtilage because of the implied licence to walk through and knock on the door.281 
Additionally, the driveway can usually be seen by anyone passing by. Therefore the privacy 
of the driveway can differ depending on any physical barrier such as a high fence preventing 
access and obscuring the view, or a behavioural barrier such as any communication asking 
the general public for privacy. If the driveway is completely hidden from view and there are 
signs stating “no entry”, then the reasonable expectation of privacy will be particularly high. 
 
In the recent New Zealand intrusion case Faesenkloet v Jenkin the part of the driveway that 
was filmed “was a distance away from the Faesenkloet home” and was not used exclusively 
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by Mr Faesenkloet, instead being “open to the public”.282 Asher J held there to be no 
reasonable expectation of privacy, stating that “the road end of a driveway that is not in the 
immediate vicinity of the house, is not an area that is traditionally highly private, even if it is 
privately owned”.283 Asher J however, paid scant attention to what arguably gives a driveway 
a reasonable expectation of privacy: the possibility that it can provide information regarding 
every time a person enters or leaves the Faesenkloet premises. In other words, the driveway 
itself could facilitate an unacceptable information gathering exercise on Mr Faesenkloet’s 
daily interactions. This could have the effect of altering the visitation habits to the property or 
at least make Mr Faesenkloet uncomfortable that a metaphorical “big brother” is watching. 
Although information gathering on visitors was arguably not the purpose of Mr Jenkin’s 
camera, the factor of place considers the likelihood of intruding upon private activity and 
information. The case is therefore a useful example of the importance of deconstructing the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test in the manner advocated in this thesis. 
 
7 Open fields 
 
Land that is attached to residential use has a higher expectation of privacy because it is 
“associated with [the intimacies] of domestic life”.284 It should therefore be more readily 
protected by the intrusion tort than open fields. Open fields “do not provide the setting for 
those intimate activities…intended to [be] shelter[ed] from…interference”.285 However, just 
as distinctions can be made between different parts of the home,286 open fields in a New 
Zealand context should also be distinguished from each other in terms of differing 
expectations of privacy. An open field should have a higher reasonable expectation of privacy 
in circumstances where a desire for privacy has been communicated, for example by a 
physical barrier such as an unmovable, high, strong fence. Such a physical barrier might also 
create a normative barrier that society would want to protect the privacy of someone who has 
gone to those lengths to try and avoid being disturbed. This indicates that when a subjective 
desire for privacy is communicated strongly, such as by the Hughes barriers, a place that 
ostensibly lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy can develop one. 
 
8 Criticism of a sliding scale of expectation of privacy: the automobile exception 
 
The question could be asked as to why there should be a sliding scale of reasonable 
expectation of privacy in different parts of the home or between open fields in different 
contexts, given that it makes it difficult for a potential intruder to work out whether a 
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reasonable expectation of privacy is likely to be infringed. American search and seizure case 
law has indicated distaste for such distinctions and prefers to provide clarity that open fields 
will always have a much lower expectation of privacy than the home, rather than forcing 
intruders to second-guess at which point an open field develops an expectation of privacy.287 
 
One of the reasons that a desire for a more blanket than nuanced approach arose was due to 
the automobile exception for search and seizures in the USA. A motor vehicle was noted in 
United States v Chadwick as having a lower expectation of privacy as “its function is 
transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or the repository of personal 
effects”.288 It was this sentiment that originally created the automobile exception which 
essentially meant that a warrantless search of a motor vehicle with “probable cause” to 
believe it contained contraband was reasonable.289 In New Zealand, cars have also been 
considered to have lesser reasonable expectations of privacy, with Jefferies reasoning this to 
be so because cars travel on public roads290 and are subject to extensive government 
regulation.291 At the same time, a car with a current warrant and registration which is being 
driven in a legitimate manner provides no reason to be intruded upon. These considerations 
should, however, be part of a public interest analysis that occurs after evaluating a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.292 Jefferies is correct that there is a lesser reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a car compared to the home; nevertheless it still has a high reasonable expectation 
of privacy. A car has physical barriers of locked doors and closed windows which prevent 
people entering without permission, and is often perceived as a private space in which 
personal items are often carried or temporarily stored.  
 
It is this kind of reasoning that enabled Chadwick to find that despite there being no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a car per se, luggage “is intended as a repository of 
personal effects” and therefore some containers inside a vehicle may be protected by 
reasonable expectations of privacy if they are intended to carry personal items.293 This meant 
that each container in a car was assessed on whether it was intended as a repository of 
personal effects, culminating in the decision of United States v Ross in which there were two 
containers: a zipped leather pouch and an unsealed brown paper sack, one containing drugs 
and the other proceeds from drugs.294 Were one to follow the line of cases on containers, the 
likely conclusion would be that a zipped leather pouch has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy because these are typically used for carrying personal items, and because the physical 
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barrier of the closed zip communicates a desire for its contents to remain private. However, 
sacks do not typically carry personal belongings, particularly when they are unsealed. The 
fact that the decision could come down to the finest of distinctions, such as whether the sack 
was sealed or not, was seen as exacting too great a price in having to determine reasonable 
expectations of privacy through an “unmanageable vortex of factual complexity”.295 
 
Consequently, US v Ross broadened the scope of the automobile exception saying that: “if 
probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of 
every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search”.296 This of 
course meant that any luggage inside a vehicle did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy that could prevent the searching of said luggage. The broad brush approach to cars, 
extended to include containers inside cars, has been applied to other situations of reasonable 
expectation of privacy, such as the previously mentioned open fields in Oliver. 
 
Whilst the Ross approach might have been necessary due to the policy considerations 
underpinning the particular context of police searches of cars, it does not translate well into 
the civil context, and therefore should not be applied more broadly. Were such an approach to 
be applied to intrusion into seclusion it would certainly provide clear guidelines for 
reasonable expectation of privacy; but it would be a crude approach at the expense of nuance. 
It would in effect make the other factors of the tripartite approach, namely intrusiveness and 
nature of activity/information, almost redundant. It is only by assessing the unique 
circumstances of each place in regards to the Hughes barriers, and looking at the extent of the 
intrusion and the activities taking place there, that a sensible assessment can be made.  
 
This thesis rejects the one size fits all approach and favours flexibility in assessing reasonable 
expectations of privacy when applying intrusion into seclusion, because it makes sense to 
approach each case on its very specific merits and because it accords with the New Zealand 
case law on search and seizure that Whata J pointed to in C v Holland.297 That means using 
all three Wilkins factors to assess each example within a category such as open fields, and 
thereby determine each example’s own unique level of reasonable expectation of privacy. It 
is not enough to reject a nuanced approach by bringing up an example of a case where 
flexibility in assessing reasonable expectations of privacy is problematic, such as that 
described in United States v Ross, and use it to justify an overly simplistic approach to a 
concept of detailed complexity. It is not too much for private citizens to consider open fields 
or luggage with greater barriers in place, or which are more likely to contain large amounts of 
personal information, as potentially deserving a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
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9 Written correspondence 
  
One place in which there should be a high reasonable expectation of privacy is in “personal 
papers, such as diaries, personal correspondence and other documents revealing the personal 
lifestyle of that person”.298 This is because there is an assumption that personal papers are 
very likely to reveal personal information about an individual. For example in Birnbaum v 
USA it was held to be an intrusion into seclusion that the Central Intelligence Agency 
covertly opened and reproduced “first class mail which American citizens sent to, or received 
from, the Soviet Union” for twenty years.299  
 
In the modern age this would almost certainly extend to text messages, emails or Facebook 
private messages, as for similar reasons to personal papers there should be a high reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the likes of a mobile phone or email inbox. These places will 
invariably reveal a large amount of personal information. Even if a person asked a friend to 
hold onto a non-password protected phone for a few minutes while he or she went to the 
bathroom, that would still not amount to acceptance that the contents of said phone could be 
perused with abandon. This would be a bit like an invited guest in a person’s house looking 
through the cupboards while the host was out of the room.  
 
The New Zealand tort should recognise however, that there can be some fluctuation in the 
reasonable expectation of privacy depending on the place where a mobile phone or personal 
letter is found and scrutinised. Intruding upon a phone in a person’s house might have a 
higher reasonable expectation of privacy, for instance, than intruding on a phone discovered 
on a park bench.  
 
10 Public places 
 
The lowest reasonable expectation of privacy occurs in a public place, as previously 
suggested in the BSA context.300 In most cases a public place does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Intuitively this is because when people are in public they know that 
everything they do can be seen by others. However, a public place should not preclude there 
being a reasonable expectation of privacy.301 As Elias CJ argued, “if those observed or 
overheard reasonably consider themselves out of sight or earshot, secret observation of them 
or secret listening to their conversations may well intrude upon personal freedom”.302  
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Hosking in the context of publicity of private facts noted that “in exceptional cases a person 
might be entitled to restrain additional publicity being given to the fact that they were present 
on the street in particular circumstances”.303 There are exceptional cases which demonstrate 
this. For example Daily Times Democrat v Graham found liability for a photograph taken of 
a woman whose dress was accidentally blown up.304 Andrews, in a private facts context, held 
that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation despite the incident 
occurring in public.305 Intrusions in public places can therefore give rise to liability in 
extreme situations; “a purely mechanical application of legal principles should not be 
permitted to create an illogical conclusion”.306 Hence it should not be automatically assumed 
that there can be no liability in such a location. Instead, a public place should provide a 
starting point that there is a much lower reasonable expectation of privacy, therefore 
requiring that the actions be particularly intrusive and infringing on obviously sensitive 
activity or information, in order to find liability.  
 
Whilst the level of intrusiveness and the nature of the activity or information will often be 
determinative as to whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public place, 
there must also be analysis of the public place itself. Not every public place has the same 
reasonable expectation of privacy and must be assessed on its merits by such factors as 
physical and normative barriers. Consequently, a person behind a bush has a higher 
expectation of privacy than a person standing in the middle of an open field both because a 
bush creates a physical barrier, and because normatively a person who is hidden from view 
should have a higher societal expectation not to be intruded upon. Additionally, a person on a 
little used side street has a higher expectation of privacy than a person in a busy shopping 
mall, and in Shulman the fact that the wreckage of the accident was located off the highway 
created a higher reasonable expectation of privacy than if the cars had been in the middle of 
the road.307 
 
An assessment of a public place should examine both empirical and normative 
considerations. Empirical considerations are the actual probability that “there will be a 
privacy incursion in this situation”.308 A smaller number of people will see a person behind a 
bush than will see that person in the middle of an open field, and far fewer people will view a 
person in a quiet side street than on a busy main road. As previously indicated, normative 
considerations are those that indicate, based on social norms, when society objectively 
believes privacy should be respected. Empirical considerations intertwine with normative 
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considerations in regard to reasonable expectations of privacy. When the prima facie 
normative considerations suggest that there may be no reasonable expectation of privacy, 
because for example the intrusion has occurred in a public place, this can potentially change 
based on empirical considerations. If the place is such that despite it being nominally public it 
is unlikely that anyone would hear the conversation, then there is more likely to be a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the location. For example, the actual amount of people in 
a place can change the extent to which it has a reasonable expectation of privacy. A normally 
busy shop in which people can usually overhear parts of other people’s conversations may 
have a different reasonable expectation of privacy on a day when very few customers visit the 
shop. Normatively, society might expect that if no-one is around, a reasonable expectation of 
privacy may be created more easily.309 
 
All this means that public and private should exist on a spectrum rather than be classified as 
binary notions. Despite the fact that both are nominally public, there is a huge distinction 
between being filmed in a very public protest on parliament’s steps, and sitting on the 
roadside of a severely underpopulated rural area. There are also situations that are far more 
complex to place on the privacy spectrum, which sit in between these two more obvious 
examples. For example, people with no banners sitting in the back row of a sport’s match that 
is attended by 100,000 people might expect to be anonymous, and therefore assume that the 
camera is not pointing at them, but the fact that the game is so well attended and is being 
simultaneously broadcast to millions, indicates that they should know the risk.  
 
The limits of the view that public and private are binary are exemplified in the BSA decision 
of Davies v TVNZ. In this decision the complainant was unsuccessful because even though he 
was collecting shellfish in Whangaroa Harbour where a limited number of people could view 
him, he was considered to be in a public place.310 This decision neglected to consider that 
public place is on a sliding scale. A person can still suffer an actionable intrusion if a small 
subset of the public is able to see what is occurring. Additionally, even in some very busy 
places there are conversations in which it would be improbable for the participants to be 
overheard. Therefore the BSA decision of CanWest TVWorks Ltd v XY311 may also have been 
a poor one. Although the filmed conversation was deemed to occur in a public place due to it 
occurring at a busy airport check-in counter, it was “unlikely that more than a handful of 
people would have been able to observe [or hear] the exchange”.312 
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In the very recent decision of PG v Television New Zealand Ltd the BSA upheld an intrusion 
that occurred in a public place.313 The complainant was filmed in his boat in the Marlborough 
Sounds, “not wearing any pants”, and with a towel wrapped around his waist instead.314 The 
BSA noted affirmatively315 Moreham’s assertion that “potential exposure to passers-by at the 
time that the events occurred is not enough to make them public for all purposes”.316 The 
BSA held that “no other boats were visible in proximity to him”317 and was influenced by the 
fact “PG stated he objected to the filming”318 which constituted a behavioural barrier. 
 
The idea of reserve helps afford a reasonable expectation of privacy even when in public. 
Altman describes personal space as “an “invisible” boundary or separation between the self 
and others”319 and Solove describes “privacy” as including civility and respect of not 
interfering in personal space.320 He elaborates that seclusion is relative and just because some 
people can see and hear them does not mean the whole world should be able to.321 When the 
zone of personal space is broken, there is potential liability, depending on how and the extent 
to which it is broken.322  
 
11 Semi-public places 
 
Courts applying the Holland tort will also have to decide what to do with places which can be 
classified as semi-public, such as some places of work. Whilst a hospital can be clearly 
demarcated between a public waiting area and a private treatment area, some places of 
employment can easily be viewed as either semi-public or partially private. There is a low 
reasonable expectation of privacy in places such as retail stores in which anyone can browse 
(subject to the aforementioned considerations like how busy it is), but there would be a higher 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the staff quarters to which the general public is not 
admitted. Sometimes, however, a staff area is not exclusively for staff, creating blurred lines.  
 
In PETA v Bobby Berosini a dancer secretly filmed Berosini “grabbing, slapping, punching 
and shaking” his orang-utans before going on stage to perform with them.323 “The area in 
question was demarcated by curtains which kept backstage personnel from entering the 
staging area where Berosini made last-minute preparations”.324 Even though the curtains 
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created a physical barrier, and Berosini reportedly created a behavioural barrier by 
demanding that he be left alone with his animals before going on stage, he was not 
considered to have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Part of the reason is that the video 
camera was only doing what other backstage personnel were also permissibly doing. That is, 
they were able to catch glimpses of what Berosini was doing with his animals as he was 
going on stage. On the other hand, backstage personnel are a subset of the public; his actions 
were not viewable to the community at large.325 
 
Likewise in Bogie v Rosenberg it was not an infringement of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy to film a person who had gone backstage to obtain an autograph, as the backstage 
area was crowded, and the “conversation took place immediately after the comedian exited 
the stage in the plain view and company of four other individuals”.326 In both cases the Court 
held that busy backstage areas are semi-private areas that do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for the performer or the autograph hunter. 
 
A semi-public area in which a large number of co-workers can see or hear what is going on 
can still create a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Sanders327 “the plaintiff could have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy against a television reporter’s covert videotaping”328 of a 
personal conversation between co-workers, “to which the general public did not have 
unfettered access”,329 despite “the plaintiff lack[ing] a reasonable expectation of complete 
privacy because he was visible and audible to other co-workers”.330 The court may also have 
been influenced by the reporter masquerading as a bona fide co-worker.331 
 
These cases demonstrate that the assessment of a reasonable expectation of privacy in semi-
public places is not only interested in how many people can actually hear or see any 
particular situation, but what section(s) of the public have access to what is occurring and the 
general likelihood of people using that access. In other words a semi-public place that is only 
visible or audible to a small subsection of the population has a higher reasonable expectation 
of privacy than a place that is accessible to a large subsection of the population as the more 
people who have the potential to witness the events, the more public is the place. In Sanders 
it is the normative consideration of the lack of unfettered public access and the access to only 
co-workers that is determinative. Having said that, the empirical consideration of the actual 
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amount of people who can see or hear an interaction should always be an important part of an 
overall determination. 
 
It is suggested, then, that when considering semi-public places in the intrusion context, every 
area that is not obviously completely public or private must be assessed according to its 
merits, such as by asking who is permitted to be in the area and how many people are in the 
vicinity at the time of the intrusion.  
 
12 Digital hacking  
 
The usefulness of the notion of place is not limited to physical locations. Actions like digital 
hacking or gathering information from the internet can also be analysed in terms of place. 
The way that place can be conceived in such a situation is as a virtual place. The internet is 
usually a public virtual place, although sometimes it can be seen as semi-public or even 
private. Personal files on a person’s computer are stored in a private virtual place. In other 
words, the straightforward intercepting of “information voluntarily transmitted by consumers 
via the Internet” that is unencrypted and therefore willingly exposed to the public will always 
have a lower reasonable expectation of privacy than the hacking of a seemingly secure 
private computer server.332 “The bulk of the information stored on personal computers … is 
not normally made available to the public and therefore should be considered private”.333 
 
When one considers information voluntarily transmitted by consumers over the internet, this 
is problematic as it is difficult to categorise what exactly is meant by this phrase. The best 
way of considering it can be proposed as follows. Any social media post or comment on a 
message-board, or information written down on a website will have a limited expectation of 
privacy that is dependent upon how accessible it is to the person who obtains it. If for 
example a person makes a public Facebook post, this can be viewed by anyone – regardless 
of whether or not he or she is friends with that person, or even if he or she does not have a 
personal Facebook profile. This is essentially a virtual public place as people from the public 
can view it if they wish. As with public places in the physical world, even though this is a 
virtual public place there will always be the consideration of how many people will view or 
are likely to view the post. A person with only twenty Facebook friends whose public post is 
not “liked” (liking provides exposure) or seen anywhere else on the internet is similar to an 
uninhabited side street. Both are ostensibly in public, but neither have many people there. 
Alternatively a person who makes a public post which receives 1,000 “likes” from his/her 
2,000 Facebook friends, 5,000 “likes” from members of the public, is “shared” by 100 people 
to his or her own Facebook friends, and is quoted in two news articles, has made a post in a 
very public way. This is akin to walking down the main street of a city in a very noticeable 
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way. In the latter scenario it becomes almost impossible to have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. However, in the former scenario, there may be an action deemed intrusive enough to 
infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is harder to ascertain than in the quiet 
public place in the physical world as will become clear in the second factor of intrusiveness. 
 
A Facebook post with the audience set to “friends” is a semi-private virtual place. If it is read 
by a Facebook friend it is like having a conversation with a co-worker that no-one outside of 
the work place has access to. Therefore a Facebook post with the audience set to ‘friends’ 
that is read by a Facebook friend can have little expectation of privacy with respect to that 
Facebook friend. The person has voluntarily exposed information to a set number of people 
who have access to it, with only those people reading it. If, however, someone outside that 
person’s Facebook friends accesses it, there is more likely to be an infringement of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy as objectively the person should not have been able to 
access it. This would be similar to a member of the public hearing a conversation between 
two co-workers in a workplace that excludes members of the public. It is a semi-private place 
because only a subset of the public has access to it, and once someone outside that subset 
reads it, it invokes concerns about a possible infringement of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
 
Data on the internet that can be considered as existing in a similarly private virtual place as 
personal files on a person’s computer; is that which no-one, or a very limited number of 
trusted people, has access to. Such data is that which is encrypted on the internet in order that 
only the person who encrypted it, and perhaps a small number of trusted associates, is able to 
view it.334 The original data which cannot be seen because it has been encrypted can be 
regarded as existing in a private virtual place. 
 
Ultimately it seems logical to analyse digital hacking in terms of place, in the above way. 
 
B Intrusiveness 
 
Wilkins’ second factor in determining a reasonable expectation of privacy is that of 
intrusiveness. This is the only one of the factors that focuses on the actions of the intruder 
rather than what is actually intruded upon, and is therefore couched in the language of 
infringing a reasonable expectation of privacy rather than having a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Although it does not lend itself to easy definition, it has been recognised by judges 
and academics alike.  
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Wilkins points out that by considering whether surveillance of the curtilage for marijuana 
plants was done in a physically intrusive or non-intrusive manner, the Supreme Court in 
Ciraolo emphasised “the degree of intrusiveness [as] a central factor” in a reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis.335 Daniel Pesciotta also notes that “[t]he [Supreme] Court has 
considered the degree of intrusiveness” as a factor in several Fourth Amendment cases.336 
 
Whereas the Court in Ciraolo emphasised the presence or absence of a physical intrusion, in 
Katz the intrusiveness factor was considered to include anything that “unreasonably intrudes 
upon the person”.337 The Katz conception of intrusiveness appears to be implicitly favoured 
in Wilkins’ analysis,338 and it is explicitly favoured in this thesis. As Powell J (dissenting in 
Ciraolo) persuasively points out, an emphasis on physical intrusion “provides no real 
protection against surveillance techniques made possible through technology”.339 Katz 
provides clear flexibility for the intrusiveness enquiry to evolve providing that the focus is on 
the extent that the perpetrator’s behaviour intrudes upon the victim. This could be through 
electronic devices, something more overtly physically intrusive, or any method that 
unacceptably impinges on another person’s dignity and autonomy. As it was expressed in the 
search and seizure context, “it is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offen[c]e; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible 
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property”.340 
 
The key points the New Zealand intrusion into seclusion tort should consider in this factor are 
both the intrusiveness of the method used, and the degree to which the method in question is 
employed. Intrusiveness can essentially be assessed by considering how demeaning the 
actions are, and the severity to which they attack a person’s dignity. 
 
1 The degree to which the method in question is employed 
 
The following sections will analyse different methods of intrusion and the extent to which 
they are intrusive. However, prior to that it is useful to consider the other prong of 
intrusiveness: the degree to which the method in question is employed. In essence, this 
considers that intrusions using the same method can still differ in their intrusiveness, 
depending on such factors as how long they are employed for, how many photographs are 
taken, or the strength of the zoom lens used.  
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The following comparison of two cases illustrates this. In Maryland v Macon there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the goods in a retail shop such that would prevent two 
officers from making a brief stop for some purchases to investigate their legality.341 However, 
in Lo-Ji v New York officers spending hours in a store conducting wholesale searches meant 
that reasonable expectation of privacy was infringed.342 Normatively, there is a reasonable 
expectation that a person’s business not be subjected to the intrusiveness of such a 
comprehensive investigation of its contents. It impedes the owner’s ability in his or her 
private space to conduct business.343   
 
Another example sees Justice Alito stating that "short-term monitoring of a person’s 
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy" but "the use of longer 
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offences impinges on expectations of 
privacy”.344 Long-term surveillance is demanding and costly, therefore society would expect 
empirically, that it is unlikely to be carried out. Normatively it should also be considered as 
unacceptable because it involves extensive and potentially humiliating incursions into 
people’s lives, impeding their autonomy and damaging their dignity. Whether or not short-
term monitoring does accord with expectations of privacy, it certainly has a lower expectation 
of privacy because it is less intrusive than long-term monitoring. Similarly, the longer video 
surveillance lasts, the more intrusive it is. 
 
In Boring v Google Inc, a vehicle entering an ungated driveway and taking a photograph of 
the view was not considered intrusive enough to infringe a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.345 Any person could enter the driveway and see “the external view of the Borings’ 
house, garage, and pool”, and the photograph is no more than could be seen on the internet.346 
However, if the vehicle had stayed down the driveway for a much longer time despite 
attempts to get it to leave, and numerous less generic photographs been taken, then the 
actions would have been more intrusive and potentially infringed a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
 
The degree to which the method in question is employed is also determinative in a number of 
employee monitoring cases in the USA.347 As discussed in “place”; personal correspondence, 
such as an email or a text message, generally has a high reasonable expectation of privacy 
because of the likelihood that it will reveal personal information. When personal 
                                                            
341 Maryland v Macon 472 US 463 (1985). 
342 Lo-Ji v New York 442 US 347 (1979). 
343 Both cases are also discussed in Wilkins, above n 8, at 1117-1119. 
344 Jones v United States 362 US 257 (1960). 
345 Boring v Google Inc 362 Fed Appx 273 (3rd Cir 2010). 
346 At 279. 
347 Although these may be covered by the Privacy Act in New Zealand (see above in III B 3 (b) at 30-31) they 
help elucidate the concept of the degree to which a particular method is employed. 
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correspondence is sent to a person’s place of work, the determining factor will often be the 
extent to which the employer intrudes upon that correspondence.  
 
In Roth v Farner-Bocken it was a potential intrusion into seclusion for an employer to read a 
letter written to an ex-employee, even though the employer did not expect it to be addressed 
to the employee personally.348 The reason for this decision is that the employer did not just 
read enough to ascertain that it was a private letter, but becoming aware that the nature of the 
information in the letter is private he read all the contents regardless.349 Reading the letter 
was not intrusive until the employer read enough to ascertain that the letter was a private one. 
Consequently, the longer that the employer read beyond this point, the more intrusive his or 
her actions were.350 
 
In summary then, the greater the degree to which the method in question is used, the more 
cumulatively demeaning and disrespectful it is, and therefore the more intrusive.  
 
2 Intrusiveness of the method used 
 
This section will consider a variety of different methods and how intrusive they are. It will 
consider for example why electronic surveillance is more intrusive than just watching 
someone, and whether the likes of harassment, and interference with abandoned property, are 
intrusive.  
 
(a) Electronic surveillance 
 
Contrary to the indication in Ciraolo, some non-physical intrusions are highly intrusive and 
will easily infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, technology in 
contemporary society renders electronic surveillance as one of the most intrusive actions a 
person can do.351 This is highlighted by C v Holland in which the video footage of a flatmate 
in the shower was considered to be so obviously an infringement of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy that analysis was not required.352  
 
Video surveillance is likely to have a high reasonable expectation of privacy because it is 
highly intrusive on a personal level. It is an affront to a people’s dignity because it intrudes 
                                                            
348 Roth v Farner-Bocken 667 N W 2d 651 (SD 2003). 
349 At 661. 
350 Similarly, in Watkins v L M Berry & Co 704 F 2d 577 (11th Cir 1983) the company informed its employees 
that their calls were to be routinely listened to, but only long enough to determine if they are of a personal 
nature. Potential liability was found when the employer continued to listen to a call after becoming aware that it 
was personal. 
351 Goldberg, above n 243, at 68 actually considers “an electronic connection to an individual’s property … [as] 
a physical intrusion, albeit on a microscopic level”. 
352 At [6] and [99]. 
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upon their ability to keep information private, and to converse intimately with whomever they 
like.  
 
For example, filming people spending time in their property, by setting up a video camera, is 
much more intrusive than the naked eye looking through a crack in the fence. This is because 
recording something with a video is more intrusive than seeing it with the naked eye. 
“Television surveillance is exceedingly intrusive”, “inherently indiscriminate” and “could be 
grossly abused”.353 A video can be watched numerous times allowing the footage to leave a 
much more indelible impression in the mind than seeing something once in real life. It can 
also provide extra details, either from a video’s capability to enhance the images or by 
pausing on a one second moment in real life, for a much longer period of time. It also has the 
potential to be shared. Therefore if for instance a couple are surreptitiously viewed having 
sexual intercourse, this will be less humiliating and demeaning for them than if it was 
captured on video and watched repeatedly.  
 
Video surveillance in comparison with viewing by the naked eye can also relate to the degree 
to which the method in question is employed. This is because video surveillance has the 
potential to be carried out for hours or days depending on such factors as battery life and tape 
space, but a human being undertaking surveillance with the naked eye will normally do so for 
a shorter period of time because he or she can easily become tired or hungry.   
 
(i) Whether electronic surveillance needs to be viewed or listened to, and whether it 
needs to capture the person 
 
Intrusive technological methods do not necessarily require that the fruits of such methods be 
proven to have been viewed or listened to by the intruder. For example in Harkey v Abate 
“see-through panels in the ceiling of the women’s restroom, allowing surreptitious 
observation of the restroom’s interior”354 were seen as an intrusion into seclusion even 
though it could not be proven that Abate had viewed the plaintiff or her daughter.355 The case 
held that “the installation of the hidden viewing devices alone constitutes” infringement of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.356 This decision was based on Hamberger v Eastman in 
which installing an eavesdropping device in the plaintiffs’ bedroom was an intrusion into 
seclusion even though it could not be proved the defendant “overheard any sounds or voices 
originating from the plaintiffs’ bedroom”.357  
 
                                                            
353 United States v Torres 751 F 2d 875 (7th Cir 1984) at 882. 
354 Gorman, above n 308, at 230. 
355 Harkey v Abate 346 NW 2d 74 (Mich App 1983). 
356 At 76. 
357 Hamberger v Eastman 106 NH 107 (1964) at 112. 
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Hernandez v Hillsides suggests that where it can be proven that the perpetrator did not use the 
equipment to directly record the plaintiff, there will be no actionable intrusion into 
seclusion.358 This is likely to be because this will show that there was no intentional and 
unauthorised intrusion on that person. However, care must be taken to prove that no private 
matters of the plaintiff were recorded, as a person can clearly suffer from an intrusion into 
seclusion when something associated with that person is intruded upon. For example, 
perpetual video surveillance of a person’s property that never captures the person is still an 
intrusion which is likely to infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore it is only 
in some circumstances that the absence of the plaintiff from recordings should absolve a 
potential intrusion into seclusion.  
 
In a situation where it is unable to be proven either way whether the plaintiff has been viewed 
or heard by the electronic surveillance, or whether the electronic surveillance itself has been 
viewed or heard, there seems to be an assumption in favour of the plaintiff. It has been briefly 
suggested that res ipsa loquitur be a possibility when it comes to attempted surveillance.359 
This would essentially operate such that where surveillance equipment is demonstrated to 
have been installed, the burden of proof moves to the defendant to prove on the balance of 
probabilities that he or she did not operate the device when the plaintiff (or anything 
associated with the plaintiff) was present, or that if the device was operated that he or she did 
not see or hear anything of or related to the plaintiff on it.  
 
(ii) Electronic surveillance in public places 
 
There is likely to be no infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy for “[m]ere 
observation by the naked eye” in a public place.360 This indicates that in order for intrusions 
in public places to be actionable, the intrusiveness of electronic equipment is generally 
required. Despite Prosser’s contention that it is not an invasion of privacy to follow a person 
or take his or her photograph in a public place,361 every potential intrusion in a public place 
must be assessed on its merits as to its intrusiveness.  
 
For example an inadvertently embarrassing gust of wind revealing a woman’s undergarments 
was sufficiently intrusive to create a reasonable expectation of privacy in the USA in Daily 
Times Democrat v Graham only because the moment was captured on camera.362 Although it 
has been argued that taking a photograph “is not significantly different from maintaining the 
mental impression of the scene”,363 the earlier discussion demonstrates that there is a 
                                                            
358 Hernandez v Hillsides 47 Cal 4th 272 (2009). 
359 Gorman, above n 308, at 232. 
360 Butler and Butler, above n 298, at 948. 
361 Prosser, above n 178, at 391-392. 
362 Daily Times Democrat, above n 304. 
363 Gorman, above n 308, at 251.  
   74
compelling difference. People who saw the woman’s underwear with the naked eye were not 
sufficiently intruding as it was something they could not help but see. All they will have is an 
abiding memory of the incident. However, people taking photographs indicate “that they wish 
to disseminate footage of the incident or to re-visit it for their own gratification”, making the 
“indignity even worse”.364  
 
The level of intrusiveness should also depend upon the extent to which the electronic 
equipment breaches the Hughes barriers, as intrusiveness can often be measured by 
objectively determining the subjective expectations of the people intruded upon. Breaching a 
physical, behavioural or normative privacy barrier can, depending upon the circumstances, be 
sufficiently demeaning. In the Daily Times Democrat example, the dress operates as a 
physical and normative barrier, even after the dress is blown up. One could compare a dress 
hiding a person’s underwear with a fence around a house indicating a boundary. If the fence 
had just blown over, the fact that a physical barrier had been erected in the first place would 
still indicate a desire for privacy.  
 
Electronic surveillance from a public place is generally less intrusive. For example, in 
Aisenson v American Broadcasting Company any footage of the appellant in his driveway 
was held to be an extremely de minimis invasion of privacy because he was in full public 
view.365 However, in some contexts electronic surveillance from a public place can be highly 
intrusive. For instance, drone cameras operating from the public airspace will often film 
people inside their homes. Although these are usually recorded from a lawful vantage point, 
such actions are intrusive and deeply humiliating. In addition, there are many things that can 
be seen from a public place that should never be intruded upon. For example non-
consensually watching a couple in bed together is highly intrusive as there is a strong 
normative barrier in such a situation. 
 
In Deteresa v American Broadcasting Companies Deteresa was videotaped in public view 
speaking to a reporter at her door. The appellant claimed that she could only be seen because 
of the use of an enhanced lens but no liability was found. Employer employee cases in the 
USA have been divided on this issue. Jones found that the use of enhancing equipment to see 
things invisible to the naked eye is not sufficiently intrusive to create liability;366 however, 
DiGirolamo held the opposite to be true.367  
 
                                                            
364 Moreham, above n 228, at 634.   
365 Aisenson v American Broadcasting Company 220 Cal App 3d 146 (1990). 
366 ICU Investigations Inc v Jones 780 So 2d 685 (Ala 2000). 
367 Digirolamo v Anderson & Associates Inc 10 Mass L Rptr 137 (Mass Super 1999). This case quotes search 
and seizure case United States v Taborda 635 F 2d 131 (2d Cir 1980) at 139 affirmatively, that “enhanced 
viewing of the interior of a home [impairs] a legitimate expectation of privacy” whereas unenhanced viewing 
does not. Although finding the unenhanced viewing of a home’s interior not to be intrusive is problematic, the 
case aptly portrays enhanced viewing as worse.  
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This thesis contends that electronic surveillance from public places of anything associated 
with a person, and which can only be seen with the aid of technology, is intrusive because the 
person does not expect to be observed and it can cause his or her dignity to suffer. Digitally 
enhancing a person’s actions, appearance, or belongings should have an arguable reasonable 
expectation of privacy as subjectively and normatively those aspects surrounding a person 
should not be intruded upon by electronic surveillance. If electronic surveillance does occur, 
it will naturally be more intrusive if the equipment is used to record the moment in its entirety 
than if it is used purely to enable everything to be adequately viewed and heard.  
 
(b) Electronic recordings of conversations  
 
Electronic enhancement and recordings of conversations should be considered sufficiently 
intrusive to infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy in intrusion into seclusion in New 
Zealand. As Katz states, “interception of conversations that are reasonably intended to be 
private” could constitute a reasonable expectation of privacy.368 Shulman, in which a 
microphone was attached to the rescue nurse in order to capture and record her entire 
conversation with the accident victim, provides such an example.369  
 
Sanders and Shulman both point out that “[w]hile one who imparts private information risks 
the betrayal of his confidence by the other party, [there is] a substantial distinction … 
between the second[-]hand repetition of the contents of a conversation” and recording it for 
future use”.370 Notably, Sanders also states that, “a person may reasonably expect privacy 
against the electronic recording of a communication, even though he or she ha[s] no 
reasonable expectation as to confidentiality of the communication’s contents”.371 Regardless 
of the place the conversation occurs, and the nature of the information contained within that 
conversation, recording a conversation can be so intrusive in itself that it infringes a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  
 
In summary, hearing snippets of other people’s conversations is an unavoidable concomitant 
of being part of society, which even when summarised to another person is not intrusive. 
However, as soon as it is recorded, or made more audible by the use of electronic equipment, 
there is often sufficient intrusiveness to invoke a potential reasonable expectation of privacy.  
 
 
 
                                                            
368 Katz, above n 148, at 362. 
369 The reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversations in Katz and Shulman will be discussed further in 
VI C 2 (b) at 89 and (d) at 93-94 respectively.  
370 Ribas v Clark 38 Cal 3d 355 (Cal 1985) at 360: quoted by Sanders, above n 202, at 72 and Shulman, above n 
141, at 492. The sentiment and part of the quotation is also used by Medical Lab, above n 328, at 815. 
371 Sanders, above n 202, at 72 drawing on Shulman. 
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(i) Participant recordings 
 
Alpha Therapeutic Corporation v Nippon Hoso Kyokai, in which a person answered the door 
and was asked questions by a reporter who was secretly recording the conversation,372 raises 
an interesting question. Is it intrusive for a person to surreptitiously record a conversation in 
which he or she is a participant? This section considers whether unauthorised participant 
recordings should be an intrusion into seclusion in New Zealand.  
 
In Alpha Therapeutic there was no agreement for an interview beforehand and no subsequent 
consent to being recorded. Although McAuley did not know that he was being recorded, he 
knew he was being interviewed by a reporter and therefore that his words might be reported. 
The case considered the above quote from Sanders, that “a person may reasonably expect 
privacy against the electronic recording of a communication, even though he or she had no 
reasonable expectation as to confidentiality of the communication’s contents”,373 as 
determinative. Consequently, the recording of McAuley’s specific comments was considered 
sufficiently intrusive to infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
In comparison, in Deteresa v American Broadcasting Companies a reporter speaking to 
Deteresa at her door, and making an audiotape of this conversation,374 was held not to be an 
intrusion because “Deteresa spoke voluntarily and freely with an individual whom she knew 
was a reporter. He did not enter her home, let alone did he enter by deception or trespass”.375 
It was not considered sufficiently offensive, or as it should more aptly have been expressed, 
was not enough to infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
 
In addition, Holman v Central Arkansas Broadcasting Co, in which a TV reporter recorded 
Holman loudly complaining while he was in custody for drunk driving,376 claimed that “use 
of a device to record [speech] cannot create a claim for invasion of privacy when one would 
not otherwise exist”.377 Whilst unauthorised participant recordings such as those in Deteresa 
and Holman do not seem as intrusive as those involving entering somewhere by deception, 
they should still potentially be intrusive enough to infringe a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  
 
In Medical Laboratory Management Consultants v American Broadcasting Companies 
(Medical Lab) there was no liability for an unauthorised participant recording which occurred 
as a result of entry by deception by a reporter masquerading as a business person.378 
                                                            
372 Alpha Therapeutic Corporation v Nippon Hoso Kyokai 199 F 3d 1078 (9th Cir 1999) at 1083. 
373 Sanders, above n 202, at 72. 
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377 At 544. 
378 Medical Lab, above n 328, at 819. The facts of this case will be looked at more closely in VI C 2 (e) at 94-95.   
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However, this is because Arizona law does not have the same breadth of protection against 
electronic communications as California. Legislation in Arizona allows “any person present 
at a conversation [to] record [conversations] without obtaining the consent of the other parties 
to the conversation”.379 The legislation “reflects a policy decision by the State that the secret 
recording of a private conversation by a party to that conversation does not violate another 
party’s right to privacy”.380  
 
In Canada search and seizure case law the Supreme Court held in both R v Duarte381 and R v 
Wiggins,382 that “an undercover police officer could not legally record a conversation in 
which he was a participant, without either the consent of all parties or a court order”.383 
Jonathan Colombo claims that many courts in the US make a “distinction … between third 
party interception of a conversation and unauthorised participant recording of a 
conversation”, and that Duarte and Wiggins “render [that distinction] inapplicable”.384   
 
This thesis contends that unauthorised participant recordings will, in the vast majority of 
circumstances, be sufficiently intrusive to infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy.385 In 
general, to suddenly learn that one’s throwaway statements have been recorded by the other 
party in a conversation is an unreasonable indignity to suffer. As well as being degrading, the 
unconsented recordings of conversations would, from a wider perspective, lead to a person 
undertaking greater self-censorship and having less autonomy. In other words, if 
surreptitiously recording a conversation is not considered intrusive then people will worry 
about what they say due to the fear of it being recorded in perpetuity.  
 
(c) Computer Hacking 
 
Coalition for an Airline Passengers' Bill of Rights v Delta Air Lines Inc. had no difficulty in 
finding that hacking a person’s private computer and stealing personal correspondence is an 
intrusion into seclusion.386 This is essentially because computer hacking can be considered a 
similar form of electronic surveillance as taking a video of people inside their home. It is the 
use of electronic equipment to obtain personal information or see something intimate about a 
person, which he or she does not consent to be seen or known. It is therefore equally as 
intrusive as traditional methods such as video surveillance. Although users may empirically 
                                                            
379 Medical Lab, above n 328, at 816 interpreting statute Ariz Rev Stat § 13-3005. 
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381 R v Duarte 1990 1 SCR 30. 
382 R v Wiggins 1990 1 SCR 62. 
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be quite likely to suffer a form of cyber-attack at some point in their digital lives, there is 
absolutely a normative and subjective expectation that such behaviour will not be carried out. 
It is arguably no less intrusive than the act of rummaging through a person’s drawers 
containing private correspondence.  
 
In the same way that video surveillance can occur to a greater or lesser extent, computer 
hacking comes in many forms and in many degrees. In general, the higher percentage of a 
person’s files intruded upon, the more intrusive it is. At the highest end of the intrusiveness 
scale would be hacking into every single one of a person’s computer files and taking copies. 
If those files were looked at but copies were not made this would also be highly intrusive, but 
less so. This is because copying a file, like recording a conversation or video, enables it to be 
viewed again at any time. A person will be unable to remember every detail of a file he or she 
views, but taking a copy of it ensures that the details will be available to the intruder, or any 
person the intruder wishes to show it to, at any time he or she likes. At the lowest end would 
likely be such actions as simply disrupting the computer’s operation without viewing a 
person’s files. There are a variety of methods of computer hacking and all of them are 
susceptible to either particularly prolonged and intrusive use, or merely providing an 
annoyance. 
 
It is very unlikely that intrusiveness will occur in a virtual public place. When something is 
posted in public and receives wide exposure one cannot intrude upon it. The post is there to 
be seen and has been viewed by many people; therefore even taking a copy of that post is not 
intrusive as this is like taking a photograph of someone walking down a busy main street 
without incident. Additionally, when people hoping for wide exposure only receive a few 
views for their public internet posts, the desire for exposure will prevent it from being 
intrusive for others to access it. This is akin to it not being intrusive for someone to film a 
widely publicised public lecture in which only six people are in attendance.  
 
As pointed out in the discussion of place, the comparison of the rarely viewed public internet 
post with the uninhabited side street, whilst being useful as a conceptual tool, has its 
limitations. The reason it is harder to ascertain sufficient intrusiveness in a rarely viewed 
public internet post than in a person’s actions in an uninhabited side street, is because in order 
to do so, the internet post must be posted with the expectation that although it is accessible to 
anyone, only a small subset of people will read it (such as a post on a rarely visited public 
forum). There must also be an expectation that the author of the post or host of the site will 
remove the post within a short period of time of its posting, similar to the expectation one 
usually has in an uninhabited side street that the person will only be there for the time it takes 
to complete what he or she is doing, and that once the person leaves it is physically 
impossible for him or her to be intruded upon any longer. Such an expectation or reality will 
rarely exist as unlike physically secluded public areas, people tend to have the reasonable 
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expectation that things will be posted indefinitely on the internet, whether or not they are. 
Viewing the post can never be intrusive because that is akin to someone seeing the person in 
the uninhabited side street with the naked eye; it is only if a copy is made that intrusiveness 
will be invoked, just as the uninhabited side street requires photographs to be taken before 
sufficient intrusiveness can occur. 
 
Intrusiveness may occur in a semi-private virtual place. In the earlier example of the 
Facebook post shared to Facebook friends viewed by a non-Facebook friend, this may or may 
not have resulted from intrusiveness that infringes a reasonable expectation of privacy. If the 
Facebook friend showed it to a non-Facebook friend there would be no reasonable 
expectation as this is similar to someone passing on second-hand information. However, if it 
was obtained by hacking into the person’s Facebook profile, or another person’s Facebook 
profile who is Facebook friends with the person who wrote the post, then the intrusive 
electronic method of hacking has been introduced. In the latter example of hacking into the 
profile of a Facebook friend of the person, this has similarities with a person pretending to be 
a workmate (Sanders)387 or a business person (Medical Lab)388 in order to hear conversations 
that were not meant for his or her ears.  
 
The degree to which intrusiveness occurs should be based around a vast range of factors such 
as the extent to which a person intrudes, whether the material intruded upon is likely to be 
personal or not based on its location and the type of file it is, and whether the hacking 
completely disables a computer’s operation or if it can continue to be used. The intrusiveness 
of every situation should be closely assessed by considering how demeaning the intrusion is, 
and the extent to which it undermines a person’s dignity.  
 
(d) Direct intrusions on a person’s body or a person’s body samples 
 
Search and seizure case law has often found a high reasonable expectation of privacy for 
direct intrusions made on a person. At the most serious end of the spectrum is touching the 
individual without consent, for example a search to “find [and remove] hidden items in, on or 
about [the] person”.389 Within that category, one might postulate that the worst direct 
intrusions on people will involve stripping them naked and searching their body cavities. This 
is demeaning, highly invasive, attacks a person’s dignity and both reveals and interferes with 
the naked body that a person tends to keep hidden from the outside world. A frisk, which 
involves no stripping or inspection of body cavities, is still highly intrusive, although the 
indignity suffered is less. 
 
                                                            
387 As discussed in VI A11 at 66.  
388 As discussed in VI B 2 (b) (i) at 76-77. 
389 Butler and Butler, above n 298, at 943. 
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The non-consensual taking of samples such as “blood, sweat, urine, breath, hair, sputum 
[and] buccal swabs”390 directly from an individual, such as “the insertion of a needle to draw 
… blood”,391 is also considered to be particularly intrusive in New Zealand and US search 
and seizure. It provides a good example because of the importance of bodily integrity, the 
potential for personal information concerning a person’s health to be obtained through bodily 
products (such as by DNA testing), and because the process of directly collecting a sample 
from a person’s body can be degrading.  
 
An intrusion on a person’s seclusion, unlike a battery, does not necessarily require the 
touching of a person or his or her body samples. In a search and seizure context in State v 
Hardy, an officer’s request for Hardy to open his mouth so that his mouth could be observed 
in relation to possession of drugs was seen as a sufficient intrusion upon privacy interests.392 
In part this was based on the Californian Supreme Court in Schmerber v California stating 
that individuals have a legitimate privacy interest protecting “searches involving intrusions 
beyond the body's surface”.393 
 
It can also be intrusive, but less so than the direct taking of bodily samples, to take people’s 
discarded body samples. In Froelich v Adair, which introduced intrusion into seclusion as a 
cause of action in Kansas, a hospital orderly “obtained combings from Froelich’s hairbrush 
and a discarded adhesive bandage to which Froelich’s hair was attached”.394 The hair was 
passed on to Mrs Adair who had it analysed as part of her investigations as to whether her 
husband was having a homosexual affair. Although the case granted a “new trial on the 
failure of the trial court to make findings of fact”,395 and therefore did not adequately address 
whether the taking of hair samples is an intrusion into seclusion, there is a good argument to 
say that it is. People’s hair is something inherent to them such that hairs should only be 
removed from a person’s comb or discarded sticking plaster if it is consented to in a specific 
context, such as cleaning purposes. Tying in with the factor of place, taking a hair sample is 
particularly intrusive when the used hairbrush or sticking plaster is taken from an intrinsically 
private space such as a person’s home, hotel room or hospital bed, rather than from the 
abandoned roadside. 
 
Taking a person’s body sample from another person who legitimately has that sample has 
also been held to be intrusive. In one of the leading Canadian search and seizure cases, R v 
Dyment, it was held that taking possession of a person’s blood sample from his doctor 
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without the patient’s permission, and using it for non-medical purposes, was sufficiently 
intrusive to infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy.396  
 
Although direct intrusions by one citizen on another will often fall within the tort of trespass 
to the person,397 not all instances of physical intrusion will fall neatly within that action. The 
last three examples in this section would arguably be located most appropriately in an 
intrusion into seclusion claim. Courts might therefore be persuaded to incorporate some types 
of physical intrusions within the scope of the intrusion into seclusion action. 
 
(e) Intrusions on a person’s abandoned property 
 
This section considers whether an intrusion into seclusion claim in New Zealand can be 
successful based on the intrusiveness of interfering with abandoned property. In the search 
and seizure case of California v Greenwood, it was held that rubbish left just outside the 
curtilage of a house does not generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy.398 Whilst 
part of the reason for this is that the rubbish is not afforded the high reasonable expectation of 
privacy that it would be if it were stored in the enclosed backyard of a family home, it raises 
questions as to whether inspecting rubbish outside the curtilage can ever be intrusive enough 
to infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
In the case, rubbish collectors handed Greenwood’s rubbish over to police who found 
evidence of drugs. In court it was argued that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the rubbish bags because they were opaque not transparent, the rubbish collectors were the 
only people expected to pick them up, and the garbage was to be mingled with the refuse of 
others and discharged at the dump. In other words there was an expectation that no-one 
would be aware of the contents of the rubbish and therefore that it would be intrusive, 
regardless of what was contained within the rubbish, for the contents to be investigated.  
 
Whilst the arguments may have subjectively created a reasonable expectation of privacy it 
was concluded that objectively, garbage bags left on the side of the street are “readily 
accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other members of the public”.399 The 
Court therefore assumedly believed that if so many others could access the rubbish that it 
would not be intrusive for anyone to do so. This fails to appreciate that a person who puts out 
the rubbish does so on the basis that only the rubbish collector will access it, and only in a 
way that his or her job requires. It also neglects to consider that although the rubbish bags 
could be accessible to the likes of scavengers, this does not mean that a scavenger’s actions 
are not intrusive themselves. Certainly if a scavenger took a person’s full rubbish bag home 
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and systematically searched through it in great detail, the extent of the method in question 
would surely be significantly intrusive. The contents of a person’s rubbish may reveal 
personal information, or details on how a person lives his or her life. Whether or not such 
information is revealed, a thorough investigation of the contents of rubbish will leave a 
person feeling violated and lacking in dignity and autonomy.  
 
The essence of intrusiveness in this situation does not lie in an assessment of the location of 
the rubbish bags. Whilst keeping the rubbish bags just inside the curtilage of a person’s 
property would render it in a private place, animals could still spill the contents onto the 
street outside of the curtilage, and snoops could potentially lean over into the curtilage and 
rummage through the contents. It therefore makes little difference to reasonable expectation 
of privacy that Greenwood’s rubbish bags were kept in the public place of just outside the 
curtilage. There is little normative difference in interfering with rubbish that is inside or just 
outside the curtilage; it will be equally degrading in both scenarios.  
 
The question of intruding on discarded rubbish has also been analysed in the intrusion into 
seclusion case of Danai v Canal Square Associates.400 In this case rubbish was taken from 
Danai’s office “and placed with trash from other offices in a locked community trash room 
under the control of [Canal’s] property managers for disposal of off-site”.401 Canal’s property 
managers went through Danai’s rubbish in the trash room, taking a torn letter which they 
used during a trial “to impeach Ms Danai’s testimony as to her understanding of the renewal 
provision in her lease agreement”.402 The issue in the case was therefore whether the taking 
of the discarded torn letter from the trash room was sufficiently intrusive to infringe a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  
 
It was concluded by the court that whilst Danai obviously had a subjective expectation of 
privacy in her discarded rubbish that this was not reasonable. The trash room was not 
considered a place of seclusion for Danai or her trash as it was under the control of property 
managers, and she did not even have a key to the room. The problem with this thinking, as 
alluded to earlier in this section, is that just as in California v Greenwood it should be 
considered equally intrusive for rubbish to be searched inside or outside the curtilage, it 
should also be equally intrusive for Danai’s rubbish to be searched in her office or in the trash 
room. Therefore the Court’s argument that the trash room was “not akin to “the curtilage” of 
Ms Danai’s office space”403 is largely irrelevant.  
 
The Court also argues that “as in Greenwood, the property managers and the trash collector 
could have been expected to sort through Ms Danai’s trash and permit others to do the 
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same”.404 However, there is clearly a difference between sorting through rubbish which 
involves cursory inspection of its contents and reading through discarded pieces of paper for 
evidence. Abandonment and relinquishment of control should not remove all privacy from 
refuse, as surely the general expectation is that those who are permitted to remove it should 
not be entitled to disrespect people’s dignity by trawling through their waste in painstaking 
detail.  
 
This seems even clearer than in Greenwood where the accessibility of the bags to scavengers 
caused the Court to hold that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the rubbish 
bags. Here the trash room was locked to prevent access to scavengers; therefore there is 
arguably a stronger reasonable expectation of privacy in the rubbish. Even though property 
managers have keys to the locked trash room, and therefore easy access to the rubbish, it is 
only for the legitimate purpose of disposing of it. Nevertheless, cases in the USA would tend 
to disagree that it is intrusive to interfere with a person’s rubbish that has been “knowingly 
and voluntarily … placed in [the] trash”.405  
 
Although it is intuitively less intrusive to interfere with abandoned property than it is to, say, 
use electronic surveillance, this thesis contends that in some situations it can be intrusive 
enough to infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
(f) Harassment 
 
Harassment such as by hounding to pay a debt has often been considered sufficiently 
intrusive to be considered an intrusion into seclusion in the USA. According to the 
Restatement “there is no liability for knocking at the plaintiff's door, or calling him to the 
telephone on one occasion or even two or three, to demand payment of a debt”.406 However, 
when they “are repeated with such persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of 
hounding the Plaintiffs” this is a breach of a reasonable expectation of privacy.407 In Housh v 
Peth the actions were seen as a “campaign to harass and torment the debtor” by ringing six or 
eight times every day both at home and at work, calling the debtor’s superiors to inform them 
of the debt, and making calls as late as 11.45pm.408 Cases in which vast numbers of phone 
calls are made or in which a wide variety of means of communication are employed have in 
some circumstances been sufficiently intrusive to constitute an intrusion into seclusion.409 For 
example Dunlap v McCarty described Collection Consultants Inc. v. Bemel as being “a 
classic case of invasion of privacy. In ten months the plaintiff received about fifty collection 
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letters and seventy phone calls from the defendant, some to the plaintiff’s place of 
employment and many made at irregular hours”.410   
 
Whilst harassment would arguably fit under the Harassment Act in New Zealand, this thesis 
covered in chapter III why the Harassment Act offers insufficient protection against all such 
behaviour. It may be that harassment situations which are inadequately protected by the 
situation could fit under an intrusion into seclusion analysis instead. 
 
(g) Novel intrusions on a person  
 
An intrusion does not necessarily have to fit into a neat category to be intrusive. Interestingly, 
Melvin v Burling considered it an intrusion to order items under another person’s name 
leading to that person receiving demands for payment.411 Whilst this seems to be a relatively 
novel scenario for an intrusion into seclusion claim, it can be used to defend the point made 
in chapter II that any intrusion into a realm “that people should be free from the incursions of 
others” can be held liable.412 Ordering items under another person’s name was seen as 
demeaning under those circumstances, although it is the consequence of the subsequent 
demands that would be seen as the more traditional intrusion into seclusion. 
 
Perhaps then, the receiving of spam emails a person has asked not to receive or has opted out 
from, can be conceived as an intrusion into the private space of the email inbox, a realm in 
which people should be free from the intrusion of others. This, however, would seem unlikely 
to ever be so demeaning as to be sufficiently intrusive to infringe a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  
 
C Nature of Activity or Information 
 
Wilkins identifies the third factor as “the object or goal of the surveillance”.413 In analysing 
this factor Wilkins essentially contends that the more private the information gathered by the 
search and seizure, the higher the reasonable expectation of privacy. Intruding upon personal 
information undermines people’s ability to decide for themselves the extent to which their 
personal information is communicated to others, and violates the core of a person’s privacy. 
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As Katz states, “what a person knowingly exposes to the public”414 will generally not create 
liability.415 Wilkins therefore analyses the “object of the surveillance” as being about the 
extent to which the information obtained is personal.  
 
Whilst Wilkins’ conception of “object” largely ignores the nature of the activity that is being 
intruded upon, it is cursorily mentioned once in his analysis. He states that “the very nature of 
the object, undertaking or activity sought to be shielded from official scrutiny plays an 
important part” in reasonable expectations of privacy.416 Wilkins is therefore aware that the 
type of activity intruded upon is important, although he refers to it more in his analysis of 
“place” than he does in his analysis of “object”. He points out for example, that a person’s 
home and curtilage should be protected because they are associated with intimate 
activities.417  
 
It is suggested that Wilkins’ analysis is clearly more useful if this third factor is re-labelled as 
being about the nature of activity or information, as this better encapsulates the third factor. 
The best way of understanding the “nature of activity or information” factor is to provide 
examples in which the place and intrusiveness are the same but the nature of activity or 
information is different, thereby creating different reasonable expectations of privacy. In 
example 1, person A and person B are standing in an open field having a five minute 
conversation about the weather and the latest English Premier League football results. Person 
C makes a secret video recording of their conversation from a video camera hidden in a tree. 
In example 2 person A and person B are in the same part of the open field for five minutes, 
having sexual intercourse. Person C makes a secret video recording of the activity from a 
video camera hidden in a tree. If A or B makes an intrusion claim in both scenarios, he or she 
will have the same reasonable expectation of privacy in the place (a point in the open field) 
and in the intrusiveness (a five minute secret video recording), but a lower expectation of 
privacy in a conversation in which no personal details are discussed compared with that 
engendered by a highly intimate act.418 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, liability can sometimes be found when one of the three 
Wilkins factors is absent or has a very low reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, 
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Phillips v Smalley Maintenances Services Inc made clear that “acquisition of information 
from a plaintiff is not a requisite element” in an intrusion into seclusion action.419 The case 
pointed out that for instance, illustration 5 in the Restatement finds liability where a 
photographer repeatedly telephones a person’s home at various inconvenient times, insisting 
she allow him to photograph her, and ignores her entreaties for him to stop.420 Such an 
intrusion into seclusion acquires no more than nominal information from a plaintiff, yet the 
place and level of intrusiveness is sufficient to breach a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Similarly in the Tigges case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that there was an intrusion into 
seclusion when a husband installed a number of cameras in his wife’s bedroom even though 
the wife believed that no demeaning material was uncovered, only the “comings and goings” 
from her bedroom.421 Whilst it should have been held that there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the nature of the information in these “unremarkable activities”,422 the point is that 
it does not matter what information is found or what activity is intruded upon – the place and 
the intrusiveness can have a very high reasonable expectation of privacy that makes the 
nature of activity or information redundant. 
 
This illustrates that it is a combination of the reasonable expectation of privacy in all three 
factors that achieves an overall determination. Although the focus of this section is on when 
there will be a reasonable expectation of privacy in the nature of activity or information, 
given that it is the third and final factor it will also emphasise, where appropriate, how all 
three Wilkins factors work together. 
 
1 Why intimate activities should be protected  
  
The Alabama Supreme Court in Phillips declared that a person’s “emotional sanctum” or 
psychological seclusion “is certainly due the same expectations of privacy as one’s physical 
environment”.423 Whilst each of the factors of place, intrusiveness, and nature of activity or 
information is related to the effect on a person’s psychological seclusion, it is perhaps the 
nature of activity or information which goes most to the heart of that query. It may always be 
demeaning to be intruded upon in certain situations but what will usually clinch the extent to 
which people feel debased is considering precisely what has been seen or found out about 
them. 
 
In an intrusion context it is particularly appropriate to focus on the nature of the activity as 
there are often situations in which minimal information is provided by an intrusion, but in 
which intimate activities are observed. Protecting these intimate activities means allowing 
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people greater dignity and respect for their private actions. The more intimate the activity is, 
the higher the reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, watching two friends play a 
board game has a lower expectation of privacy than observing someone use the bathroom. 
This is because people’s bodily functions are more intimate than how they play a board game. 
Actions like those in C v Holland that are voyeuristic easily infringe a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. They will have a negative effect on a person’s emotional sanctum, and the more 
intimate activity or information that is seen, the worse it will be. In situations when it is 
borderline whether a reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed, the question of the extent 
to which intruding upon intimate activity or private information degrades the person, will 
always carry significant weight.  
 
2 Conversations 
 
As indicated earlier,424 a private conversation has a very strong expectation of privacy.425 
Indeed Wilkins considers “the highly personal content of a private, interpersonal 
conversation” as having the highest reasonable expectation of privacy in the nature of the 
information.426 As Wilkins says, “protecting the privacy of conversations” is more important 
“than maintaining the secrecy of physical objects located in suburban backyards”.427 That is, 
a person will consider the location of physical objects as far less private than what he or she 
says in conversation with friends and family. Personal conversations strike to the heart of 
reasonable expectations of privacy because they promote and preserve the state of intimacy, 
and the ability to keep conversations secret from others.  
 
Wilkins does not go on to compare and contrast different conversations as to the extent to 
which they are personal or impersonal. Nor does he consider when it is relevant to analyse 
the content of the conversations as to the degree to which they should enjoy privacy, 
compared with when a conversation might be considered personal regardless of what 
information is revealed. Wilkins is useful for explaining why conversations will generally 
have a high reasonable expectation of privacy, but it is useful to go further and deal with 
many of the nuances inherent in the nature of activity and information.  
 
(a) How place and intrusiveness interact with the nature of information in 
conversations  
 
Any private conversation has a high reasonable expectation of privacy because any private 
conversation is, in and of itself, a highly intimate activity that contains a significant amount 
of personal information. That is, there is a high reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
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nature of the activity of a private conversation per se. Therefore, the fact that a conversation 
is private, regardless of the contents of the conversation, will be enough to infringe an overall 
reasonable expectation of privacy when the reasonable expectation of privacy in place and 
intrusiveness are high. In fact, as will shortly be demonstrated, a conversation occurring in a 
private place can in itself make a conversation private. 
 
However, when the reasonable expectation of privacy in place and intrusiveness is borderline 
or low, for example if it occurs in a public place and no recording is made, an assessment of 
the actual content of a conversation as to how private or intimate the details are can be vital to 
determining an overall reasonable expectation of privacy. This is because even in a public 
place with a low level of intrusiveness, the reasonable expectation of privacy can arguably be 
sufficiently high if the conversation’s contents are of a particularly personal nature. How 
private or intimate the details are that are intruded upon will have a direct correlation with the 
emotional sanctum of the victim, as the more private the details are the more demeaning it is 
to have them encroached on.  
 
(b) Conversations in private places 
 
When considering a conversation, it is essential to decide whether it is a private one that is 
intended for others not to be privy to, or if the participants in the conversation are having an 
everyday communication in which they are relaxed about whether they can be overheard. 
 
In order to determine whether a conversation will be private, regardless of the content, will 
require analysing Wilkins’ first two factors: place and intrusiveness. This will consider, for 
example, the location of the conversation and the likelihood both that other people will hear 
the conversation, and that something private or intimate will be revealed. That is, a 
conversation that occurs in a private place such as the home will always be private. Similarly, 
an empirical evaluation that very few people are in the vicinity of the conversation can also 
render it private. There will be an evaluation of the extent to which a person attempts to 
preserve the privacy of the conversation, such as the employment of the Hughes physical or 
behavioural barriers. A physical or behavioural barrier can indicate that this is a location or 
situation in which personal conversations or intimate activities are taking place. In terms of 
intrusiveness, a person using technology to enable communications to be heard does not just 
increase the intrusiveness of the behaviour, but indicates that the participants do not intend to 
be listened to by others, thereby making the argument that the conversation is a private one 
more robust.  
 
The fact that the home is an intrinsically private place in which any conversation is a private 
one is demonstrated somewhat by the Canadian case of R v Sandhu,428 which found a 
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reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation inside a house, even though it was only 
being listened to by police officers with ears to the door and no electronic surveillance. 
Sandhu held that any conversation in the home carried on in an ordinary tone of voice has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.429 Therefore even the most anodyne of conversations in 
the home is protected. This is partly because any conversation in the most private of places 
will invariably reveal something sufficiently private or intimate as to have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. However, it is also because people need a space in which they can 
drop the mask and say anything they like. The sanctity of that free space is not greatly 
lessened if the weather is being discussed.  
 
Katz also substantiates the point that any conversation in a private place should be deemed to 
be private. In Katz, the FBI put microphones on top of phone booths frequented by the 
appellant, and recordings were made of the appellant’s end of various conversations.430 The 
appellant closing the door of the phone booth transformed it from a public place to a 
“temporarily private” one by virtue of enclosing himself inside it in order to use it.431 By 
shutting the door the appellant indicated by the simultaneous use of a physical and 
behavioural barrier that he was excluding others from hearing his calls, even though he could 
be observed through the glass. Harlan J states that the critical fact is that a person who 
occupies a telephone booth “shuts the door and … [is] entitled to assume that his [or her] 
conversation is not being intercepted”.432 If one is in any doubt as to whether a phone booth is 
sufficiently private to make any telephone conversation inside it a private one, the fact that 
the conversation can only be heard with the use of microphones is indicative of a private 
conversation taking place. The combination of there being a private conversation, and the 
highly intrusive behaviour of it being enhanced and recorded via the use of microphones, 
creates an infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy. As the reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the place of the phone booth is lower than in a private home, had the actions 
been less intrusive, the actual content of the conversation may have become relevant.  
 
Cases like Sandhu and Katz highlight that one of the purposes of the assessment of place is to 
protect the likely nature of the activity or information that will be revealed, regardless of the 
nature of activity or information that is actually revealed. Consequently, any conversation in 
a private place will likely be protected because it is very likely to reveal personal information. 
The “intrusion interest” focuses on the indignity of the situation, and the long-term effects on 
intimacy, autonomy and self-censorship. Thus, protecting intrusions on conversations in 
places where there is a high reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of whether any 
private information is revealed, can improve intimacy, autonomy and self-censorship in the 
long-term.  
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When the combined reasonable expectation of privacy in the place and intrusiveness is low or 
borderline, a conversation can be considered private by virtue of its highly intimate contents. 
For example, sometimes a conversation does not appear to be private or seems unlikely to 
reveal something private or intimate, because say, it is carried out in the earshot of others; but 
if it contains clearly confidential or personal content it can still be deemed a private 
conversation. In essence, the nature of the information that is revealed can sometimes 
determine whether or not it is a private conversation per se. The lower the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the place and intrusiveness, the higher the reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the nature of information must be, in order for an overall infringement of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy to be found. Sometimes the conversation can be a clearly 
public one, intended to be heard by a large number of people, and subjected to no intrusive 
behaviour, in which case the nature of the activity is no longer personal and intimate. This 
highlights that the Wilkins factors require an ad hoc balancing approach in order to make an 
overall determination of reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
(c) Determining if information is personal 
 
As stated in the previous section, when the likely nature of the activity or information is not 
enough to render the reasonable expectation of privacy in the place as sufficiently high, and 
the behaviour is not sufficiently intrusive, the actual nature of the activity or information 
becomes crucial. Indeed, two conversations recorded in exactly the same situation can have 
materially different overall levels of expectation of privacy depending entirely on the 
contents of the actual conversation. However, it is not always easy to determine whether a 
conversation’s details are private or not. It is not merely a normative enquiry, but also 
considers the extent to which the participants of the conversation consider its contents private 
or otherwise. 
 
Whilst empirical considerations such as the number of people in the vicinity who can hear a 
particular conversation are more relevant to public place, they can also influence the extent to 
which information is considered personal. This is because it is a person’s attitude towards 
being heard that indicates subjective expectations of privacy, which can have an effect on the 
objective determination. Different people consider different pieces of information to have 
different levels of privacy. The reason for this is that some people feel demeaned by others 
seeing them do a particular activity while others do not; some people want to boast about 
personal details while others consider them intensely private. Therefore a person’s subjective 
view on the nature of his or her information can only become objective if it is communicated. 
 
For example, if a person stands on a public rooftop and boasts loudly within earshot of 
anyone passing by about how big his or her salary is, not only is this a place lacking in 
reasonable expectation of privacy and is not intrusive because passers-by could not help but 
   91
hear it, the nature of the information is not private either. The reason for this is that the 
subjective expectations of individuals regarding what they wish others to know about their 
life, can translate to objective expectations if those subjective expectations are 
communicated. That is, by literally shouting it from the rooftops, the person’s income 
becomes not just subjectively lacking in privacy, but objectively too. This is because he or 
she has imparted to the outside world that the nature of the communicated information is not 
considered to be private. 
 
There is a higher reasonable expectation of privacy in the nature of the information, 
compared with the person shouting from the rooftops, when two people are having a 
conversation in which they are careless about being overheard. A person who is careless 
about being overheard can create an objective inference that he or she does not consider the 
nature of the information in the subject matter to be intensely private, especially in 
comparison to the person whose conversation is at the level of a whisper. However, this 
conversation can still indicate some desire for privacy.  
 
A person’s subjective expectations of privacy in the nature of the information is not just 
communicated by a person telling his or her information to everyone, or being careless about 
who can hear it, it can be communicated by a person’s previous actions or attitudes towards 
the information. This can be explained easily in the non-conversational context of an 
exhibitionist. People who regularly strip naked in front of strangers will not consider the 
nature of information in their naked form as private, whereas the default position regarding 
general people on the street is that their naked form is private by its very nature. Another 
example would be that if a person writes a blog detailing all of his or her sexual exploits, this 
is an objective demonstration that the person subjectively does not consider the nature of this 
information to be private. Consequently, if he or she is overheard discussing this information 
with another person there will be a much lower reasonable expectation of privacy in it than 
there would be for the generic reasonable person.  
 
The above examples focus on people’s information that might normally be considered private 
having a lower reasonable expectation of privacy because they have communicated that they 
are quite happy for other people to know this information. It can also happen that something 
which is not ordinarily private can have a high reasonable expectation of privacy in the nature 
of the information, if a subjective expectation for it to be so has been communicated. As 
pointed out in chapter II, if a person feels acutely sensitive about the privacy of something 
that general society would consider innocuous, then this will only be protected if it is 
communicated, such as by one of the Hughes barriers. 
 
In some situations the normative societal view can be so strong that it overrides the objective 
determination of a person’s subjective expectation. In other words, a person communicating a 
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subjective expectation of privacy is not always enough to create a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the nature of the information. This is because what a person communicates about 
his or her subjective expectation does not automatically translate into a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; rather it is a factor that is taken into account. In the above example of 
people being careless about who hear their conversations, and who know that being 
overheard is likely, the contents of the conversation must be more personal to create a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, if a high probability of being overheard 
exists, and the participants appear comfortable being overheard, an obvious societal 
expectation of confidentiality in the particular conversation can still make the nature of the 
information private. Additionally, sometimes a person can communicate that he or she 
considers certain facts to be private and therefore not to be intruded upon, but be effectively 
overruled by normative considerations. It would be objectively nonsensical for example to 
enforce a person carrying a sign saying “please do not walk within 10 metres of me” on a 
busy street. 
 
One case that demonstrates this is Roberts v Houston Independent School Dist, in which a 
teacher was filmed taking a class as part of her teacher assessment and despite her 
objections.433 This was held not to violate a reasonable expectation of privacy as she “was 
videotaped in a public classroom” and “at no point, did the school district attempt to record 
[her] private affairs”.434 Despite the teacher communicating by her objection to the filming 
that she considered herself to have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the nature of the 
activity of teaching was not enough to create one, nor was the nature of the information that 
came out of her mouth.435  
 
When a person does not communicate subjective expectations in any way, an assessment of 
the reasonable expectation of privacy in the nature of activity or information will be based on 
a purely normative societal standard relying on an objective determination of the views of the 
reasonable person. 
 
(d) Shulman  
 
In Shulman a mother and her son were injured in a serious car accident on a California 
highway. The “car went off the highway, overturning and trapping them inside”436 and Ruth 
Shulman was “left …  a paraplegic”.437 The lack of people in the public area who could 
possibly hear the conversation between the nurse and the patient (Ruth Shulman) is largely an 
                                                            
433 Roberts v Houston Independent School Dist 788 SW 2d 107 (Tex App 1990). 
434 At 111. 
435 In New Zealand this would likely have been dealt with by employment law based on the terms of her 
teaching contract. However, the case is still instructive as to the type of situation in which communicated 
subjective expectations do not create a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
436 Shulman, above n 141 at 474. 
437 At 476. 
   93
indication of the extent to which the place is public, rather than an indication of the nature of 
the information that could be obtained from the conversation. In terms of nature of 
information, what is crucial is that the conversation takes place between a medical 
professional and a patient as a person’s health and injuries are clearly personal. It is also a 
situation that is generally imbued with an expectation of confidentiality.  
 
The nature of some of the phrases expressed is also relevant. When Shulman stated: “I just 
want to die. I don’t want to go through this” she was expressing a very personal sentiment of 
worry about her circumstances, which is demeaning to have heard.438 When she revealed that 
she was 47 and considered herself old,439 there is potentially a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in this as age can be highly personal. In addition her repetitive comments about the 
well-being of the rest of her family and questions about whether she was dreaming,440 which 
reveal the disoriented and distressed state she was in, arguably created a high reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the nature of the information. Intruding on these comments would 
clearly be disrespectful and lack dignity. 
 
The conversation between Shulman and her nurse was a private one. Although it could be 
argued that Shulman appeared relaxed about who could overhear her public conversation 
with the nurse, as she did not communicate her subjective expectations of privacy through a 
behavioural barrier or any other means, this would be flawed for a number of reasons. One is 
that a microphone was required in order to hear the entire conversation, which suggests that 
Shulman was talking so quietly her intention was only for the nurse to hear what she was 
saying. Another reason is that,441 Shulman was in no state to be assessing her environment 
and engaging in such self-censorship. The conversation was imperative in order to increase 
the chances of Shulman’s recovery. A person cannot be expected to self-censor him or herself 
because of the possibility of there being others in the area when the content that would be 
self-censored is the very content that must be spoken about in order to save that person’s life. 
Such an expectation would be preposterous. 
 
Such an argument also misses the point that it does not matter whether other people were 
present at the accident scene, whether Shulman was aware of them, and if so what her attitude 
might have been towards their listening to her conversation. This is because the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the nature of information itself, including the nature of the 
confidentiality between a nurse and her patient, indicate that this was a private conversation 
per se.  
 
 
                                                            
438 At 476. 
439 At 476. 
440 At 476. 
441 As alluded to in VI A 2 at 54. 
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(e) Workplace conversations 
 
As suggested in the intrusiveness factor,442 in some situations the reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the place and in the intrusiveness can be so high as to make analysis of the 
contents of the conversation unnecessary. Sanders and Medical Lab are two cases in which 
similar situations are treated differently. In Sanders there was no analysis of the contents of 
the conversation other than commenting, almost as an aside, that “Sanders discussed his 
personal aspirations and beliefs and gave Lescht a psychic reading”.443 This is presumably 
because such an analysis was unnecessary given that the conversation occurred in a 
workplace to which the public lacked access,444 and given that it was videotaped by a 
representative of the mass media disguised as an employee of the company. In other words, 
regardless of what was said between the two workers, the reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the place was sufficiently high, and the actions suitably intrusive, that the conversation was 
deemed to be private irrespective of the nature of the information in its contents. 
 
Medical Lab revolved around a workplace conversation in which the content of the 
conversation was deemed to be determinative. Despite the similarities with Sanders, the place 
and level of intrusiveness was not considered sufficient to infer a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the conversation. In this case, ABC producers masquerading as business persons 
were invited into “a conference room in Medical Lab’s administrative offices”.445 It was a 
room that Devaraj, the founder and owner of Medical Lab, testified was generally only used 
for “private conversations and meetings of a confidential nature”.446 The conversation in the 
conference room was recorded, but no personal information was revealed, nor did Devaraj 
state that any of the conversation was confidential.447 Consequently, there was considered not 
to be a reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation.448 
 
In the author’s view there should have been a reasonable expectation of privacy regardless of 
whether there was anything private in terms of the nature of activity or information. Medical 
Lab is a workplace in which nobody had access to the conference room unless they had been 
invited. Although it was thought significant that Devaraj had denied the ABC producers 
access to his own office but invited the strangers into the administrative offices and on a tour 
of the premises, thereby waiving any reasonable expectation of privacy, this logic fails to 
stand up to scrutiny. The conference room was a semi-private place (unlike the adjoining 
laboratory which is open to the public) to which no-one else beyond prospective customers 
                                                            
442 VI B 2 (b) at 75. 
443 Sanders, above n 202, at 70. 
444 As mentioned in A 11 at 66. 
445 Medical Lab, above n 328, at 810. 
446 At 810. 
447 At 811. 
448 At 819.  
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and other authorised persons were ever permitted access, and the ABC producers were only 
admitted on false pretences because of who they aberrantly represented themselves to be.449 
 
The nature of information in the conversation did not imbue it with a reasonable expectation 
of privacy because it was a “business conversation amongst strangers in business offices”.450 
That is, “the topics of conversation were restricted to discussions of the industry as a whole 
and to the general practices at Medical Lab”.451 Essentially, ABC obtained information about 
Medical Lab’s business operations which the court considered to lack privacy because 
“privacy is personal to individuals and does not encompass any corporate interest”. This is 
predicated upon § 652I of the Restatement which states that “[a] corporation, partnership or 
unincorporated association has no personal right of privacy”.  
 
Although as William Dalsen points out, describing Medical Lab as involving a business 
conversation is “pure fiction because it was an obvious pretext to enter the lab”,452 it is indeed 
true that the nature of information that Medical Lab imparted in the conversation had no 
intrinsic private value and therefore a low reasonable expectation of privacy.453 The case 
nevertheless raises an important question about the dividing line between business and 
personal information, which can arguably intersect, at least at the margins. For example, were 
one to pierce the corporate veil and therefore treat the company’s affairs as an individual’s 
affairs, one could consider the practices of a company to reflect such things as the ethical 
compass of the owner, his or her financial and business circumstances and capabilities, and 
his or her general approach to life. These may still register low on the reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the nature of information factor but they are at least likely to exist on the scale. 
 
3 Public places 
 
A reasonable expectation of privacy in a public place will usually only be able to be found if 
there is an intrusion upon highly intimate activity or personal information (in conjunction 
with a high level of intrusiveness). However, the higher the reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the public place, such as a situation in which very few people are present, the lower the 
reasonable expectation of privacy that is required in the nature of the activity or information 
(or the less intrusive an intrusion needs to be). 
 
                                                            
449 As mentioned in the intrusiveness factor, the fact that it was recorded would likely be sufficient to find a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in New Zealand, particularly as the blatant deception involved to obtain such 
a conversation is deeply intrusive. However, this was prevented by the narrowness of Arizona’s law. 
450 Medical Lab, above n 328, at 819. 
451 Medical Laboratory Management Consultants v American Broadcasting Companies Inc 30 F Supp 2d 1182 
(D Ariz 1998) at 1189. 
452 Dalsen, above n 182, at 1082. 
453 Discussing the company’s affairs lends itself instead to the argument that there is a breach of confidence. See 
chapter 5 in John Burrows and Ursula Cheer (eds) Media Law in New Zealand (7th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2015).  
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Returning to the example of Daily Times Democrat, the reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the nature of activity/information was high because the photograph that was taken was one of 
the woman’s underwear revealed in a gust of wind. A person’s undergarments and general 
private area is particularly intimate. Knowing that others have seen this when it is supposed 
to be hidden is likely to have a deleterious effect on a person’s emotional sanctum. The 
exposed area is something that only very specific people have access to view, such as a lover 
or a doctor, and to have a stranger take a photograph of that is not just upsetting from an 
intrusiveness perspective but also in the nature of the information that was caught on camera.  
 
Liability was able to be found in the case because the nature of the information had a high 
reasonable expectation of privacy and taking a photograph in the circumstances was highly 
intrusive. If a photograph was taken of a person walking without incident in public it is 
unlikely there would be a reasonable expectation of privacy. Even though taking a 
photograph can have a high reasonable expectation of privacy in terms of the intrusiveness 
factor, there is no private information to be gleaned or intimate activity to be seen. Similarly, 
a person who only sees the woman’s underwear with the naked eye would not infringe a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.454  
 
In public places, it is ultimately the combination of the intimate information of what is seen 
and the fact that it is captured on camera that can enable an intrusion into seclusion to 
succeed. As Moreham convincingly argues, “taking a … photograph in a public place should 
be legally actionable if the person photographed is involuntarily having an intimate or 
traumatic experience”.455 
 
(a) Stalking and nature of activity/information  
  
In extreme situations information gathered in public places can be an invasion of privacy, 
particularly where stalking is involved. For example, in Kramer v Downey when a married 
man ended his extra-marital affair his lover was so enraged that she followed him to and from 
work, to school events he was at with his children, and to restaurants.456 There was a high 
expectation of privacy in the nature of the information because the accumulation of all the 
information that could be acquired from following the man was beyond what a reasonable 
person would expect someone to acquire from his or her public exploits. Essentially it is 
reasonable that a person not be followed so much in public that a general profile of that 
person be able to be put together. It is a combination of the nature of the accumulated 
information and the effect of the intrusiveness of the stalking/harassment on a person’s 
emotional sanctum which creates liability for intrusion into seclusion in this instance. 
                                                            
454 This was also discussed in VI 2 (a) (ii) at 73-74. 
455 Moreham, above n 228, at 634. 
456 Kramer v Downey 680 SW 2d 524 (Tex App 1984) at 525. 
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Although the precise situation in Kramer might be covered by the New Zealand Harassment 
Act, as previously discussed the remedies may be insufficient. In any event, this example is a 
useful way of conceptualising the idea that the more extensive the information obtained, the 
more likely there is to be an infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
 
4 Nature of information on a computer 
 
This thesis has earlier discussed that there is a high reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
place of a person’s private files on a personal computer or when a person’s information is 
stored in a virtual private place. It has also canvassed how digital hacking can be highly 
intrusive. However, what also needs to be considered is the nature of information found on a 
person’s computer files or his or her internet communications. Naturally, this is particularly 
important in a borderline situation when an assessment of place and intrusiveness does not 
create an obvious breach of a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
 
Determining the reasonable expectation of privacy in the nature of information means 
assessing the extent to which the information obtained from digital hacking is private or not. 
This means analysing the information with respect to what it reveals about a person’s 
intimate and personal details, and how demeaned and humiliated a person would feel were 
others to become aware of this information. For example, if a person only obtains information 
about the person which is already public, there is perhaps going to be a lower expectation of 
privacy in that information compared with a person’s internet banking records. Some 
information is more difficult to determine a reasonable expectation of privacy for however. 
For example, the reasonable expectation of privacy in the nature of information in a person’s 
private music taste might seem on first inspection to be low; however, music taste can 
disclose a lot about a person’s personality. Determining a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in such an example should therefore rely on an assessment of the specific facts.  
 
One also has to consider the amount of information acquired. For example, Google logs all of 
a person’s searches.457 If a person puts together all of a person’s searches, a number of 
intimate things about a person can be discovered, such as sexual orientation, health concerns, 
or if he or she suffers from depression. Therefore whilst having data that a person regularly 
logs on to Leeds United’s official website is unlikely to have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy because the football team a person supports is generally expressed very publically, 
the knowledge that a person regularly seeks out guidance from mental health websites is very 
intimate and would cause a large amount of distress to a person if he or she knew this had 
been exposed. Similarly the knowledge that a person once googled “how do I know if I have 
                                                            
457 Caitlin Dewey “How to see everything you’ve googled” (22 April 2015) New Zealand Herald 
<www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
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depression?” has a lower reasonable expectation of privacy compared with the knowledge 
that a person spends half an hour a day on a depression message board. 
 
As has been indicated previously, if one intrusion into seclusion claim is more intrusive than 
another by virtue of the degree to which the method in question is employed, it will also tend 
to have a higher reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. This is because the 
greater extent that a method is employed, the greater the amount of information that will 
usually be acquired. That is, constant video surveillance of a driveway for a month will be 
both more intrusive than a half an hour video and far more easily infringe a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the nature of the information. The greater extent of the intrusion 
allows information to be obtained for about one month of comings and goings in a driveway 
compared with an isolated half an hour, revealing far more private information.  
 
In relation to GPS monitoring,458 Alito J pointed out that “prolonged surveillance reveals 
types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does 
repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information can 
each reveal more about a person than any individual trip viewed in isolation”.459 Short-term 
surveillance might obtain information about what a person is doing on that day, but long-term 
surveillance can determine information which has a higher reasonable expectation of privacy, 
such as how regularly a person visits a particular person, goes to a particular shop, or drinks 
at a particular bar.  
 
However, the extent of intrusiveness does not always translate to obtaining a greater amount 
of personal information. Whilst intrusiveness might ask what percentage of a person’s 
documents or photos were obtained, a nature of activity or information enquiry asks what 
knowledge was acquired. It could be, for example, that one file out of the 250 files on the 
computer is infinitely more personal than the other 249, and so whether that one particular 
file is intruded into can have a large bearing on the nature of information, but little effect on 
intrusiveness. 
 
5 Information and the use to which it can be put  
 
The lowest reasonable expectation of privacy in the nature of information is where the data 
obtained “contain[s] little information that is truly “private”.460 There is little personal 
information for example in noting down the registration number of a passing car. Car 
registration plates are visible to the public and provide generic information. As stated in State 
of Rhode Island v Bjerke, “there can be no expectation of privacy in one’s licen[c]e plate 
                                                            
458 Discussed in chapter V B 1 at 70 but relevant to all intrusions in which one method is used extensively. 
459 United States v Maynard 615 F 3d 544 (DC Cir 2010) at 562. 
460 Wilkins, above n 8, at 1122.  
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when it hangs from the front and the rear of one’s vehicle for all the world to see”.461 
Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston compared the licence plate number with the area outside 
the curtilage of a house: both are “constantly open to the plain view of passers[-]by”.462 
Therefore the information contained in a licence plate is constantly exposed to the public and 
thus is not private. This is similar to the low expectations of privacy in elements such as 
height, weight, appearance, and physical aspects of voice and handwriting that are fairly 
obvious from generic daily life.463  
 
Although a car number plate is not necessarily private information, if it is used to follow 
someone’s everyday movements then this would naturally invoke privacy concerns. This 
merely addresses the difference between to what extent information about a person such as a 
number plate is expected knowledge in society, and to what extent using that information 
creates knowledge that infringes a reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, in essence, 
knowing a person’s registration number is completely different to using it to track his or her 
daily movements. 
 
The obvious point to make from this distinction is that seeing what a person’s number plate is 
as he or she drives past is a very different situation to using that number plate to acquire more 
detailed information. It is not comparing two similarly intrusive situations that impart two 
different sets of information; it is comparing two situations that not only garner different 
information but in which one involves far more intrusive actions than the other. In the first 
situation, obtaining people’s number plates from seeing them drive by involves a non-
intrusive naked eye observation in a public place. The reasonable expectation of privacy is 
low in all three factors. In the second situation, whatever method is used to map every car 
ride that a person takes, it involves something very intrusive: whether it’s constantly 
following the car or using technology such as Automatic Licence Plate Recognition Systems 
(ALPRs) the actions amount to systematic surveillance that is highly intrusive. In the second 
situation it is no longer a consideration of the nature of information in a licence plate, rather it 
is the nature of information obtained in constantly following a car or using ALPRs.  
 
The car licence plate example illustrates a relevant point. Any publically available 
information such as a person’s address on the electoral roll may not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; yet that information can be used to intrude upon a person, in the case 
of the examples just given, at home. Again, as soon as the intrusion occurs on a person’s 
home the question is no longer about the reasonable expectation of privacy in terms of the 
nature of information in a person’s address, but an analysis of the intrusion into seclusion in 
terms of intruding upon a person’s home.  
                                                            
461 State of Rhode Island v Bjerke 697 A 2d 1069 (RI 1997) at 1073.  
462 Olabisiomotosho v City of Houston 185 F 3d 521 (Tex 1999) at 529. 
463 Wilkins, above n 8, at 1122. 
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However, the reasonable expectation of privacy in the nature of someone’s personal 
information might also take into account the potential this information provides to intrude on 
a person. Since the number plate or address is specific to the individual it has the potential to 
reveal other important information about him or her. Additionally, the way information is 
used after an intrusion, if it is not an intrusion in itself, will often be indicative only of the 
intruder’s original motive, which is separate from a reasonable expectation of privacy 
analysis. 
 
What this analysis shows, then, is that care must be made to separate information that does or 
does not have an expectation of privacy, and breaches of privacy that use that information. 
The latter does not make the former have privacy protection per se.  
 
D Is It a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Assessed from the Shoes of the Plaintiff? 
 
One important question to clarify is whether a reasonable expectation of privacy should be 
one assessed in the shoes of the plaintiff, based on the plaintiff’s subjective desires, personal 
characteristics and circumstances; or is purely objective.  
 
This thesis contends that the general perspective considered is closest to that of a reasonable 
person in the shoes of the plaintiff. However, because people can often have a different 
subjective expectation of privacy compared to the views of the reasonable person, the 
reasonable person will usually only be able to take on these views if they have been 
communicated, such as by a Hughes barrier. It would be inappropriate to stymie an intruder 
based on subjective views that he or she cannot expect to be aware of. Even where they have 
been communicated and seem reasonable for that person to have, a reasonable expectation of 
privacy must also consider whether it is normatively appropriate to impose liability. 
 
A reasonable expectation of privacy approach aimed at the reasonable person in the shoes of 
the plaintiff is also consistent with the approach taken to the Hosking tort, although that is 
sometimes centred on the question of high offensiveness. For example, the Court of Appeal 
in TVNZ v Rogers stated that the highly offensive test “must be tested from the perspective of 
that person but subject to an objective overlay”, ensuring that “the fragile sensibility of the 
claimant cannot prevail”.464 Brown v Attorney-General also noted that the test is “of a 
reasonable person in the shoes of the person that the publication is about”.465  
A reasonable expectation of privacy cannot solely be based on what society considers is or is 
not a reasonable expectation of privacy. This would be inconsistent with the approach 
developed throughout the thesis of an intrusion interest grounded in the actual experience of 
privacy, in which privacy is protected based on a combination of a person’s subjective 
                                                            
464 Television New Zealand v Rogers, above n 160 at [67]. 
465 Brown v Attorney-General DC Wellington, CIV-2003-08-236, 20 March 2006 at [81].  
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desires, the extent to which they are communicated, and whether they are objectively 
reasonable.  
 
Two scenarios will be considered in regards to the best approach for reasonable expectation 
of privacy to take. 
 
1 Mistaken belief  
 
The first scenario is when a person subjectively believes he or she has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy due to an erroneous belief as to the actual situation. 
  
In White v White the husband wrongly believed that his emails were password protected and 
that his wife therefore intruded upon his seclusion by reading emails between him and his 
girlfriend.466 The computer was located in the sun room where the husband slept; however, 
everyone had access to both the sun room and the computer.467 This was determinative in the 
holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy. However, if his emails had been 
password protected, the outcome may have been different. If the situation had been assessed 
as to whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the shoes of the plaintiff an 
intrusion into seclusion would potentially have been found, as a person in his shoes would 
reasonably consider an intrusion into his password protected emails as infringing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
 
Similarly in the “late-night romp” in Christchurch, which involved two employees in an 
office being watched through the window having sexual intercourse by the people in the pub 
across the road, it is “understood that the pair thought the tinted windows in the office would 
stop anyone from looking in”.468 However, they were easily viewable from the pub across the 
road. If White v White was applied to the situation it would seem that there could be no 
reasonable expectation of privacy. However, if the objective person was in the shoes of the 
couple, he or she would surely consider there was a reasonable expectation of privacy due to 
the mistaken belief that they could not be seen.  
 
The problem with saying that in the case of a mistaken belief as to the reality of the situation 
there must be an assessment of reasonable expectation of privacy in the shoes of the plaintiff 
is that it makes an intruder, who did not know the person laboured under a mistaken belief, 
liable. This seems unnecessarily harsh on an intruder who has a correct belief based on the 
reality of the situation, that his or her actions were not unacceptable. In situations of mistaken 
belief there should be an objective determination of the facts of any given situation. The 
                                                            
466 White v White 344 NJ Super 211 (2001).   
467 At 215. 
468 “Bar patrons snap employees having late-night romp in Christchurch office” (2 Feb 2015) Television New 
Zealand <www.tvnz.co.nz>. 
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reasonable expectation of privacy could then include an assessment of what the claimant’s 
attitude towards those facts would be were he or she to know said facts.   
 
2 Genuine belief as to whether the activity or information is private 
 
As indicated at various points in the body of the thesis, when a person considers what society 
might deem a normally private fact or activity not to be private, or vice versa, the reasonable 
expectation of privacy will take into account what the person genuinely thinks rather than 
what a purely objective analysis would create, providing the subjective belief has been 
communicated. A subjective belief can be communicated in a number of ways, such as the 
imposition of a physical or behavioural barrier; or an indication from a person’s blog or 
general attitude. The reasonable expectation of privacy will tend to be assessed 
predominantly from the plaintiff’s perspective. This will enable factors like the person’s 
religion or occupation to be taken into account when considering what the reasonable person 
would think in any given situation. In this way, Moreham’s “out” gay rights campaigner in 
chapter II does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her sexuality. 
 
E Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis should be undertaken based on a 
combination of the objective facts of a situation and what the victim has indicated his or her 
subjective attitude to those facts is or is likely to be. A reasonable expectation of privacy 
analysis should analyse each of the Wilkins factors separately, assessing to what degree each 
one indicates a reasonable expectation of privacy. By combining these analyses together a 
final evaluation can be made as to whether the intruder has infringed a reasonable expectation 
of privacy or not. 
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VII Should High Offensiveness be an Element in an Intrusion into 
Seclusion Action  
 
In the explanation of how the elements of intrusion into seclusion work in New Zealand, this 
thesis has detailed how high offensiveness works as an extra threshold to satisfy before 
liability is enforced. High offensiveness is a requirement in intrusion into seclusion torts in 
New Zealand, the USA and Ontario (Canada) and is also consistent with the Hosking tort and 
its US equivalent. The BSA privacy principles covering private facts and intrusion also 
include a highly offensive prerequisite for liability. The point is that high offensiveness is a 
common requirement in privacy torts and principles, and emerges from a perspective that 
views privacy as important but only when breaches are extreme. 
 
The Courts are arguably influenced by a historical wariness about privacy impinging on other 
more established rights such as freedom of expression, which includes “the freedom to seek, 
receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form”.469 They may also be 
influenced by the relative newness of both torts in the Anglo-Commonwealth, and cognisant 
of the controversy of their existence. Additionally, although intrusion into seclusion has been 
around for about half a century in the USA it has not evolved to a point in which high 
offensiveness is not required. Hence New Zealand and Canadian courts are reluctant to create 
the tort without the insurance of this extra threshold, assumedly reasoning that if a 
jurisdiction that has recognised the privacy value in tort law for so long is not seeking to 
remove a barrier of high offensiveness, then it must be included for a reason. 
 
The important question to be asked is whether a threshold of high offensiveness is really 
necessary. Whata J acknowledges that some academic writers would like to have no highly 
offensive test, thereby causing any established breach of reasonable expectation of privacy to 
be held liable (providing the first two elements are also met and the public interest defence is 
not applicable); but he still chooses to include the element.470 One reason for this is that he 
considers the reasonable expectation of privacy test as “not sufficiently prescriptive”.471 
However, by suggesting a strong framework for the test, and explaining in detail how this can 
be applied, this thesis can go some way to assuaging that fear.  
 
Tipping J, however, in the context of the Hosking tort, commented that he would “prefer that 
the question of offensiveness be controlled within the need for there to be a reasonable 
expectation of privacy”.472 In Rogers, Elias CJ indicated some dissatisfaction “that the tort of 
privacy requires not only a reasonable expectation of privacy, but also that publicity would be 
                                                            
469 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
470 C v Holland, above n 1, at [97]. 
471 At [97]. Whata J is also worried about the “unduly sensitive litigant” and the very significant “capacity for 
conflict between the right to seclusion and other rights and freedoms”. 
472 Hosking, above n 5, at [256]. 
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highly offensive”.473 Moreham has argued that the high offensiveness stage should be 
removed because “it obfuscates the dignitary nature of [the] privacy interest”, “is inconsistent 
with other dignitary torts”, “is unnecessary”, and “is value-laden and unpredictable”.474 
  
It may be that as breaches of privacy become more pernicious, and privacy’s value as a right 
or important concern becomes more entrenched, that stringent requirements like “highly 
offensive” are relaxed. This thesis argues that the requirement of an infringement of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy substantially covers the factors deemed to apply to high 
offensiveness, and that if their application to reasonable expectation of privacy via the 
Wilkins factors is sufficiently rigorous, it will render the requirement of high offensiveness 
unnecessary. The only high offensiveness factor that may not quite fit with reasonable 
expectation of privacy is motive. As discussed below, this is best dealt with in damages or 
defences. 
 
The “highly offensive” factors, other than “the intruder’s motives and objectives”, covered by 
a reasonable expectation of privacy are, according to Miller: “the degree of intrusion”; “the 
context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion”; “the setting [in which the 
intrusion occurs]”; and “the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded”.475 In terms of 
the Wilkins factors the degree of intrusion comes under intrusiveness; the context, conduct 
and circumstances of the intrusion comes under both the nature of activity and intrusiveness; 
the setting comes under place; and the expectation of those whose privacy is invaded comes 
under all three via analysis by the Hughes physical and behavioural barriers. There is little 
point analysing this list of ideas twice, once in a reasonable expectation of privacy context 
and secondly in a high offensiveness context, when it can simply be analysed in one rigorous 
step. Reasonable expectation of privacy should not be a straightforward element to satisfy 
such that preventing liability for insignificant intrusions can only be achieved through a 
highly offensive standard. 
 
There are numerous examples from the US in which reasonable expectation of privacy (often 
expressed as private matters) is either not adequately addressed or is considered met far too 
easily, resulting in an evaluation of high offensiveness that would be more appropriate to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy context. For example the Restatement states that high 
offensiveness will be found for payment demands only if they are “repeated with such 
persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff”.476 However, 
                                                            
473 Rogers v Television New Zealand Ltd [2007] NZSC 91, [2008] 2 NZLR 277 at [25]. 
474 N A Moreham “Why is Privacy Important? Privacy, Dignity and Development of the New Zealand Breach of 
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475 Miller v National Broadcasting Company, above n 161, at 1483-1484. 
476 At § 652B comment d. 
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reasonable expectation of privacy if applied properly should only be found if demands are 
insistent and often, such that they besiege a complainant.  
 
In Harkey v Abate, considering whether see through panels of a restroom infringe a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court only offered the truism that a person has a right 
to privacy in a restroom before stating that “the installation of the hidden viewing devices 
alone” is highly offensive.477 Instead the installation of the hidden devices should be 
considered with respect to reasonable expectation of privacy by assessing the Wilkins factors 
and making a holistic determination. In another example, commentator Libardoni noted that 
determining high offensiveness requires considering “the type of seclusion that plaintiffs 
have established” and “if the invasion occur[s] in view of the public”.478 These 
considerations, along with those already mentioned, should be evaluated at the reasonable 
expectation of privacy stage.  
 
Additionally, the high offensiveness element can be used to create perverse outcomes. In 
Plaxico v Michael the defendant took partially naked photos of his ex-wife’s new female 
lover through their bedroom window in a quest to obtain a more favourable child custody 
ruling.479 Although the Court stated that “Plaxico was in a state of solitude or seclusion in the 
privacy of her bedroom where she had an expectation of privacy”, it also stated that “a 
reasonable person would not feel Michael’s interference with Plaxico’s seclusion was a 
substantial one that would rise to the level of gross offensiveness”.480 “In fact, most 
reasonable people would feel Michael’s actions were justified in order to protect the welfare 
of his minor child”.481 High offensiveness should not protect clear breaches of the tort on 
spurious grounds of reasonability. 
 
As suggested, the most appropriate Miller factor for a question of high offensiveness is that 
of motive. Reasonable expectation of privacy is very much centred on the expectations of the 
person who has been intruded upon and the objective expectations of a reasonable person 
who is in his or her approximate shoes. It has sparing interest for the motives of the intruder 
unless it helps better elucidate one of the Wilkins factors, or somehow alters the expectations 
of privacy of the person intruded upon.  
 
More appropriately, high offensiveness could use motive as a means of better reflecting the 
culpability of the person who did the intruding. In other words, after determining that the 
person is subjectively and objectively intruded upon, it could then say that a person should 
only be liable if the motive was sufficiently bad. However, this is not the criminal law in 
                                                            
477 Harkey v Abate, above n 355, at 182.  
478 Libardoni, above n 27, at 1463. 
479 Plaxico v Michael 735 So 2d 1036 (Miss 1999).  
480 At 1039. 
481 At 1040. 
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which culpability would have the stigma of a conviction, it is tort law which is designed to 
compensate the victim.  
 
The motive of the intruder should instead apply in two ways. The first is as a public interest 
defence if information is being sought for a sufficiently good reason. Such a motive will 
satisfy the public interest defence and prevent liability. The second is when it comes to an 
assessment of damages, as it would for instance, be unfair to force the intruder to pay 
excessively for an intentional act with no malice behind it.  
 
The idea that high offensiveness is a largely redundant element is backed up by the following 
quote in Faesenkloet: “to an extent the consideration of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
links with whether the intrusion was highly offensive. The greater the expectation, the more 
likely an intrusion will be offensive”.482 In other words, where the overall reasonable 
expectation of privacy is high, its infringement should easily create liability, but where it is 
low, infringement is unlikely to make the intruder liable. This thesis also takes such an 
approach, and thereby renders the “highly offensive” element unnecessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
482 Faesenkloet, above n 152, at [50]. 
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VIII Conclusion 
 
Intrusion into seclusion, introduced in New Zealand in 2012, is an important tort that is 
significant in New Zealand’s legal landscape because of the potential effect it could have in 
responding to the proliferation of new technologies that constantly allow easier access to 
people’s highly sensitive information. The likes of instant photography and videos are 
commonplace techniques that enable the capture of anything that a person happens to be 
doing at any given time. People are also continually finding new ways to digitally hack into 
extremely intimate files on personal computers, phones or other digital devices.  
 
The tort of intrusion into seclusion protects the “intrusion interest”. This thesis argues that the 
Hughes barriers theory is an excellent analytical tool for determining when the intrusion 
interest is invoked.483 The theory is a concept grounded in the actual experience of privacy 
which provides a clear and realistic link between the theory of privacy and the legal 
requirements of an intrusion into seclusion action. It essentially reduces the scope of privacy 
from anything a person desires to protect, to one that is communicated or demonstrated by a 
physical, behavioural or normative barrier. A physical barrier is a tangible object that is 
placed in between the intruder and the subject matter, such as a fence or chest of drawers. A 
behavioural barrier is verbal or non-verbal communication that indicates a desire for privacy, 
such as whispering rather than speaking in a normal tone of voice. A normative barrier is a 
societal expectation that the subject of the intrusion should not be intruded upon, such as 
something pertaining to family, personal finances, or sexuality. 
 
The Hughes barriers improve access-based definitions of the intrusion interest. Under these 
access-based theories the intrusion is defined as the unwanted physical access of someone’s 
person (or things closely associated with the person) by means of the senses, technological 
devices that enable the use of the senses, or physical proximity. More generally it can include 
any incursion into the private realm of another person. The intrusion must be undesirable 
because it impinges on something that the person is acutely sensitive about. The Hughes 
barriers add an essential extra dimension by providing that such a desire for privacy should 
be communicated or plausible by virtue of a physical, behavioural or normative barrier.  
 
This thesis subsequently argues that the elements of an intrusion into seclusion action should 
be refined so that it principally focuses on when there is an infringement of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.484 Consistent with the approach of many US states, the first three 
elements could be integrated into a single inquiry as to whether there is “an intrusion into 
intimate private activity, space or affairs that infringes a reasonable expectation of privacy”. 
Providing that reasonable expectation of privacy is rigorously analysed, the highly offensive 
                                                            
483 See above in II C 1 (b) at 9-10. 
484 See above in IV C at 39-40. 
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element should be eliminated. This is because the highly offensive factors suggested by 
Miller − the degree of intrusion, the circumstances surrounding the intrusion, the setting, and 
the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded – are already covered by the reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis. The other factor Miller suggests regarding the motives of the 
intruder should be dealt with as part of the public interest defence or damages.  
 
This thesis contends that reasonable expectation of privacy, considered the crux of the tort, 
should be analysed in terms of the Wilkins framework.485 Wilkins, in the US search and 
seizure context, postulates that there are three factors to take into account when assessing a 
reasonable expectation of privacy: place, intrusiveness and object. This thesis argues that a 
modified version of the three factors is highly useful and applicable to intrusion into 
seclusion in New Zealand. The modification made is to relabel the third factor as “nature of 
information or activity” which both better encapsulates Wilkin’s argument, and tailors the 
approach more specifically to intrusion into seclusion. 
 
It is argued, firstly, that “place” requires evaluating the extent to which the location of the 
intrusion is public or private, such as a home being a more quintessentially private place than 
a car, or an uninhabited side street having a higher expectation of privacy than a busy main 
road. “Intrusiveness” considers how intrusive the circumstances are in terms of the method 
used by the intruder and the degree to which the method in question is employed, for example 
electronic surveillance being more intrusive than watching someone with the naked eye, and 
using it 24 hours a day for a week being more intrusive than making a one hour recording. 
Finally, the “nature of the activity or information” considers the degree to which activities 
and information are personal or intimate, for instance a person having a shower is 
undertaking a more intimate activity than if he or she is playing a board game, and a 
conversation is more private if it is discussing a person’s love life rather than the football 
results.  
 
Assessing each factor in the Wilkins framework is aided by the invaluable Hughes barriers 
which help to navigate the conceptual thinking behind the factors. This thesis has therefore 
analysed each factor from first principles and, using the reasonable expectations of privacy in 
various contexts such as both intrusion into seclusion and search and seizure case law in New 
Zealand, the USA and Canada, and in some appropriate BSA decisions, considered how they 
should be applied in future intrusion into seclusion decisions in New Zealand.  
 
Once all three factors have been analysed a holistic determination should be made as to 
whether or not a reasonable expectation of privacy has been infringed. Sometimes all that is 
needed is one or two of the three factors to be sufficiently high to satisfy the element. Often, 
however, situations are more borderline as to whether there is an infringement of a reasonable 
                                                            
485 This is the focus of chapter VI. 
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expectation of privacy. It is only by bringing the three factors together and making 
comparisons with previous decisions that a reasonable judgement can be made. A reasonable 
expectation of privacy should never be satisfied too easily, and it should take proper account 
of contemporary social mores such that future applications of previous decisions are suitably 
flexible. 
 
Given the newness of the tort of intrusion into seclusion in New Zealand, and the fact it has 
never been considered at the Court of Appeal level, it is likely that this cause of action will 
grow and develop. It is hoped that such ideas as the Hughes barriers and the Wilkins factors 
will enable such growth to occur.  
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